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JJrt^e Economic ©asaps
THE CAUSE AND EXTENT OF THE RECENT INDUS-
TRIAL PROGRESS OF GERMANY. By Earl D. Howard.
THE CAUSES OF THE PANIC OF 1893. By William J.
Lauck.
By Harlow Stafford Person,
By Al-
INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION.
Ph.D.
FEDERAL REGULATION OF RAILWAY RATES.
bert N. Merritt, Ph.D.
SHIP SUBSIDIES. An Economic Study of the Policy of Sub-
sidizing Merchant Marines. By Walter T. Dunmore.
SOCIALISM : A CRITICAL ANALYSIS. By O. D. Skelton.
INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENTS ANDTHEIR COMPENSATION.
By Gilbert L. Campbell, B. S.
THE STANDARD OF LIVING AMONG THE INDUSTRIAL
PEOPLE OF AMER.CA. By Frank H. Streightoff.
THE NAVIGABLE RHINE. By Edwin J. Clapp.
HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF CRIMINAL STATIS-
TICS IN THE UNITED STATES. By Louis Newton
Robinson.
SOCIAL VALUE. By B. If. Anderson, Jr.
FREIGHT CLASSIFICATION. By J. F. Strombeck.
WATERWAYS VERSUS RAILWAYS. By Harold Glenn
Mouhon.
THE VALUE OF ORGANIZED SPECULATION. By Harri-
son H. Brace.
INDUSTRIAL EDUCATION: ITS PROBLEMS, METHODS
AND DANGERS. By Albert H. Leake.
THE UNITED STATES INTERNAL TAX HISTORY FROM
1861 TO 1871. By Harry Edwin Smith-
WELFARE AS AN ECONOMIC QUANTITY. By G. P. Wat-
kins.
CONCILIATION AND ARBITRATION IN THE COAL IN-
DUSTRY IN THE UNITED STATES. By Arthur E. Suf-
feru.
THE CANADIAN IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY. By W. J.
A. Donald.
THE TIN PLATE INDUSTRY. By D. E. Dunbar.
THE MEANS AND METHODS OF AGRICULTURAL EDU-
CATION. By Albert H. Leake.
THE TAXATION OF LAND VALUE. By Yetta Scheftel.
RAILROAD VALUATION. By Homer Bews Vanderblue.
RAILWAY RATES AND THE CANADIAN RAILWAY COM-
MISSION. By D. A. MacGibbon.
THE CHICAGO PRODUCE MARKET.
Nourse.
THE ARBITRAL DETERMINATION OF RAILWAY WAGES.
By J. Noble Stockett.
THE RESULTS OF MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC LIGHTING
IN MASSACHUSETTS. By Edmond Earle Lincoln.
FAIR VALUE. The Meaning and Application of the Term
"Fair Valuation" as used by Utility Commissions. By
Harleigh H. Hartman.
A HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAIL-
ROAD. By Harold Douglas Dozier.
By Edwin Griswold
%oxt, #c6affn«: & (Utatx (Jh*?* <&&scw
XXIX
A fflSTORY OF
THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
A HISTORY OF
THE ATLANTIC
COAST LINE RAILROAD
BY
HOWARD DOUGLAS DOZIER, PH. D.
PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS. DARTMOUTH COLLEGE
BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON MIFFLIN COMPANY
ffl)t fitoer#&e p«# Cambubge
1920
COPYRIGHT, I920, BY HART, SCHAFFNBR & MARX
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
TO
K. B. D.
PREFACE
This series of books owes its existence to the generosity of
Messrs. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, of Chicago, who have
shown a special interest in trying to draw the attention of
American youth to the study of economic and commercial
subjects. For this purpose they have delegated to the under-
signed committee the task of selecting or approving of
topics, making announcements, and awarding prizes an-
nually for those who wish to compete.
For the year ending June 1, 1918, there were offered:
In Class A, which included any American without re-
striction, a first prize of $1000, and a second prize of $500.
In Class B, which included any who were at the time
undergraduates of an American college, a first prize of $300,
and a second prize of $200.
Any essay submitted in Class B, if deemed of sufficient
merit, could receive a prize in Class A.
The present volume, submitted in Class A, was awarded
second prize in that class.
J. Laurence Latjghlin, Chairman
University of Chicago
J. B. Clark
Columbia University
Henry C. Adams
University of Michigan
Edwin F. Gay
N. Y. Evening Post
Theodore E. Burton
New York City
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
This volume owes its existence to a suggestion of Dr. Arthur
S. Dewing, formerly of the Economics faculty of Yale Uni-
versity, now of the Harvard, that the consolidation of a
number of short railroads along the South Atlantic Seaboard
into the Atlantic Coast Line System illustrates well the
growth of the holding company period of American rail-
roads and its decline. To determine to what extent this is
true the work was originally undertaken. It soon became
evident that the location of the early constituent roads
was determined by the geographical influence of the fall
line, and that they, when once built, had a peculiarly
marked influence on the economic conditions of the section
of country through which they ran.
As the work progressed it seemed worth while to broaden
somewhat its scope and to make a study of the history of
the road with the economic history and economic condi-
tions of the section as a background. The results of this
study were submitted to and accepted by the Yale faculty
as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.
With changes and additions they now appear in permanent
form and may be summarized as follows :
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is the result of the
consolidation of more than a hundred railroads stretching
along the Atlantic Coast from Richmond, Virginia, to Fort
Myers, Florida. The period of consolidation came later
than in the case of most other railroad systems, due to the
retarding influences of the Civil War, followed by those of
the panic of 1873. From an historical point of view chief
interest centers in the roads connecting the towns between
Richmond and Wilmington — the Richmond and Peters-
burg, the Petersburg, and the Wilmington and Weldon
x AUTHOR'S PREFACE
Railroads. Of these, the Richmond and Petersburg, twenty-
two miles long, was the parent company. A short and pros-
perous line, it acquired the Petersburg, a longer and less
prosperous neighbor, and became the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad of Virginia. This in turn acquired a system of
roads of greater mileage than itself, the Atlantic Coast Line
of South Carolina, also the Wilmington and Weldon Rail-
road, and was rechartered as the Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road Company. Farther south the Savannah, Florida, and
Western developed from a large number of unsuccessful
roads into a successful system and was purchased outright
by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. The last
important acquisition was that of the majority of the stock
of the Louisville and Nashville. Control of this system,
secured by accident rather than design, has proved profit-
able. Neither the original parent company nor any of its
successors has ever undergone a reorganization.
Though constructed originally for local purposes, these
lines developed into a continuous system and became the
main thoroughfare of north-and-south travel, thus entering
into competition with steamship lines. Only when acting
as a unit could the roads meet successfully this competition.
They collected produce at the fall line towns and carried
it overland, partially supplanting water transportation.
When physical connections were made, gaps closed, and
the gauges standardized, through trains were possible.
These enabled farmers along the route to grow the perish-
able truck crops and fruit in addition to the staple, cotton.
By marketing cotton and naval stores, and by developing
the trucking industry, the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
has rendered its greatest service to its patrons.
The author is indebted to Dr. Arthur S. Dewing and to
Professor L. D. II . Weld, formerly head of the School of
Business Administration of Yale University, now head of
the Department of Commercial Research of Swift and
Company, for helpful suggestions in the early stages of the
AUTHOR'S PREFACE xi
study; to Professor Arthur W. Shelton, formerly head of
the School of Commerce of the University of Georgia, now
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, for reading the
entire manuscript and offering valuable criticisms; to many
officials of the railroad company for aid in securing in-
formation otherwise unobtainable, especially to Mr. Lyman
Delano, vice-president, for access to all records and docu-
ments in the general offices of the company at Wilmington,
North Carolina; to Mr. H. L. Borden, vice-president and
secretary, for first-hand information, and to Mr. Samuel B.
Woods, formerly assistant to general counsel, for a copy of
a statement with regard to the road filed with the Inter-
state Commerce Commission; to Professor C. W. Doten,
of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, for reading
the manuscript and suggesting improvements and for a
careful reading of the proof; most of all, to my wife, who
helped in collecting much of the material, assisted in its
presentation, did all of the typing, read the proof, and
willingly underwent the sacrifices of the years of graduate
study while the work was being done.
H. D. D.
Dartmouth College
Hanover, New Hampshire
January 1, 1920
CONTENTS
I. Early Trade and Transportation Con-
ditions of the Atlantic Seaboard States 1
II. Economic Background of the North and
South Railroads of Virginia 10
III. The Petersburg and the Richmond and
Petersburg Railroads before 1860 22
IV. North Carolina and the Wilmington and •
Weldon Railroad before 1860 48
V. The South Carolina-Georgia Territory
and its Railroads before the Civil War 67
VI. Summary of Railroad Conditions along the
Atlantic Seaboard to 1860 83
VII. Growth from the Civil War to 1902 102
VIII. Integrations and Consolidations 138
IX. Summary and Conclusion 160
Appendix 165
Bibliographical Note 183
Index 191
MAPS AND TABLE
Map showing North and South Railroads of
Virginia and North Carolina in 1860 23
Map showing Railroads (A.C.L.) of South
Carolina and Georgia in 1860 67
Table of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
System 164
A HISTORY OF THE ATLANTIC
COAST LINE RAILROAD
CHAPTER I
EARLY TRADE AND TRANSPORTATION
CONDITIONS OF THE ATLANTIC SEABOARD STATES
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is one of the five prin-
cipal railway systems of the South. * It owns and operates
a system of roads in the states of Virginia, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and xAlabama, amounting
to 4661 miles of fine.2 In addition to this, it owns the ma-
jority of stock of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad
Company,3 which owns and operates 7507 miles of line.4
These two roads lease the Georgia Railroad. Through this
lease the Atlantic Coast Line and the Louisville and Nash-
ville control fifty per cent of the stock of the Western
Railway of Alabama and forty-seven per cent of the stock
of the Atlanta and West Point Railroad Company.
Through direct ownership of additional shares they exer-
cise control over fifty per cent of the stock of the latter
road.
The territory served by the Atlantic Coast Line may
be conveniently divided into three main sections; that of
Virginia, that of North Carolina, and that of South Caro-
lina, Georgia, and Florida. In Virginia the lines run north
and south connecting the fall line towns. The parent road,
the Richmond and Petersburg, was chartered in 1836, and
1 The other four roads are: the Southern; the Illinois Central; the
Seaboard Air Line; the Louisville and Nashville.
2 Report of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company for year
ending June 30, 1915, p. 5.
3 Poor's Manual, 1903, p. 203.
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xcix, p. 1135.
2 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
was operated till 1867 as a small local line running between
Richmond and Petersburg, twenty- two miles. l The Peters-
burg Railroad Company was incorporated in Virginia in
1830 2 and in North Carolina in 1831.3 In 1898 the Rich-
mond and Petersburg purchased the Petersburg Rail-
road and became by change of name the Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad Company of Virginia.4
In North Carolina the only road of importance was the
Wilmington and Weldon. This was an outgrowth of the
Halifax and Weldon, chartered in 1834 5 and consolidated
in 1837 with the Wilmington and Raleigh, which also
had been incorporated in 1834,6 and in 1855 became by
change of name the Wilmington and Weldon.7 This line
also runs north and south and connects the Roanoke and
Cape Fear sections of the state. In 1900 the Wilmington
and Weldon, with other roads, was consolidated with and
into the Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia to form the Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad Company.8
In the South Carolina-Georgia-Florida territory two
systems developed; the Atlantic Coast Line of South
Carolina, and the Savannah, Florida and Western, popu-
larly known as the "Plant System." The general direction
of these roads is east and west. The Atlantic Coast Line
of South Carolina was incorporated March 5, 1897,9 as the
result of a consolidation of five roads: the Wilmington,
Columbia, and Augusta, chartered in 1846 as the Wilming-
ton and Manchester;10 the Northeastern Railroad of South
Carolina, chartered in 1851 j11 the Cheraw and Darlington,
1 Acts of Virginia, 1835-36, ch. 121.
8 Ibid., 1829-30, ch. 62, p. 59.
8 Acts of North Carolina, 1830, ch. 56.
* Acts of Virginia, 1897-98, ch. 635, p. 674.
6 Acts of North Carolina, 1833-34, ch. 75. 6 Ibid., 1833-34, ch. 78.
7 Special Act of North Carolina, February 14, 1855.
8 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxx, p. 791.
9 Acts of South Carolina, 1897, No. 394.
10 Ibid., 1846, No. 2988; Acts of North Carolina, 1846-47, ch. 82.
» Acts of South Carolina, 1851, No. 4069.
WAR OF 1812 AND TRANSPORTATION 3
chartered in 1849; 1 the Manchester and Augusta, chartered
in 1870; 2 and the Florence Railroad, chartered in 1882. 3
On April 21, 1900, the Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia
absorbed the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina, the
Wilmington and Weldon, the Southeastern of North Caro-
lina, and the Norfolk and Carolina, and changed its name
to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.4 Two
years later, April, 1902, this company acquired by pur-
chase the Savannah, Florida, and Western,5 which was a
consolidation of a number of small roads, the most im-
portant of which were: the Atlantic and Gulf, chartered
in 1856; 6 the Charleston and Savannah, chartered in
1853; 7 the Brunswick and Western, chartered in 1835 as
the Brunswick and Florida;8 and the Alabama Midland,
chartered in 1887 as the Alabama Terminal and Improve-
ment Company.
In order to understand the growth of the Atlantic Coast
Line System, it is necessary to consider the trade and
transportation conditions which existed along the South
Atlantic seaboard prior to and during the construction and
operation of the independent roads which finally went into
it. Roughly speaking, this period extends from the War of
1812 to the close of the Civil War. A background for the
history of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is found in the
trade and transportation conditions which grew out of the
War of 1812, and in the physiography of the South Atlan-
tic seaboard.
The War of 1812 interrupted coastwise trade, since ves-
sels of the enemy lurked in the waters of the Atlantic
1 Acts of South Carolina, 1849, No. 3079.
2 Ibid., 1870, No. 254. 3 Ibid., 1881-82, No. 560.
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxx, p. 791.
5 The Investors' Supplement to Commercial and Financial Chronicle,
October 25, 1902, p. 11.
6 Acts of Georgia, 1855-56, p. 159.
7 Acts of South Carolina, 1852-53, No. 4142; Acts of Georgia, 1853-
54, p. 406.
8 Acts of Georgia, 1835, p. 187.
4 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
ready to capture any commerce they might find.1 This
forced those who desired to travel between the coast
towns or to carry on trade to resort to the Conestoga
wagon. Such a four-horse wagon which could make in
three days the ninety miles between New York and Phila-
delphia over the almost impassable roads was considered
a "flying machine." Under such conditions trade was small
and travelers few. Great excitement prevailed in Philadel-
phia even as late as July 4, 1825, because of the pres-
ence of three hundred New Yorkers, enough to fill thirty-
five coaches, at the Independence celebration in the city.
The connecting of the towns and cities along the eastern
coastal plain was discussed very early. Gallatin, in his
report to the Senate on April 12, 1808, 2 recommended
that a highway be constructed from Maine to Georgia,
stating that south of the Potomac there were few artifi-
cial roads on account of the scattered population. He fur-
ther urged in the same report that the inland bays and
sounds along the Atlantic between Massachusetts and
Georgia be connected by a system of canals in order to
form one continuous inland waterway.
The physiographical factor of the South Atlantic sea-
board which influenced the location of the route of the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is the "fall line." 3 Begin-
ning at Trenton, New Jersey, this line runs southward
through Philadelphia, Baltimore, Richmond, Fredericks-
burg, and Petersburg. The fall line and the tide line down
to this point coincide. Leaving Petersburg the fall line ex-
tends southwestward and runs parallel to the mountains,
passing through Raleigh, Columbia, Augusta, Macon, Co-
lumbus, and Montgomery, leaving a space of navigable
water on the rivers between the falls and the ocean. In
1 Kettell, in Eighty Years of Progress, p. 184.
2 Report of Secretary of Treasury on Public Roads and Canals,
made in pursuance of a resolution of the Senate of March 2, 1807.
3 For a description of the "fall line " see Bulletin of American Geo-
graphical Society, vol. xl, p. 136.
INVENTION OF THE COTTON GIN 5
passing over this line all the important rivers flowing into
the Atlantic have either rapids or falls obstructing naviga-
tion. As the country became more thickly settled, trading
towns sprang up at these points. Their access to each other
was down one river and up the next or overland by wagon
roads. The Atlantic Coast Line System is a consolidation
of the short railroads built to give these fall line towns
connection. These roads, especially those in the northern
part of the territory, ran parallel to the coast and perpen-
dicular to the ridges between the rivers.
In addition there was an ever-increasing struggle to get
connection with the West by means of the navigable rivers,
sluices around the rapids at the fall line, and either canals
or railroads through the mountains to the tributaries of
the Ohio and other western rivers. George Washington had
been interested in this, and before he was twenty-one had
crossed the mountains and studied the possibility of con-
necting by means of a canal the Chesapeake Bay and the
Ohio River.1 In 1784 he presided over a commission at
Annapolis on behalf of Maryland and Virginia to consider
the improvement of the navigation of the Potomac. The
first real connection with the West was by means of the
Cumberland Road, begun in 1812. 2 This started at Cumber-
land, Maryland; passed through Uniontown, Pennsylvania;
Wheeling, then Virginia; Zanesville and Columbus, Ohio;
reaching the latter about the beginning of the railroad era.3
The greatest of the early undertakings was the Erie Canal,
begun in 1817 and completed in 1825, joining Lake Erie
and the Hudson River.4 Then followed a titanic struggle
for the trade of the Mississippi Valley.
The connection with the WTest, the invention of the
1 Kettell, in Eighty Years of Progress, p. 173.
2 Hulbert, "The Cumberland Road," in Historic Highways of
America, vol. x, p. 54.
3 Ibid., pp. 77-78.
4 A. B. Hepburn, Artificial Waterways and Commercial Development,
pp. 28-31.
6 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
cotton gin, and the invention of the steamboat had far-
reaching effects upon the trade and transportation of the
southern Atlantic coastal plain. The invention of the cotton
gin in 1792 removed the greatest impediment in the way
of cotton culture which soon spread westward from the
Georgia and South Carolina coast, where it had been
concentrated, to the western part of Georgia, to Alabama,
and to Mississippi. Great plantations sprang up. Settlers
swarmed in, drawing off the population of the older coast
states of North and South Carolina. Georgia, Alabama,
and Mississippi together in 1816 contained 75,000 people;
four years later they contained 200,000.* As early as 1802
some cotton had been raised near New Orleans, Natchez,
and Nashville. The exports from New Orleans in that
year amounted to 29,000 bales. The introduction of cotton
culture into the Southwest led to a division of labor be-
tween the planters of the South and the farmers of the
West. This gave rise to an important trade upon the west-
ern rivers which was of the same character as that carried
on in earlier times between the northern colonies and the
southern coast and the West Indies.
The invention of the steamboat was largely responsible
for the extension of this trade. In 1811 the first steamboat
trip was made down the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers from
Pittsburgh to New Orleans.2 The following figures will
give an idea of what this invention meant to the western
country and to New Orleans as a market. The distance
from New Orleans to St. Louis is 1300 miles. The time
required to make the trip upstream in the old flatboat was
120 days. In 1815 the steamer Enterprise made it in 25
days. In 1823 the time had been reduced to 12, in 1826 to
9j, in 1860 to 3.3 Yet the steamer, instead of supplanting
1 Callender, "Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the
States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations," Quarterly Journal
of Economics (November, 1902), vol. xvn, p. 16.
2 Latrobe, First Steamboat Voyage in Western Waters.
3 Kettell, in Eighty Years of Progress, p. 183.
DECLINE IN EXPORTS 7
the flatboat, really encouraged its use because of the ease
with which rivermen could now get back upstream. The
old flat, which had either been broken up and sold as lum-
ber on reaching New Orleans or else loaded and poled up-
stream, could now be loaded and towed back.
In 1815 there were 14 steamboats on western waters;
by 1842 there were 1200. x This fleet gave New Orleans for
a time a monopoly of practically all the products of
the Mississippi Valley. In the end New York captured the
greater part of the trade, but New Orleans, thanks to the
growth of cotton culture in the Southwest, was in 1830
second only to New York in its export trade, which was
double that of Boston and treble that of Philadelphia.2
The amount had remained about stationary for half a
century, but the character was greatly changed. In 1800
60 per cent of the exports of the city was western produce;
in 1845, only 18 per cent. This decrease in western prod-
uce was offset by the tremendous growth of the export
trade in cotton: 1,900,000 pounds were exported in 1795,
as compared with 639,000,000 pounds in 1838. 3 A violent
fall in the price during this period, however, kept the
money value about the same.
The opening of the Erie Canal did not increase materially
the sum total of the exports of the country, but merely
deflected them from their former course. New York profited
by the deflection; the cities of the South Atlantic seaboard
lost. The following figures show the decline in exports of
South Carolina and Georgia, and indicate that Virginia
was about at a standstill: 4
1819 1830
South Carolina $8,251,000 $7,627,000
Georgia $6,310,000 $5,337,000
Virginia $4,392,000 $4,792,000
1 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. ir, p. 460.
2 Emory R. Johnson, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of
the United States, vol. 11, p. 39.
3 Hunt's Merchant Magazine, vol. I, p. 89. 4 See note 2, supra.
8 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Charleston and Savannah were the greatest sufferers
among the coast towns. They found the exports which had
formerly been theirs leaving the country through New
Orleans. These cities had secured some advantage from the
spread of cotton culture as long as it was confined to the
river valleys on the eastern side of the pine barrens and on
the immediate western slopes. When great plantations
sprang up farther west, however, New Orleans and Mobile
reaped the benefits. There was no adequate communication
with the western country. From Savannah to the nearest
branch of the Tennessee River is three hundred miles,
and the distance from the head of navigation of the Savan-
nah River to the Tennessee River had not been spanned. 1
As a matter of fact, the first important communication
between the coast and the Southwest came on the comple-
tion of the Western and Atlantic Railroad, when in 1851
trains ran from Chattanooga, Tennessee, through Atlanta
to the coast.2
The eastern seacoast towns were also doomed to disap-
pointment in the results of the application of steam to
transatlantic vessels. The first steamship built in the
United States was the Savannah, owned by Savannah
capitalists who had it built in the North. It reached Savan-
nah from New York in April, 1819, and left for Liverpool
in May.3 The people along the coast believed this to be the
solution of their difficulties. They had failed to secure the
export of the surplus cotton from the Southwest, and felt
that the remedy was to develop a great direct trade with
Europe and to supply the southwestern farmer with his
wares. But a steamship can defy trade winds and ocean
currents. Previous to this time most of the trade from
Europe, carried on in sailing vessels, had gone down the
coast of Africa and had followed the trade winds and the
1 Gallatin's Report, 1808.
2 Phillips, History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt to I860,
p. 316.
3 Joseph Bancroft, Savannah, Census and Statistics, p. 55.
SUMMARY OF CONDITIONS 9
Gulf Stream. These had brought the ships to America and
practically cast them ashore at Charleston, Savannah, or
Norfolk which had accordingly become important shipping
centers.1 The introduction of the steamship enabled this
trade to go directly to the more prosperous cities of the
North.
This, then, was the situation: the wide stretch of ter-
ritory lying between the mountains and the ocean, com-
prising the greater part of Virginia, North and South Caro-
lina, Georgia, Florida, and Alabama, was well suited to
agriculture, but was worked under a system which ex-
hausted the soil without replenishing it. It was cut off
from access to the West by natural barriers, and the export
trade diverted to New York and New Orleans. The pop-
ulation was leaving the worn-out land and taking up new
plantations in the Southwest. The two chief transportation
problems were to effect a connection with the West by
canals or railroads running perpendicular to the coast,
and to develop a local system of inland communication by
railroads running parallel to the coast, joining the fall
line towns and cities. The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
had its beginning in such conditions and was developed
as a solution of the second of these problems.
1 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. hi, p. 3.
CHAPTER II
ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF THE NORTH AND
SOUTH RAILROADS OF VIRGINIA
Conditions in Virginia at the beginning of the railroad
era were similar to those of her neighboring states to the
south. She had seen her land exhausted and her farmers
moving away. l Although the first to attempt a connection
with the West, by means of the James River and Kanawha
Canal, and the last one to give up the idea of canal con-
nection, she never completed the project. She saw the
cities of other seaboard states secure the coveted connec-
tion; New York by means of the Erie Canal, Boston by
the Western Railroad, Philadelphia by the Pennsylvania
line of improvement and portage canal, and Baltimore by
the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad.
Virginia was the first southern state to attempt rail-
road construction north and south, parallel to the coast.
In spite of this fact there was nothing that approached a
consolidated system of railroads until after the Civil War.
Two of the chief reasons for this were: first, the lack of
floating capital; second, the fact that coastwise transpor-
tation in a measure met the needs. Additional causes of
the slow growth of trade and transportation in Virginia
were jealousy of other states, the conviction that internal
improvements undertaken by the federal government were
unconstitutional, and the rivalry between the tide water
and western sections of the state.
An illustration of the jealousy toward other states is
shown by the fact that the Senate rejected a bill which
had passed the House of Delegates to give the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad, a Maryland corporation, a more ex-
1 Joseph Martin, New and Comprehensive Gazetteer of Virginia, p. 99.
JEALOUSY BETWEEN SECTIONS OF THE STATE 11
tended range for the location of its route in the western
part of the state. "The sum and substance of the whole
seems to be that Virginia ought to retain for herself the
sovereign right to prevent internal improvements whether
she herself will or will not make them. And it appears as
if agreed that it will be better for the state that its large
and fertile western district should remain as it is, deprived
of a market for many of its productions, than that Balti-
more may become the place of their deposit, Baltimore
being a foreign port, without the limits of the 'nation of
Virginia.'"1
A committee of the House of Delegates expressed the
attitude of the state toward federal construction of internal
improvements in a report which stated that the term "in-
ternal improvements" was in common and ordinary use
and susceptible of the clearest definition. No reason could
be assigned why this power was not granted to the general
government if it had been so intended. The peculiar
character of the power to make internal improvements
was locality, and therefore peculiarly unsuited to the ju-
risdiction of the general government, and peculiarly suited
to the jurisdiction of the state governments intended for
local objects.2
Not only was Virginia as a state hostile to enterprises
which originated in other states, but the eastern section
was extremely jealous of any undertakings which threat-
ened it with competition. There was a feeling on the part
of some eastern citizens that the opening of the West would
bring keen competition to the tide water farmers. An illus-
tration of this feeling appears in the reply of an eastern
Virginia farmer to a letter of a westerner in the Richmond
papers in the summer of 1838, urging that the water be
turned into the James River Canal so that the western
farmers might market their wheat crop. He begged the
1 Constitutional Whig, Richmond, February 16, 1827.
2 Niks' Register, December 29, 1827.
12 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
westerner to keep quiet so that for once the tide water
farmers might get a good price for their wheat, stating
that even at the advanced price which this freedom from
competition would give, the tide water people would not
realize a tithe of the excess of taxation paid by them in
developing facilities in which they had no interest. ! In the
early years this feeling was particularly strong in Norfolk,
the principal port of the state. Appeals were made to her
in vain by the fall line towns to join them in an attempt
to develop trade with the western part of the state.2
In order to appreciate this provincial feeling it is only
necessary to contrast the two divisions of the state. The
tide water section is that part lying to the east of the fall
line. It forms an irregular quadrilateral 114 miles in length
north and south and 90 miles in width east and west, con-
taining 11,350 square miles of which some 2500 square
miles are water.3 This division contained, until well into
the nineteenth century, the wealthiest and most influen-
tial portion of the population.4 Ocean vessels going up the
Chesapeake Bay, the Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and
James Rivers could land at the wharves of the individual
planters, thus obviating the necessity of market towns of
any considerable size. That part of the state lying between
the fall line and the Blue Ridge consists of what has
been called the Atlantic Coast Range and the Piedmont.
Sparsely settled, it did not until much later acquire suffi-
cient influence to demand consideration in the legislature.
The only city of importance in the tide water counties
1 Richmond Enquirer, July 13 and 24, 1838.
2 W. S. Forrest, Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk, p. 222.
Quotation from Petersburg Intelligencer on occasion of Norfolk's be-
coming a city, 1845.
3 Virginia, A Geographical and Political Summary, published by
Board of Immigration, 1876.
4 History of Transportation in the United States before 1860, prepared
under the direction of B. H. Meyer by Caroline E. MacGill and staff of
collaborators, published by Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1917,
p. 265.
POSSIBILITIES OF WINNING FOREIGN TRADE 13
of Virginia was Norfolk. Therefore the history of trade
and transportation conditions in tide water Virginia is
practically the history of trade and transportation con-
ditions in Norfolk. The excellence of its harbor, Hampton
Roads, its central location on the Atlantic coast, and its
extensive back country gave it this commanding position.
It was the most convenient point where the produce of the
interior might be collected and whence it might be dis-
tributed north and south among the markets of the sea-
board.1 The back country upon which it could draw was
that drained by the Chesapeake Bay, including that part
of Pennsylvania which lies in the valley of the Susque-
hanna, all of Maryland east of the mountains, the valleys
of the Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and James Rivers,
and the Roanoke section of North Carolina.2 Because
of this advantageous location, Norfolk was an important
commercial town before the Revolution and by 1804 had
a growing trade and a population of about 9000. 3
In her efforts to win for herself a leading place among the
trading cities of the coast, Norfolk had the following pos-
sibilities: to retain her direct foreign trade or to establish
trade relations with South America; to develop the North
Carolina trade through the Dismal Swamp Canal and the
Roanoke River; to secure western trade, either by supplant-
ing Richmond as the port of deposit or by uniting with the
fall line towns to secure it through canals or railroads.
Norfolk, small and weak as she was, longed to share the
foreign trade with New York and the other coast cities,
and in 1852 made a feeble effort to capture some of it. This
attempt was made in connection with a Belgian effort to
establish a direct line of steamers with some port in the
United States. The legislature of Virginia was petitioned
1 Lieutenant Maury, Executive Documents, 44th Congress, 1870-71,
p. 65.
2 Lieutenant Maury, in De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern
and Western States, vol. in, p. 2.
3 W. S. Forrest, Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk, -p. 306.
14 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
to grant a charter to the Atlantic Steam Navigation Com-
pany, the purpose of which was to run a line of first-class
steamships between the ports of Norfolk, Virginia, and
Antwerp in Belgium.1 In spite of popular agitation the
House of Delegates in 1853 refused to grant the charter.
Thereupon a line was established to New York instead of
to Norfolk, but it could not compete with those already ply-
ing between New York and Liverpool. Having failed to se-
cure direct foreign trade, the Virginians raised the cry, "Let
the South look to the South. Behold the valley of the
Amazon and the great river basins of South America.' ' 2
But attempts to establish such commerce went no farther
than the cry.
The most successful attempt made by Norfolk to develop
her commerce was that by which she secured the North
Carolina trade through the Dismal Swamp Canal. Begin-
ning at Norfolk this canal runs south to the Albemarle
Sound. It was chartered in Virginia in 1787 and in North
Carolina in 1790.3 Its original purpose was to furnish a
means of getting lumber out of the Dismal Swamp by
obviating the necessity of hauling it over the corduroy
roads. Later the canal was extended and formed the chief
means of communication between Norfolk and the Roa-
noke country of North Carolina. Virginia was a subscriber
to seventy shares ($250 each) of the stock of the company.
Much of the other capital was secured by means of lot-
teries.4 It was finally completed in 1823, and on April 28
of that year the schooner Rebecca Edwards with a cargo
of cotton, flour, tobacco, and hogs passed through and
arrived at Norfolk.5 For many years this canal was of
1 W. S. Forrest, Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk, p. 319.
2 Lieutenant Maury, in De Bow, Industrial Resources of Southern
and Western States, vol. in, p. 5.
8 American State Papers, vol. xx, Miscellaneous Documents, vol. I,
p. 763.
4 Constitutional Whig, Richmond, February 2, 1827.
6 W. S. Forrest, Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk, p. 97.
KANAWHA CANAL — THE JAMES RIVER 19
inspected there from 15,000 to 18,000 hogsheads of to-
bacco weighing 1500 pounds. This was the largest inspec-
tion of any city in the United States. Besides this it ex-
ported some 25,000 to 30,000 barrels of flour yearly. This
produce was conveyed in batteaus to Richmond. It was
estimated that there were 500 of these boats in use giving
employment to 1500 people. Richmond and not Norfolk
had secured the trade with Lynchburg. Ocean steamers
could ascend the James as far as Richmond, secure their
freight, and put to sea without stopping at Norfolk. In
addition to the trade which came down the James River
and Kanawha Canal, an important source was the coal
fields then operated in Chesterfield County. The first rail-
road in Virginia was built from Manchester on the op-
posite side of the James from Richmond to these mines.
The road was constructed largely by the owner of one of
them and brought down 2,000,000 tons of coal yearly.
The chief claim of Richmond to distinction outside of
being a trading center was the fact that the river at this
point furnishes ample water power for manufacturing
establishments. From the commencement of the rapids a
few miles above, the fall is upward of one hundred feet
to the level of tide water. Situated along the river there
were a number of flouring mills, grist mills, a cut-nail
manufactory, a rolling and slitting mill, an iron foundry,
and a cotton mill. Yet there was continual chafing under
the dependence upon northern cities for home supplies.
A resident of the city writes in the Richmond Times: l
Consider these things — "Just received another lot of those
celebrated Troy Cooking Stoves." A heading like the above is
not strange to your columns. Docs anybody know how many
thousand dollars are yearly sent north from Virginia for that one
article? Have we not as good water power, as good iron and coal
as they have at the North, or as skillful mechanics? "Just re-
ceived, one hundred bales of northern hay." Is it a fact that Vir-
1 Quoted by Forrest, in Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk,
pp. 410-11.
20 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
ginia cannot raise hay to feed her own stock? I have seen even
this dry season at least three tons per acre on land that a few
years since was worth no more than — in fact, as poor a piece
of land as could be found in the state. What crop pays better at
from fifteen to twenty dollars per ton?
Petersburg was not materially different from Richmond
and Fredericksburg. It had grown up at the falls of the
Appomattox, but instead of securing its trade from the
west as Richmond had done, it had secured it largely from
North Carolina. With this state it had a considerable
wagon trade before the building of the Petersburg Rail-
road. It was the chief tobacco market of that section.
Travelers met continually on the road hundreds of single
hogsheads of tobacco drawn by two horses tandem, com-
ing eighty or one hundred miles from the interior.1 The
method used was to run a beam through the hogshead
lengthwise in the center of the heads and attach a pair of
shafts to the protruding ends of the beam, hitching the
horses in these shafts.
The dirt roads leading from the North through these
cities and on into North Carolina were very poor. After
leaving Alexandria, Virginia, the road ran for miles through
woods of pine mingled with oak and cedar. It was some-
times so narrow that a vehicle struck against the trees.
Again it was so full of stumps as to be almost impassable.
Now and then scattered along the way was a little village
composed of a few frame houses with one rather more
extensive and substantial used as a tavern. The only pubic
conveyance to be had was the "fast" United States mail.
In summer ten days were required to go from Baltimore to
Richmond and thirty-three from Baltimore to Augusta,
Georgia. The sixty-nine miles from Richmond to Fredericks-
burg was covered in two days in May, 1817, in high hacks.2
1 Hodgson, Letters from North America, vol. I, Letter 3, pp. 32-33.
2 Transportation in the United States before 1860, p. 60. Prepared
under the direction of B. H. Meyer by Caroline E. MacGill and staff
DIRT ROADS 21
South of Petersburg conditions were if anything worse.
The roads were almost impassable for a good portion of
the year and the population was even more scattered than
was the case farther to the north.
With a growing demand for overland communication
along the fall line and the introduction of the railroad else-
where as a successful competitor to navigation, it was to
be expected that the towns along the line should give their
attention to the building of railroads. This interest re-
sulted in the building of a number of roads which in time
were connected physically and consolidated into the Atlan-
tic Coast Line System. At the time of their building, how-
ever, there was no plan of a system. Like all the roads of
the time they were built to connect local points, namely,
the fall line towns. x There was little concerted action. The
roads were constructed to benefit the towns which they
connected and with little idea of forming a transportation
system for the general benefit. To the extent to which the
state aided these enterprises there was a broader view.
of collaborators, published by the Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1917.
1 Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United
States, p. 71.
CHAPTER III
THE PETERSBURG AND THE RICHMOND
AND PETERSBURG RAILROADS BEFORE 1860
The Petersburg Railroad
The oldest of the roads which went into the Atlantic Coast
Line System was the Petersburg. It was preeminently an
enterprise of the citizens of Petersburg, Virginia. Their
purpose was to tap the Roanoke country of North Caro-
lina and increase the trade which had long existed with
that section. The building of the road was a stroke at the
Dismal Swamp Canal and at Norfolk, for it would divert
much trade to Petersburg which would have otherwise
gone to Norfolk. There had for a long time existed an
intense rivalry between the two towns.
Although the idea of using railroads as a means of trans-
portation was new, the citizens entered enthusiastically into
the organization of a company and obtained a charter
from the state of Virginia on February 10, 1830, which was
later granted also by the state of North Carolina.1 This
charter served as a model for most of the other early
roads of Virginia. It provided that: the capital stock was
to be $400,000; the road was to extend from Petersburg to
some convenient point on the North Carolina line; per-
mission was given to erect toll-gates on the line and scales
at its various depots; when ten miles should be completed,
the company was allowed to be^in operation, charging 12 \
cents per ton mile for freight; when the entire road was fin-
ished, the rate was to be $8 a ton for the whole distance.
The net profit allowable was to amount to a sum equal to
the capital stock expended, with 6 per cent interest on it
1 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1829-30, ch. 62, p. 59; Acts
of North Carolina, 1830, ch. 56.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 23
from the time the money was advanced by the stockhold-
ers until received back in net profit. After this sum should
be collected, the rates were to be fixed and regulated by the
Board of Public Works of the state so that the road could
earn 6 per cent on the capital stock above running ex-
penses.1 All machines, wagons, vehicles, and carriages pur-
chased by the company, all works constructed, and all
profits were to be vested in the company forever, deemed
personal estate and free from all public charges or taxes
whatsoever. The charter was amended three years later
so as to allow the building of a branch road from the inter-
section with the Portsmouth and Roanoke to Weldon.2
By the middle of the summer of the year in which the
charter was granted, over $325,000 of the necessary
$400,000 had been subscribed.3 The country through
which the road was to run was sparsely settled, averaging
about one farmhouse to the mile except in a small village
or two on the fine.4 The land owners with few exceptions
gave the right of way from Petersburg to the Roanoke
River.5 Little time was lost and by the fall of 1830 engi-
neers were engaged in locating the road from the Rowanty
River to the Nottoway.
The interest of the state in all her internal improvements
had been vested in 1816 in the Board of Pub He Works.
This board was endowed with all the stock then held by
the state in the various turnpike and canal companies,
in the Bank of Virginia, and in the Farmers' Bank of
Virginia. The rule was established that when internal im-
1 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1830, ch. 18; Acts of North
Carolina, 1830, ch. 10.
2 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1833, ch. 80.
8 Niks' Register, July 24, 1830.
4 An old map dated 1832 and drawn for Moncure Robinson, chief
engineer, gives the route of the road, the elevation, the curvature, and
the location and name of the owners of the farmhouses on the line.
The map is in the attic in the dome of the Virginia State Capitol at
Richmond.
6 Petersburg Times, quoted in Norfolk Herald, November 12, 1830.
24 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
provements were undertaken, the Board of Public Works
would subscribe two fifths of the capital in the name of the
state when private individuals had subscribed three fifths.1
The Petersburg Railroad therefore petitioned the board for
a subscription on behalf of the state of two fifths of the
capital stock of the company.2 The Board of Public Works,
in its report to the General Assembly of Virginia on Janu-
ary 24, 1831, recommended that the subscription be made.
The cause of this favorable recommendation was the belief
that the investment would produce a profitable income,
open up a choice of markets between Petersburg and Nor-
folk to the upper Roanoke country, furnish additional
facilities for transportation to market of products along
the fine of proposed road, and add greatly to the com-
mercial prosperity of the town of Petersburg.
There was a disadvantage to the state which arose when-
ever the question of investment in a new enterprise pre-
sented itself. The state was already an investor in the Dis-
mal Swamp Canal to the amount of $64,000. To encourage
the building of the Petersburg Railroad, a competitor of
the canal, would evidently decrease its traffic and conse-
quently its earning power, to the detriment of the state.
Besides injuring itself financially, the state through its
Board of Public Works must go on record, if the subscrip-
tion were made to the railroad, as favoring Petersburg at
the expense of Norfolk. This was the first instance of what
was afterward to become a perplexing question to the
state. It paved the way to political strife and increased
the jealousy which already existed between the coast
and fall line towns. These considerations had weight with
the board, but in spite of them they recommended to the
legislature favorable action.
Acting on this recommendation the General Assembly
1 Joseph Martin, A New and Comprehensive Gazetteer of Virginia,
p. 88, Message of Governor Tazewell.
2 Fifteenth Annual Report of Board of Public Works to the General
Assembly of Virginia, January £4, 1831, Document No. 24, p. 7.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 25
passed an act on March 22, 1831, authorizing the Board of
Public Works to subscribe two fifths of the capital stock,
payable when three fifths had been paid in by the public.
On account of this subscription the state was entitled to
appoint two of the five directors of the company. This act
was amended on February 27, 1832, so that the state
might pay its subscription when one half of the amount
subscribed by the public was paid. The state also agreed
to borrow $80,000, giving its stock in the railroad company
as collateral, in order to pay its part.1 The entire subscrip-
tion was as follows: by individuals, $196,400; by Board of
Public Works on behalf of the state, $160,000; by the cor-
poration of Petersburg, $43,600; total, $400,000.
By means of the money thus collected, with the aid of
the farmers who graded much of the roadbed with their
slaves, and with cross-ties and sills cut from the pine
forests along the fine, the road was partially in operation
in the latter part of 1832. The light sandy soil and the
level country through which the road runs facilitated its
construction. The route followed was a very direct one,
the distance from Petersburg to a point one and a half miles
below the falls of the Roanoke being fifty-nine miles, only
three miles more than the direct distance. The curves were
arcs of circles varying in diameter from two to nine miles.
The maximum grade did not exceed thirty feet to the mile.
The track was of wood and iron, yellow pine rails five
inches by nine inches were plated with strips of iron one
half by two inches and secured with white oak sills twelve
inches in diameter. About one half of the road was opened
for transportation in October, 1832, when according to the
terms of the charter daily trains were put on for the trans-
portation of freight and passengers. The cost of the actual
construction exceeded the original estimate very little.
From the beginning of the undertaking up to November,
1833, the entire expenditure for all purposes was $575,334.
1 Report of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1830, p. 460.
26 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Additional expense was incurred in building depots at
both ends of the road and the incline plane at the Roa-
noke, and in buying engines, coaches, and cars.1
By 1835 the road was fairly well equipped, having seven
locomotives and one hundred cars of various kinds in
operation. Besides, the Raleigh and Gaston and the Greenes-
ville and Roanoke were being built to the south. These
roads when completed would turn over to the Petersburg
a considerable amount of freight and passengers from the
interior of North Carolina. The Richmond and Petersburg
was under contract to the north and would close the gap
between the Petersburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg,
and Potomac.2
The traffic of the road steadily increased, but great diffi-
culty was experienced in getting freight over the falls from
Blakely to Weldon. In the report of the road for the year
1834 the president complains that a year before the Roa-
noke Navigation Company had reported to the Board of
Public Works that in a few days the locks would be com-
pleted so that boats could pass up and down the river, but
that the promise had not been kept.3 In spite of these diffi-
culties and those incident to the newness of the road, it was
earning expenses, though it was not paying any dividends.
Besides its regular passenger and freight traffic the com-
pany had a contract with the Post Office Department to
carry the mail over its lines. This was a distinction enjoyed
at this time by only one other railroad in the country, the
Camden and Amboy.
Its connection was so close with the Raleigh and Gaston
Railroad and with the Greenesville and Roanoke, a
eighteen mile line joining the two, that contracts were
entered into with both companies. The Petersburg was to
1 Report of President McKenzie, November 22, 1833, in Proceed-
ings of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1833, p. 182.
8 Report of Petersburg Railroad Company, December 1, 1835.
8 Report of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1836, Document 17,
p. 451.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 27
conduct the business of the Raleigh and Gaston, furnishing
the rolling stock, train, and depot agents, in return for one
half of the gross receipts from produce and mails, and one
third of the receipts from passengers. The Raleigh and Gas-
ton was to keep the road and depots in repair and furnish
the labor and superintendence for the purpose. 1 A yearly
rental of $11,000 was paid the Greenes vi He and Roanoke
for trackage rights. This contract continued until the latter
road was finally absorbed by the Petersburg.2
In addition to the increased income from operation in
connection with these roads, the Petersburg received on its
mail contract with the Post Office Department $300 per
mile. When the government entered into this contract,
the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac was receiving
only $150 per mile for a similar service. The government
did not feel justified in paying more because of existing
contracts which it had with the stage and steamboat own-
ers between Washington and Richmond. The Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac was justly dissatisfied and
the Petersburg paid it $50 per mile out of its own funds
in order to retain the mail on the fine of railroad.3
The reports of the company for a few years prior to the
panic of 1837 show gradual improvement in its earnings.
Once on its feet, the company allayed the dissatisfaction
which had arisen among the stockholders because of its
failure to pay dividends, by the payment in 1836 of a 10
per cent dividend. The demoralization of business which
followed the panic extended to the railroad. From Novem-
ber, 1836, to June, 1838, no dividends were paid, and,
although regular payments were made to the stockholders
1 Report of C. F. Osborne, President of Petersburg Railroad Com-
pany to Board of Public Works of Virginia, December 22, 1838.
2 The Petersburg road exchanged four shares of its own stock for
seven of the Greenesville and Roanoke. Acts of Virginia, 1852-53,
ch. 172.
3 Report of President Osborne to Board of Public Works of Virginia,
March 6, 1837.
28 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
after the latter date, the rate was never so high again until
the Civil War. The fact that dividends were lower was no
indication of a falling off in business. The opposite was the
case, and the fact that business had increased necessitated
additional expense in handling it. The heavy freight which
the road was compelled to carry brought about a deteriora-
tion of the roadbed and superstructure. The wood and strap
iron track was very expensive to keep in repair. In addi-
tion much of the earnings went into new equipment so that
the value of the property was constantly increasing and
the earnings of the stockholders were in their railroad
rather than in their pockets. The amount invested in
equipment was much greater than would have been neces-
sary under ordinary conditions.
Passenger traffic was growing rapidly,1 the trade on the
Roanoke was becoming annually larger, as was the amount
of freight and number of passengers turned over to the
road by the Raleigh and Gaston as it was extended into
the Southwest. Besides this the Wilmington and Raleigh,
together with the steamboat line which it operated to
Charleston, opened up the whole eastern section of North
Carolina.2 This volume of traffic taxed the capacity of the
road to its utmost. The difficulties under which the road
was laboring were greatly increased by the fact that at cer-
tain seasons of the year the wagon roads were impassable
and the rivers not navigable. During these seasons of sus-
pension of inland traffic commodities accumulated in the
hands of the farmers or small buyers. When the roads and
rivers became passable this accumulation poured out upon
the railroad until it was overwhelmed. Grades which a few
years before had been commented on by the chief engineer
as low, thirty feet to the mile being the maximum, now
became obstacles difficult to overcome. It was estimated at
1 Report of Petersburg Railroad Company, October 31, 1839.
1 Report of Board of Directors of Petersburg Railroad Company
to the stockholders, March 4, 1839.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 29
the time that the cost of transportation on level road was
about four and a half cents per ton mile. On some parts
of the Petersburg the cost was double this amount. So it
came about that the enlarged traffic of the road, usually
sought diligently, became a real problem. For instance
the passenger travel from February, 1838, to February,
1839, increased fourfold. During the year there were
carried 15,199 bales of cotton, 6871 hogsheads of tobacco,
28,767 bushels of grain, 10,239 kegs of tobacco, and 5945
barrels of flour.
It was evident that the road had reached a new era. The
first ten years of its existence had been a preliminary
period when the road was almost purely local. Conditions
by 1840 had changed. The changes had come about from
two sources. First of all the Petersburg had become a part
of a north and south system. Although no physical con-
nection existed with the Richmond and Petersburg or with
the Wilmington and Raleigh, to all intents and purposes
the three roads, together with the Richmond, Fredericks-
burg, and Potomac, formed a great north and south route
for through travel between New York, Philadelphia, Balti-
more, and Charleston. By means of this route travelers
could reach Charleston from New York in sixty-six hours
or from Baltimore in forty-two hours, quicker time than
could be made by boat.1 This saving of time on the
through route diverted some freight and much passenger
traffic from the coastwise route.
Another phenomenon of this new era was railroad com-
petition. From the beginning the road had been in compe-
tition with the Dismal Swamp Canal. The people of Nor-
folk chafed under the loss of business to Petersburg, and
determined to construct a road from Portsmouth opposite
Norfolk to Weldon to participate in the growing business
which was developing at this point. When the Portsmouth
1 Report of Board of Directors of Petersburg Railroad Company to
the stockholders, March 4, 1839.
30 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
and Roanoke Company applied to the legislature for a
charter, a long controversy followed. The people of Peters-
burg and the Petersburg Railroad as well as the other lines
in the north and south route opposed the granting of the
charter. In spite of the opposition the charter was granted.
The news reached Norfolk on a Sunday. Bonfires were
built, kegs of powder exploded, and rockets shot over the
river. The road was built but was not successful till many
years later. The explanation was that there was not suffi-
cient business at Weldon to support two lines of road. The
Petersburg had the advantage in that it was constructed
earlier and was well under way when the Portsmouth and
Roanoke was built. The Portsmouth and Roanoke entered
Weldon by means of a bridge over the Roanoke. The
Petersburg had never gone into Weldon, but had stopped
at Blakely. When no agreement could be reached whereby
the Petersburg could use the bridge and track of the
Portsmouth and Roanoke, it became necessary to prolong
the road from Blakely into Weldon by a branch two and
three quarters miles long and a bridge across the Roanoke
below Weldon. This was one of the first results of com-
petition between the two roads.1
Another difficulty already referred to was the inade-
quacy of the track to stand the strain of the heavy traf-
fic. The president in his report to the stockholders March 1,
1841, estimated that the cost of repairs of the Boston and
Providence, a fine laid with heavy iron, for the four and a
half years previous, had averaged $246 per mile, while the
cost had been $663 on the Petersburg. These expenses drew
heavily on the earnings of the road. The fact that twenty-
five miles of track per year on an average had to be relaid
gives some idea of the inadequacy of the track. It was
evident that it must soon be relaid with heavy iron. This
would reduce the profits still further.
1 Report of President Bird to Board of Public Works of Virginia,
November 10, 1842, p. 448.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 31
Then, too, the perennial controversy with the Post
Office Department arose with the Petersburg. The road
had to surrender to the department the control of hours and
to agree to make the trip in the shortest possible time. The
government agreed that it would turn over the mails to
the road without unreasonable delay at any point. Owing
to the conditions of travel it was difficult to keep this prom-
ise. The Petersburg Railroad was the middle section of the
southern route and received the mails from Baltimore and
from Charleston over the Wilmington and Raleigh. The
mails were delayed sometimes thirteen or fourteen hours
at Baltimore and eighteen or twenty hours at Charleston.
The Petersburg Company claimed that the restrictions
were not laid alike on all roads, and that they weighed par-
ticularly hard on its road, since it was compelled to start
its trains at unseasonable hours and run at night at greatly
increased expense and risk, that it had lost double the
amount of remuneration received for carrying the mail, in
travel diverted from its line.1
The road was not prospering, yet this was doubtless
due to general mismanagement rather than to any specific
cause. No dividends were paid from December 1, 1841, to
July 1, 1844. Dissatisfaction was increasing among the
stockholders. In March, 1841, they passed a resolution
that in view of the financial condition of the country it was
unwise to borrow money to lay an iron track. In spite of
this, in the spring of 1842 President Bird and the board of
directors began to lay new T-rails. At a meeting called
in July, 1842, sanction for the improvement was secured,
and it was voted to borrow $100,000. In a month or so,
however, the scheme was given up and three fourths inch
flat iron was bought to relay the track in time to escape the
duty laid on railroad iron.
The indebtedness of the company amounted to $371,949,
of which $120,000 had to be paid within a few months,
1 Proceedings of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1842, p. 448.
32 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
and there were no funds available for meeting the obliga-
tion. Receipts had fallen off $38,841 from the previous
year. In addition to the involved financial condition of the
company, competition compelled a 30 per cent reduction
in freight rates. The gross receipts did not diminish ma-
terially, but they were received from carrying a corre-
spondingly greater amount of freight, which caused a
deterioration of the roadbed and rolling stock. It was
evident that something must be done. The usual method of
escape was resorted to. An appeal was made to the state
and as a result $150,000 in bonds of the state's holdings
were converted into stock. This left the bonded debt of the
company $136,480.* With this relief the road was able to
resume the payment of its semi-annual dividends and thus
enter into the period of prosperity which preceded the
Civil War.
Then, too, the Portsmouth and Roanoke had failed and
for a time the Petersburg was again without competition
in handling the Roanoke trade.2 A change was taking
place in the nature of the commodities which the road was
handling. The two main items of its freight from the begin-
ning had been tobacco and cotton. The tobacco crop of
1848 was short and cotton cultivation was decreasing
along the line every year.3 A further reduction in passenger
fare was necessary to meet the competition from Charles-
ton to the northern cities by water.
President Bird had aroused opposition among the stock-
holders a few years earlier because of his action in violating
the instructions given at the general meeting of the stock-
holders concerning the relaying of the track. He was now
accused by the officials of the Richmond and Petersburg
1 Twenty-ninth Annual Report of the Board of Public Works of
Virginia to the Legislature, December 2, 1844. Report of Petersburg
Railroad Company.
2 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company to Board of Public
Works of Virginia, 1847, p. 09.
8 Report of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1848, p. 370.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 33
and of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac of try-
ing to divert travel and mail from the Petersburg to the
James River and Bay Line to the detriment of the lines to
the north. The whole matter was investigated in accordance
with a resolution of the House of Delegates on December
18, 1848, to have transmitted to them by the Board of
Public Works the charges brought by Wirt Robinson,
president of the Richmond and Petersburg, and by Edward
Robinson, president of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac. The charges were that there was a systematic
attempt on the part of Bird to divert travel and the mail
to the James River and Bay Line. He was accused of delay-
ing the trains of the Petersburg until after the departure of
the Richmond and Petersburg for Richmond, thus forcing
travelers against their will to go north by water. Letters
were produced in substantiation, to the effect that Bird
seemed to be in collusion with hotel- keepers and the river
and bay boat line. 1 Bird denied the charges, and in defense
produced letters from the Postmaster General showing
that he had made every effort to have the Richmond, Fred-
ericksburg, and Potomac keep the mails, as it would insure
the use of his own road; that he had volunteered to pay the
difference between what the Richmond, Fredericksburg,
and Potomac wanted and what the Post Office Department
offered, provided the government would grant a 25 per
cent increase for night transportation. He claimed that
when his efforts were unsuccessful he rearranged his
schedule so as to connect with the river and bay line rather
than lose the mail service to the Portsmouth and Roanoke
line. The whole matter soon blew over. Bird was acquitted
of the charges and voted innocent by his board of directors.
The Richmond and Petersburg and the Richmond, Fred-
ericksburg, and Potomac bought out the boat line and
again secured the mail contract upon as favorable terms as
formerly.
x Report of Board of Public Works of Virginia, 1848, pp. 559-66.
34 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
The ten-year period just previous to the Civil War was
one of marked prosperity. The receipts from all sources
ranged from $211,000 to $250,000. Expenses were well be-
low these figures in spite of the fact that the entire road
was re laid in 1850 with new U-rails of fifty pounds to the
yard. These were bought at a very advantageous figure
and a saving of about $75,000 was effected.1 Some of these
were replaced from 1855 to 1859 by fifty-pound T-rails,
including the Gaston Branch, formerly the Greenes vi He
and Roanoke.2 It was well for the road that it was in tnis
strong position, for it was again to enter into competition
with the Portsmouth and Roanoke which began to run its
trains for a second time on November 25, 1851. More-
over, the confidence placed in the company by the public
was to suffer a shock because of the defalcation of Presi-
dent Bird to the amount of $31,298.3 He had for the
greater part of his term been engaged in a controversy of
some kind and by no means enjoyed the entire confidence
of those who had had dealings with the road. He admitted
collecting from agents from time to time money which he
did not turn over to the company.4 He resigned as presi-
dent of the road and later replaced most of the funds
which he had misappropriated.
The only other events of interest during the period
were : the acquisition of the Greenesville and Roanoke which
connected the Petersburg and the Raleigh and Gaston;
the loss by fire of the bridge across the Roanoke at
Weldon; and the transfer of the state's interest ($323,500)
to the town of Petersburg to be applied to the construction
of the Southside Railroad.5 The Petersburg, like all the
Virginia lines north of it and the Wilmington and Weldon
1 Letters of H. D. Bird to James Brown, Jr., November 10, 1852.
2 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, 1859.
3 Report of committee appointed by Common Council of Petersburg
on defalcation of H. D. Bird, March, 1855.
* Report of Petersburg Railroad Company, March 3, 1855.
6 Acts of Virginia, Marcli 13, 1849, ch. 152.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 35
to the south, was in a prosperous condition at the begin-
ning of the Civil War. In 1860 it paid a 10 per cent divi-
dend.1
The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad
The next Virginia road in point of time and the parent
road of the Atlantic Coast Line was the Richmond and
Petersburg, chartered on March 14, 1836. 2 The capital of
the company consisted of $300,000, to be subscribed by
private individuals, and "any amount which the Board
of Public Works may be authorized to subscribe on behalf
of the state at the present session of the Legislature." 3
The stock of the company was regarded as personal prop-
erty and was exempt from taxation.4 The charter further
provided that books were to be opened both at Richmond
and at Petersburg, and that when $15,000 should be sub-
scribed by the public the company was to be considered
as incorporated.5 A five-dollar cash deposit was required of
each subscriber at the time of subscription and the remain-
der was to be paid at the call of the president and board of
directors. In case the subscriber was unable or refused to
pay his subscription, his shares were to be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder and the sum due was to be
taken out of the proceeds. The remainder after the ex-
penses of sale were deducted was to be returned to the
subscriber. In case, however, the share or shares did not
bring enough to satisfy the claim and to defray the ex-
penses of sale, the deficit was made recoverable in the
court of the county in which the original owner lived.6
In case the $300,000 should prove to be an insufficient
amount of capital for building and equipping the road, the
president and board of directors were authorized to issue
1 See Appendix, Table I.
2 Charter of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, p. 11.
Published by T. W. White, Richmond, Virginia, 1836.
3 Charter, p. 12. Session referred to, 1835-36.
4 Ibid., p. 23. 6 Ibid., p. 13. 6 Ibid., p. 15.
36 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
$500,000 additional stock, making a total of $800,000
capital. The holders of the original stock had the privilege
of subscribing to this additional issue in proportion to the
amount already held. The company was also given power
to borrow money on certificates of indebtedness, convert-
ible into the stock at the option of the holder, provided
that the amount of stock should not exceed $800,000 unless
such loan should be agreed to at a general meeting of the
stockholders. l
The right of eminent domain was conferred on the
company except in the city of Richmond and in the town of
Petersburg where tracks could not be laid in the streets
without the consent of the common council. The road was
to provide an eighty foot right of way except in deep cuts
and fills. Not more than an acre and a half could be con-
demned for site of a depot or other building.2 When land
had been condemned for a depot or other purposes, if the
president of the road, the board of directors, and the owner
could not agree on the amount of damage, they were to
apply to the court of the county in which the land lay,
asking that a committee of "five discreet, intelligent,
disinterested and impartial freeholders'* be appointed to
assess the damage. The court was to instruct the commit-
tee as to how the damage should be assessed, and forms
according to which their report was to be made were pre-
scribed.3
In addition to the right of eminent domain, the com-
pany could enter upon land, cut timber, quarry stone, and
take away earth or gravel to be used in construction, the
exception being made that no fruit tree or tree preserved
in a field or lot for shade or ornament could be cut, and no
stone or gravel forming part of a fence or building could
be carried away.4 In case of disagreement between the
president of the road and the owner of the soil, gravel,
or timber, provision was made for the appointment of a
1 Charter, p. 16. 2 Ibid., p. 17. 3 Ibid., p. 18. 4 Ibid., p. 21.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 37
committee to assess the damages. 1 Power was also given
to the company to cross public roads provided the public
highway was not changed materially in direction and pro-
vided further that any new road constructed should be in
equally as good condition as the one altered.2
Another provision of this somewhat peculiar document
related to the building and operating of bridges. The road
was allowed to construct its bridges in such a manner that
in addition to the regular purpose they might be used for
travel by horseback, carriage, sheep, cattle, and hogs. It
was permitted to charge tolls for such use and rates were
prescribed. This provision applied to all the streams crossed
by the road with the exception of the James River at Rich-
mond. The bridge at this point could be used as a railroad
bridge only unless the permission of the owners of Mayo's
Bridge was secured.3
The method of counting votes in the meetings of the stock-
holders was as follows : each member had one vote for each
share owned not exceeding two ; one for each two owned not
exceeding ten; and one vote for every five shares above ten,
provided no shareholder should have more than sixty votes.4
Looked at from the standpoint of the modern railroad
student, one of the striking provisions of the charter was
that regarding rates. For passengers a charge of eight cents
per mile could be made except in case the passenger was
carried ten miles or less, when a charge of fifty cents extra
could be made to pay for stopping and starting the train.
The rate for freight could not exceed ten cents per hundred
pounds per mile of haul.5 Fifteen per cent dividends were
the maximum which the road could declare, and it was
provided that when net earnings should be such as to allow
more than such dividend, the freight and passenger charges
should be reduced to a point where a dividend of only
15 per cent could be made.6
1 Charter, p. 22. 2 Ibid., p. 23. 8 Ibid., p. 25.
* Ibid., p. 26. B Ibid., p. 24. 6 Ibid., p. 27.
38 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
At the same session of the legislature at which the Rich-
mond and Petersburg Railroad Company applied for its
charter, the Manchester and Petersburg Turnpike Com-
pany also made application for an increase of its stock to
$400,000 for the purpose of building a railroad from Rich-
mond to Petersburg along its roadbed, under such restric-
tions as might seem just and reasonable to the General
Assembly.1 The turnpike company asked that if permis-
sion to build the road were refused it and were granted to
some other company, it should be allowed an indemnity,
whereupon it would turn its stock over to the railroad com-
pany within six months.2
Many of the provisions of this charter seem strange at
the present time and are given at length only because they
are representative of those of all the early railroads built
in this section of the United States. The road has interest
for the student of railroads because it was one of the earli-
est of those built along the Atlantic coast; was the nucleus
around which a great railroad system has been built; and
was and still is, as a part of the Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road, the connecting link between the roads that converge
at Petersburg and at Richmond. Throughout its entire
history and that of its successors it has never undergone a
reorganization, a fact, however, which is due largely to the
liberality of the state of Virginia.
The first board of directors consisted of five members,
three of whom were selected by the stockholders and two
appointed by the state.3 The territory through which the
road runs was in general favorable to railroad building,
with the exception of some small creeks, the James River
at Richmond, and the Appomattox at Petersburg. The
bridging of these streams, especially of the two rivers, and
the maintenance of the bridges proved a heavy cost to the
company.
1 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1874, p. 330. 2 Charter, p. 27.
3 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 218.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 39
The charter was granted by the Virginia legislature in
March, 1836, x and in May of the same year a construction
company was organized to build the road.2 The first presi-
dent was W. H. McFarland, and upon his election as
lieutenant governor of the state, he was succeeded by Hol-
den Rhodes. The company soon bought the Manchester
and Petersburg Turnpike Company as provided by the
charter, and in the summer work was begun under Mon-
cure Robinson as chief engineer. He estimated that the cost
of the road would be $600,000, which proved in the end to
be $38,000 less than the actual cost. In his preliminary
report of December 19, 1835, he placed the estimate at
$571,059. He anticipated both local and through trade
from the completion of this, the closing link in the line
of railroad communication through the state, and a "hand-
some trade" in certain articles of freight including coal
and cotton.3
Work had not progressed far when the panic of 1837 and
the subsequent business depression came. This was a se-
vere blow to the road. Subscriptions came in slowly and the
work was often at a standstill. Nearly the whole line was
under contract and full supplies of materials had been
engaged. The board of directors was therefore compelled
to carry on the work by means of requisitions on the stock-
holders, who were also suffering in their private finances.
Moreover, the credit of the road being destroyed, larger
sums of money were required.4 The state came to the res-
cue of the struggling road by paying in advance the amount
subscribed by the Board of Public Works and also by
granting loans. The amount thus secured was $98,000,
afterward increased to $150,000. It bore interest at 6 per
1 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1835-36, ch. 121.
2 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 219.
3 Report of Moncure Robinson, chief engineer, December 19, 1835.
Published by T. W. White, Richmond, 1836.
4 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, May
14, 1838.
40 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
cent and the principal was repayable in $15,000 install-
ments every six months beginning with the date of the
fourth semi-annual payment of interest. The company not
only failed to pay the installments as they fell due, but
could not pay the interest which had accumulated to the
amount of $35,600. In addition to the aid which was se-
cured from the state, $61,500 was obtained from England.
An agent was sent to London authorized to sell one hundred
6 per cent $1500 bonds due in 1853. He failed to dispose of
the whole number, selling but forty-one. The $61,500 thus
gained was repaid in 1853 from the proceeds of another
issue.1 The company was thus tided over the panic period;
but it found itself unable to meet its obligations to the
state, whereupon the legislature passed an act in 1843
authorizing the conversion of its loan into stock of the
company, on which a 3 per cent dividend was guaranteed.2
This was regularly met by the road although in a few
instances it had to be paid by means of short-time
loans.3 Arrangement was made in 1838 with the Ches-
terfield Railroad Company for the transfer of all coal
designed for Richmond or Petersburg to the Richmond
and Petersburg. By a slight elevation of the Chesterfield
Road at the point of intersection, the Richmond and
Petersburg was enabled to pass under it, thereby facili-
tating transfer of the coal and obviating all danger of
collision. 4
The roadbed terminated at Manchester across the river
from Richmond and connected with that city by a bridge.
Negro slaves were used extensively in the construction of
the road. The president reported on December 1, 1837,
that the disbursements of the month of January would
be heavy, as the hire of negroes was then to be paid
1 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 219.
2 Act of General Assembly of Virginia, 1842-43, ch. 103, p. 71.
3 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 219.
4 Report of President Rhodes of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad
Company, May 14, 1838.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 41
and their clothing provided.1 In May, 1838, the road
was put in use from Pocahontas to Manchester, and in
September of that year it was extended to the depot at
Richmond, the bridge over the James River being com-
pleted.
As soon as the road was opened, the services of the com-
pany were tendered to the Postmaster General for trans-
portation of the mail, and with his assent the stage con-
tract was transferred to the railroad for the remainder of
the year 1838 at a price of $1260 per year. The first actual
mail contract was from January 1, 1839, to June 30, 1843,
and was $237.50 per mile per year, or $5581 per year.2
Within two years bitter complaints were made concerning
this contract. The road claimed that having given up the
control of its hours of departure to the Post Office Depart-
ment, it was obliged to run at high speed to deliver on
time, and with all the responsibilities involved received no
greater pay than for carrying leisurely the same space
filled with merchandise.3
Up to 1843 the rails were of wooden string pieces with
a fight flat bar rail nailed to the top of these stringers. In
this year, however, new iron rails (two and one half by
three fourths inches) were put down and were used for ten
years.4 A heavy duty placed on iron in March, 1843, made
the improvement imperative before that date.5 In 1853
the legislature of the state passed an act giving the road
permission to issue 7 per cent coupon bonds to the amount
of $150,000 to enable the company "to complete an edge
rail superstructure over the whole line of its road and of
1 Report of President Rhodes to Board of Public Works of Virginia,
December 1, 1837.
2 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, May 31,
1839. First report after opening of road.
3 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company to Board
of Public Works of Virginia, 1841.
4 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 218.
5 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, October
31, 1842.
42 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
the branch road to Port Walthall." 1 From the proceeds
of the sale of these bonds the entire line was relaid with
fifty-one-pound rails and the necessary equipment was
added. 2 3 The small locomotives first used had been
brought from England. These were now replaced by larger
and better ones.
One of the chief problems of the maintenance of the
road arose from the fact that it had a considerable number
of bridges to keep in repair. Richmond is situated on the
north bank of the James and Petersburg on the south
bank of the Appomattox, thus necessitating two bridges.
At the opening of the road there were no bridges used, the
line terminating at the banks of the rivers. At Petersburg
the old turnpike bridge secured from the Manchester and
Petersburg -Turnpike Company was used as a wagon
bridge. Freight and passengers were carried across in
wagons and omnibuses. A railroad bridge at Richmond was
finished in September, 1838, after the completion of the
road in May of that year.4 The old wagon bridge at Peters-
burg was destroyed by a freshet in January, 1840, and the
rebuilding of it was a severe tax upon the company. This
blow, coupled with the depression of business in 1841 and
1842 following the panic of 1837, and the bad condition of
the track at this time so reduced the earnings that the com-
pany could not pay a dividend.5 The decrease of net earn-
ings is shown by the following figures:
1840 $32,095 1842 $22,941
1841 27,814 1843 15,158 8
It was thought that the passenger receipts could be in-
1 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1853-54, ch. 51, p. 35.
2 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 218.
3 Ibid., vol. xxvi, p. 538. Quotation from Richmond Times, 1853,
states that 2027 tons of rails had been bought, sufficient to relay the
whole road.
4 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 218. B Ibid., p. 219.
6 Taken from the reports of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad
Company for these years.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 43
creased if a short arm were built to Port Walthall, near the
junction of the James and x\ppomattox Rivers. Accord-
ingly, at the regular meeting of the stockholders in May,
1842, it was decided to build this three-mile arm. It was
completed in 1844 and at the same time a steam tug for
towing vessels into port was bought.1 The entire cost of
these improvements was $40,000 and it proved to be a very
profitable investment. Passengers were now able to come
by boat up the James and reach the main line of the Rich-
mond and Petersburg Railroad, traveling to northern
points such as Washington, Baltimore, New York, and
Philadelphia through Richmond, and to southern points
through Petersburg. Ships bound for foreign ports were
also loaded with freight brought from the interior. Another
object was to participate in the passenger business be-
tween Richmond and Norfolk. Attempts were made to
induce a steamboat company to run in connection. Failing
in this an investment was made in the Norfolk and Port
Walthall Steamboat Association to prevent any combina-
tion being formed with other steamboat lines on the bay
prejudicial to the company.2 The branch road continued
in operation until the Civil War when it was partially de-
molished and never rebuilt.3
The improvement in the financial condition of the road
which took place at this time can be attributed in part to
these changes, though some of it was doubtless due to re-
turning prosperity. The report of the Richmond and Peters-
burg for 184.5 did not contain the earnings and expenses of
the Port Walthall Branch, but that of 1846 did. The net
earnings of the road increased from $17,246 in 1845 to
$33,586 in 1846, a total of $16,340 for the year.
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, May
28, 1844.
2 Ibid., May 26, 1846.
3 Statement filed by Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company with
Interstate Commerce Commission.
44 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
1845 1846
Passengers $31,729 $36,716
Freight $21,372 $35,590
Mail $6,101 $6,561
$59,202 $78,867
Total expenses $41,957 $45,282
$17,245 $33,585
Another experiment made at this time was the leasing
of the Clover Hill Railroad, a twenty-one-mile line built
in 1844 and extending from the main line nine miles north
of Petersburg to Clover Hill in Chesterfield County to tap
the coal mines at that place.2 This proved to be a good
move on the part of the Richmond and Petersburg, and in
commenting on it later the president said that the annual
income which came from hauling the coal turned over to it
by the Clover Hill exceeded that which came to the main
line from the transportation of all other freight including
mail, express, and excess baggage.3 The amount carried
from Clover Hill to the Richmond and Petersburg from
1853 to 1867 was as follows: 4
1853 52,100 tons 1861 44,199 tons
1854 53,478 tons 1862 50,608 tons
1855 45,430 tons 1863 37,168 tons
1856 36,857 tons 1864 36,385 tons
1857 44,836 tons 1865 5,743 tons
1858 49,022 tons 1866 18,315 tons
1859 44,992 tons 1867 16,414 tons
1860 42,857 tons
The general freight to and from Clover Hill from 1853 to
1867 ran from 52 J to 1685 tons, averaging 885 tons; pas-
sengers ran from 156 to 1644, averaging 203 per year. The
price of labor at this period can be ascertained from the
1 Compiled from the Reports of 1845 and 1846.
2 Poors Manual, 1868-69, p. 206.
3 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, 1870,
p. 751.
4 Poors Manual, 1868-69, p. 206.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 45
statement in the report of 1847 that there were engaged in
the shops and offices of the company, exclusive of salaried
officers, 24 white employees at 75 cents to $1.75 per day,
and about 20 blacks hired by the year at a hire not exceed-
ing $30 each.1
In 1848 the mail controversy again arose. Because of a
disagreement between the Post Office Department and the
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac resulting in the
transfer of mails to the bay route, the northern and south-
ern through mail was taken from the Richmond and Peters-
burg in December, 1848. Only $100 per mile was offered for
the transportation of way mail, and the offer being refused,
all mail left the Richmond and Petersburg by April, 1849,
local mail being carried over turnpikes after that date.2
This situation did not last long and by December 4, 1849,
the differences were adjusted and mail restored to the com-
pany at the price formerly paid.3
Another dispute had arisen in the meantime in regard
to the number of directors the Board of Pub he Works,
representing the state interest, might appoint. The truth
seems to have been that the state owned more than two
fifths, but less than three fifths of the stock, and each side
claimed the right to appoint the decisive third man.
Mr. N. M. Martin, appointed by the Board of Public
Works, was refused admittance at the meeting of direc-
tors,4 and immediately took occasion to formulate a series
of charges of mismanagement on the part of the rail-
road, which document he filed with the Board of Public
Works.5 These charges, particularly that of collusion with
the Port Walthall and Norfolk Steamboat Association,
1 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, October
1, 1847.
2 Ibid., May 30, 1848. 3 Ibid., 1849.
4 Report of Board of Public Works of Virginia to Legislature, De-
cember 4, 1848.
5 Report of N. M. Martin to Board of Public Works of Virginia,
October 2, 1848, p. 535.
46 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
were refuted by President Wirt Robinson and the matter
blew over.1
Relations of the road with the Post Office Department
were continually under strain. In 1854 the difficulties in
mail service were detailed; insufficient remuneration for
the large amount of night service rendered, and loss of local
travel from fixing of hours by the Post Office Department.2
In 1855 the same complaints were made and the resolution
passed not to transport United States mail after July 1 at
less than the present rate, a cut having been threatened,
and not to transport it on any terms unless the Postmaster
General would agree to stipulate that mail be received at
hours not later than those at which travel would be re-
ceived by it from companies on present mail routes north
of Richmond and south of Petersburg.3
In 1858 the average rate of speed adopted by passenger
trains on the road including stops was 17.6 miles per hour,
in motion 20 to 25 miles per hour; while that of freight
trains with stops was 10 miles, and in motion 12 miles.4
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the operating ratio of
the road had decreased from 74 per cent in 1850 to 44 per
cent in 1860. Plans for connecting with the Richmond,
Fredericksburg, and Potomac and the Petersburg were
already under way but were necessarily interrupted by
hostilities.5
The situation in eastern Virginia up to the Civil War
may be summarized by saying that intense rivalry existed
among all the cities. Each promoted that enterprise which
seemed most likely to advance its own interest. Richmond
and Lynchburg at first were particularly interested in the
James River and Kanawha Canal. Norfolk, jealous of the
growth of the fall line towns, was trying to secure trade
from the West in a roundabout way so that it might not
1 President Robinson to Board of Public Works of Virginia, Janu-
ary 9, 1849.
2 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, 1854.
" Ibid., 1855. 4 Ibid., 1858. 6 See Appendix, Table II.
SUMMARY 47
have to go through Richmond. She was securing much trade
from the Roanoke section of North Carolina through the
Dismal Swamp Canal. Fredericksburg, Richmond, and
Petersburg, situated at the falls, were on the direct line
of an ever-increasing north and south current of traffic,
largely passenger, over poor roads which connected them.
With the application of steam to transportation and the
introduction and improvement of railroads, these north
and south currents became more and more important and
water transportation both by canal and river declined.
Situated at the head of navigation, these towns had early
become important trading centers. The ascendency thus
gained put them in a position to take advantage of the new
method of transportation. It was but the logical outcome
of events that they should be the first to build railroads.
The independent lines constructed to give them the desired
connection were finally consolidated into the Atlantic
Coast Line.
CHAPTER IV
NORTH CAROLINA AND THE WILMINGTON
AND WELDON RAILROAD BEFORE 1860
Economic Conditions
The one outstanding fact in the economic development of
North Carolina is that the state made but slight advance-
ment from the end of the colonial period up to about the
year 1835. Conditions were somewhat similar to those
in Virginia. The influential portion of the population lived
in the eastern section and dominated the policy of the en-
tire state. It was not until after the adoption of a new
constitution, which transferred the election of governor
from the legislature directly to the people, that there be-
gan a general movement for improvement.
North Carolina has always been preeminently an agri-
cultural state. It produces all kinds of grain, cotton, rice,
indigo, tobacco, hemp, and fruits, with abundant pasturage
in the mountains. In addition to purely agricultural prod-
ucts, timber has played an important part in its economic
development. Pine covers large areas and furnishes the
material from which turpentine is distilled. Prior to the
Civil War turpentine production gave direct employment
to four or five thousand laborers, and ten or fifteen thou-
sand more were supported by the proceeds of its first sale. *
The state is watered by a number of rivers of considerable
size, but in comparison with their size and number they
afford few facilities for navigation. The chief problem of
the farmer therefore was one of transportation.
Besides the difficulties in transportation the state suf-
fered after the War of 1812 from the fact that it found a
1 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. ii, p. 172.
NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1860 49
market for all its products outside its own borders. In
short, there was no home market of importance in which
the farmer could dispose of his surplus and purchase his
necessities. He secured his supplies abroad and when the
time of payment came all the specie was drained out of the
state. The state banks could not or did not prevent this.
They issued notes which were collected in great numbers
in Virginia, South Carolina, and Tennessee and sent home
for redemption. It was felt that the crying need was to
concentrate the commerce of the state at one or two points
and do the trading there. The total annual profit which
went to other states from the business of North Carolina
was estimated at more than a half-million.1
The state occupied a unique position in regard to its
trade and transportation after the War of 1812. The ex-
ports immediately preceding the Revolution were at least
double what they were in 1853. 2 It was estimated in 1819
that 500,000 people had left for the wilderness of the
West.3 While a drain of this magnitude was going on any
effort on the part of the state to develop its internal re-
sources was practically impossible. The population at this
time was 700,000, scattered over the whole area.4 This in
itself was an impediment to improvement and would have
made progress slow even where there were fewer obstacles
to be overcome.
North Carolina offered peculiar difficulties on account
of the nature of the configuration of its seashore and the
obstacles to navigation which arose from the nature of its
rivers. The ocean currents which are set in motion by the
Gulf Stream meet the currents of the rivers which flow
1 C. C. Weaver, Internal Improvements in North Carolina to 1860,
Johns Hopkins University Historical Studies, 1903, p. 21.
2 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. ii, p. 172.
8 Hoyt, Papers of A. D. Murphey, in Publications of North Carolina
Historical Commission, vol. ii, p. 105.
* North American Review, January, 1821.
50 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
down from the mountainous section, thus causing eddies.
A deposit has thus been formed which has taken the nature
of a long chain of islands just off the coast, cut here and there
by inlets. These inlets change position from time to time
and even where stationary vary in depth. Only three of
them admit ocean-going vessels; one to the waters of the
Albemarle, another to those of the Pamlico, and a third to
the Cape Fear. x Albemarle Sound, into which the Roanoke
River empties, is cut off from the ocean by a narrow sand-
bar. A vessel descending must sail 150 miles, down and
back, over dangerous shoals, passing through Ocracoke
Inlet in order to reach a point five miles distant from
where it passed into Pamlico Sound. Nine tenths of the
shipping of the nineteen counties which had access to these
waters went to New York. This portion of the state was
thus confronted with almost insuperable obstacles to its
trade.
The price of staves in those cities which shipped through
Ocracoke was $25 per thousand; the price at Suffolk only
thirty or forty miles away, but in direct communication
with the ocean, was $40 per thousand. Salt which passed
through Ocracoke cost ten cents more per bushel than it
did at Wilmington.2 It was estimated that the lumber pro-
ducer paid to this inlet one stave out of every three that he
sold, the maker of naval stores one barrel out of every four
that he made, the cotton grower one bale out of every eight
that he produced.
Not only was passage into the ocean difficult, but the
rivers which flow into the ocean offer impediments. In all
the rivers between the fall line and the ocean, bars have
been formed in almost exactly the same manner as the
string of islands skirting the coast. The tide meets the cur-
rent of the rivers and sedimentary bars form. These diffi-
1 Message of Governor Iredell, November 17, 1828. Published in
Star and North Carolina Gazette, November 20, 1828.
2 Report on Ocracoke Inlet by Committee on Internal Improve-
ments, Star and North Carolina Gazette, December 2, 1830.
NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1860 51
culties together with the scattered population caused a
long delay in undertaking internal improvements.
In 1815 a committee of investigation was appointed by
the legislature and reported the next year, recommending
that a survey of the state be made, that private com-
panies be incorporated to make needed improvements on
the rivers, and that the state become an investor in these
undertakings to the amount of one third of their capital. l
Two companies were accordingly incorporated for the im-
provement of navigation on the two principal rivers, the
Roanoke and the Cape Fear.2 The end which the commit-
tee had in view was twofold; to improve the inlets and the
rivers of the state so that trading centers and inland navi-
gation might be secured. In addition to these main objects,
it was urged that attention should be given to roads in
the upper mountainous portions where the rivers were too
shallow for navigation.
Again in 1819 the subject of internal improvements
occupied the attention of the public. In this year there
appeared a memoir by A. D. Murphey on the improve-
ments contemplated by North Carolina. It was similar to
the former report but was not official. It was broader in
scope and was intended to arouse public interest in the
subject. The state was represented as directing its efforts
to six lines of improvement; to the inlets, to the sounds
along the coast, to the primary rivers, to the junction of
two or more of these rivers by navigable canals, to public
highways, to draining the marshes of the eastern and south-
ern counties.3 The friends of internal improvements
claimed that private enterprise could not execute such vast
works without supervision and aid by the state. A bill was
finally passed establishing a fund for improvements and
1 Pamphlet reprinted in Publications of the North Carolina His-
torical Commission, vol. n, p. 35 ff.
2 North American Reivew, January, 1821.
3 Hoyt, Papers of A. D. Murphey, in Publications of North Carolina
Historical Commission, vol. n, p. 121.
52 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
a supervisory board. But the fund was inadequate and
within a few years nearly all the navigation companies
which had been assisted by it failed. The expenditure of
the state from 1815 to 1821 for these purposes was only
$100,000, and up to 1835, the beginning of the railroad
era, it amounted to only $291,576.
Murphey's scheme was too far in advance of the time.
It asked the state to do for itself what was sorely needed
but what was beyond its ability to perform. Capital was
scarce and the stock in the companies for the most part
was subscribed by farmers to whom profits were a second-
ary matter and an outlet for their produce of primary im-
portance. They were unable to give enough personal atten-
tion to the companies to insure their success. Another
difficulty was the scarcity of labor. The negroes were
slaves and consequently had no interest in the improve-
ment; the farmers and mechanics were otherwise employed
and would not work except at wages which the companies
could not pay.1
The next effort was that made by President Caldwell of
the University of North Carolina in 1828 to effect the
building of a railroad from Newberne to Beaufort.2 The
purpose of the road was the same as that of a canal previ-
ously proposed, to connect the rivers in the northern section.
In this way the produce along all of them could be collected
and a market established at Beaufort within the state. The
produce of the Roanoke and all the rivers between it and
the Cape Fear would be developed and turned so as to
leave the state through one of its own cities. The output
of the Roanoke country as well as that of the Neuse and
Tar had been sent to market through Virginia, and that
of the Broad, the Catawba, and the Pedee, through South
Carolina, in all about two thirds of what left the state.
1 C. C. Weaver, Internal Improvements in North Carolina to 1860,
Johns Hopkins Historical Studies, 1903, pp. 20-22.
2 Ibid., p. 35 ff.
NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1860 53
The trade of the Roanoke country alone was estimated
at two and a half millions yearly.1
This north and south connection was finally made by
means of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad which
eventually became a part of the Atlantic Coast Line. The
two sections to be joined were the Roanoke country and
the Cape Fear district. The Cape Fear River is the natural
and actual outlet for the produce of twenty-eight counties
in North Carolina,2 but the great hindrance to early devel-
opment was the existence of bars which formed below Wil-
mington and at the mouth. The state had failed in its
efforts to procure a system of internal improvements, and
it was not until 1826 that the federal government took up
the matter. In 1829 the Cape Fear was included in the list
of rivers which were to receive a federal appropriation.3
For sixteen years it received an annual appropriation of
$20,000. Progress was slow, but in 1847 a depth of 13 feet
at high water was attained. Later, in 1854, although the
Democratic party was opposed to internal improvements,
the representative of the Cape Fear district persuaded
enough Democrats to absent themselves from the House
to secure the passage of a bill appropriating $140,000 to
the Cape Fear River. With the object of forcing all the
water of the river out through one channel, the closing of
New Inlet was begun when the war broke out and the
work was abandoned.4 The fact that it had not been closed
was a great advantage to the Confederate blockade run-
ners.
The impetus which Murphey gave to the sentiment for
developing the state never entirely died in spite of the fact
1 North American Review, January, 1821.
2 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 146. Edition
referred to in each case is that of 1916.
3 Congress was asked for an appropriation to clear the channel on
the ground that during the Revolution vessels were sunk in the Cape
Fear below Wilmington for the purpose of preventing the approach of
British ships of war. Fayetteville Journal, February 11, 1829.
* James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 146.
54 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
that nothing of real importance came of his efforts at the
time. The idea of developing a home market remained
uppermost. Public opinion from the time of the earliest
discussion of railroad building in North Carolina had been
divided into two hostile camps. The eastern section of the
state had contended for the building of a road north and
south while the western portion favored an east and west
line. In 1828 the citizens of Chatham, Randolph, and
Orange Counties issued an address to the citizens of the
state favoring the latter. They called attention to the fact
that cotton was the only commodity which would bear the
cost of transportation from this section of the state to
market, and predicted that it would not long do so, since
its growth in the Southwest was constantly increasing.1
E. B. Dudley, later governor of the state, represented the
opposite opinion, thinking that a line built east and west
would virtually divide the state into two parts, one part be-
ing transferred to Virginia and the other to South Carolina.
An Internal Improvements Convention was held in
Raleigh on July 4, 1833, at which there were present 120
delegates representing 21 counties of the state.2 Opinion in
this convention was still divided as to whether the efforts
put forth should be directed toward building north and
south lines of communication to connect with roads already
in process of construction, or east and west to market the
products of the state through North Carolina ports. Reso-
lutions were passed to the effect that no work should be
prosecuted conveying produce to a primary market out of
the state, that the legislature be asked to take two fifths of
the stock of companies to be formed, and that a correspond-
ing committee of twenty be appointed in each county. To
quote from the records of the convention:
The state cannot be asked to commit an act so suicidal as to
lend resources to the accomplishment of any work the tendency of
1 Star and North Carolina Gazette, August 28, 1828.
2 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 148.
NORTH CAROLINA BEFORE 1860 55
which would be to carry any portion of her produce to a primary
market beyond her own limits before she has done all she can to
create such a market within them and before proper exertions
have been made to bring every section within reach of such
markets.1
It had been evident to most of those interested that this
primary market within the state must be Wilmington. In
the early history of North Carolina this town had enjoyed
a considerable trade with the West Indies. Naval stores,
lumber, staves, rice, indigo, and hides were shipped in
"plantation vessels" of forty to one hundred and fifty tons
to other coast towns and to the West Indies. After 1735
there was a great increase in the exportation of rice, the
cultivation of which became the chief agricultural industry
of the Cape Fear region.
As population spread into the back country, Wilming-
ton still held its place as the most important trade center of
the district. It secured much of its trade from Fayetteville,
the focus for the wagon trade of the surrounding country
as well as for the river pole boats. Fayetteville had an
extensive system of plank roads into the interior and thus
carried on trade with the country lying west of the Blue
Ridge and even with Tennessee and southwest Virginia.
The old canvas-topped wagon was the vehicle which
served to bring produce to the head of navigation. The
starting point of the back trade was Wilmington and before
steamers were put on the Cape Fear, wagoning was done
in stages between Fayetteville and Philadelphia.2 The
highland country farmers for a hundred miles around and
even sometimes from beyond the Blue Ridge brought their
corn, meal, flour, and cotton down to Fayetteville in
heavy six-horse wagons, camping at night by the roadside.
1 Internal Improvements Convention, Raleigh, July 4, 1833. In-
ternal Improvements Documents and Reports, North Carolina State
Library.
2 Advertisement in South Carolina State Gazette and Columbia
Advertiser, February 15, 1831.
56 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
These wagons were unwieldy, the roads bad, and twenty
miles per day was an average rate.1 But when their work
was done in the fall the farmers were at leisure until plant-
ing time the following spring. Slowness of travel meant
little to them. Even after railroads were built many farm-
ers pursued their old method of marketing. Olmsted de-
scribes them in 1854 as getting together a load of produce
in the fall and taking it to market as their fathers had
done, exchanging it there for "sugar, molasses, coffee and
a coffee-mill or other down-coast notion" and returning
home.2
Besides the wagon trade there was a large pole boat
commerce carried on in small boats pushed up and down
the streams which were too shallow for larger ones. Car-
goes were unloaded at Fayetteville, shipped to Wilmington
and from there reshipped by means of boat through the
mouth of the Cape Fear River, or to the north after rail-
road connection was made. Before the railroad era much
of the produce, especially naval stores, found its way in
tar and shingle skippers to the coast cities of New England.3
The tonnage of the port exceeded that of Richmond though
the city was not more than a quarter the size of Richmond.4
The Wilmington and Weldon Railroad
As soon as it was found that railroads were practicable, a
movement was put on foot to secure them. North Carolina
was late, compared with other states, in securing them.
In 1830 she had only one and a half miles of line.5 Ten
years later she had but 250 miles, which had cost an aver-
age of $12,806 per mile.6
1 Olmsted, Travels in the Seaboard Slave States (edition of 1856, Dix
& Edwards, New York), p. 350.
2 Ibid., p. 364. 8 Boston Covrier, July 23, 1830.
4 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 157.
6 Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the United
States, p. 81.
6 II. S. Tanner, A Description of the Canals and Railroads of the
United States, p. 169.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 57
There was a line of steamers plying between Wilmington
and Charleston. l One of the railroads ran from Raleigh to
Gaston on the Roanoke, 87 miles, costing ' upwards of
$1,500,000, the other was the Wilmington and Weldon,
161 miles long, costing nearly $2,000,000. Communication
from Wilmington to the north had been by means of pack-
ets and two stage lines, one through Newberne and the
other through Fayetteville and Raleigh.
The idea of building a railroad north from Wilmington
seems to have originated with P. K. Dickinson who had
seen a short line in operation in New England.2 He re-
turned to Wilmington and began agitation for a railroad.
The result was that the Wilmington and Raleigh was in-
corporated on January 3, 1834. 3 At this time the intention
was to join the principal seaport with the capital but the
people of Raleigh would not subscribe. As a result it was
decided to build the road into the Roanoke country. Ac-
cordingly in December, 1835, the charter was amended to
confer larger privileges and change the destination so as
to connect with the Virginia lines at Weldon.4 Permission
was also granted to purchase, own, and possess steamboats
to ply from Wilmington to Charleston or elsewhere.5
The building of a railroad from Wilmington to Weldon,
at that time the longest railroad in the world, was a tre-
mendous undertaking for the citizens of Wilmington. At the
time the road was incorporated the population of the town
was about 3000, the majority of whom were negro slaves.
When the twenty men assembled at the home of Governor
1 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. ii, p. 176.
2 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 149.
3 Acts of North Carolina, 1833-34, ch. 68.
4 The southern portion of the road runs in an almost straight line
in the direction of Raleigh. After change in plans it was deflected to-
ward Weldon. See map at beginning of chapter in.
5 Reports of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, vol. I,
Treasurer's office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wilming-
ton, N.C.
58 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Dudley and made their subscriptions to the road, the sum
subscribed was larger than the entire taxable property of
the town. The largest subscription, that of Governor
Dudley, was $25,000. While the road was being constructed
its credit became poor and an order of the promoters for
one hundred dozen shovels, although indorsed by the
stockholders, was refused and it was necessary for one of
the stockholders to add a hardware branch to his business
in order that the road might secure needed tools. While the
company was in such straits it was necessary to hold fre-
quent meetings of the stockholders and directors. The
method of announcing these meetings was unique. A citi-
zen of the town owned a docile old gray mare. She was
borrowed periodically by the company and decorated with
placards swung on either side inscribed "Railroad meeting
to-night! " A small negro boy ringing a bell rode her through
the streets of Wilmington and thus secured the desired
attendance. 1
The main provisions of this original charter were: the
road was to run from some point within the town of Wil-
mington or in the neighborhood of it, to the city of Ra-
leigh; there was to be a meeting of subscribers when
$300,000 or more were subscribed; when 300 shares had
been subscribed the company should be incorporated as
the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company; two
dollars was to be paid at time of subscription; no person
owning less than twenty shares could become president.
In determining damages when condemning land, advan-
tages had also to be taken into consideration, the difference
to be assessed in court; only a company incorporated in
North Carolina might be allowed to build a road connect-
ing with this one, the method of weighing cars to be pro-
vided by the company desiring to "intersect," with a fine
of $200 for not arranging to weigh. Toll-gates were to be
erected at such points as the company might desire, with
1 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 154.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 59
a toll of four cents per mile and a transportation charge
of nine cents per ton mile. Passenger fares were to be six
cents per mile for each passenger until the net profits re-
ceived should amount to a sum equal to the capital stock
expended, with 6 per cent per annum interest thereon,
from the time the money was advanced by the stockholders.
After that they were to be so reduced as to enable the
company to earn only 15 per cent on its investment.1
The state of North Carolina subscribed two fifths of the
capital stock of the company, construed as including both
road and steamboat connection with Charleston, a part of
which was paid from North Carolina's share in the surplus
distributed by the federal government in 1835. 2 To enable
the Board of Internal Improvements to make this sub-
scription a transfer from the Literary Fund was agreed on.
The local jealousies that entered into all works of inter-
nal improvement are indicated by the statement of Gov-
ernor Dudley, ex-officio president of the board, that "it can
be a matter of not the slightest importance to the people of
North Carolina whether the citizens of other states should
occupy twelve hours or as many days in passing through
the state," and that the primary object was "to throw at
least a very large portion of the produce of the state into
one of its own markets." 3
The main line, extending from Wilmington to Weldon,
161 miles, with a branch from Rocky Mount to Tarboro,
19 miles, was opened on March 9. 1840. The first meeting
of the stockholders was held on March 14, 1836, in the
courthouse at Wilmington, and organized by electing
Governor E. B. Dudley president, General Alex MacRea
1 Acts of North Carolina, 1833-34, ch. 68, p. 122 ff.
1 Letter of Governor E. B. Dudley, February 4, 1837, to Charles
Fisher and Thomas G. Polk. Manuscript in Dudley letters, North
Carolina Historical Commission, Raleigh, N.C.
3 Report of Governor Dudley, ex-officio president of the Board of
Internal Improvements, to the Assembly of North Carolina, November
7, 1838.
60 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
superintendent, and James S. Green, secretary and treas-
urer. It was agreed to start building the road at both Halifax
and Wilmington at the same time, since subscriptions had
been made along the contemplated route as well as at Wil-
mington. Work was begun in October of that year but little
was done until the spring of 1837, and not till 1840 was it
finished and opened throughout, though a part was in use
from 1838. Its equipment consisted of twelve locomotives,
all having names according to the custom of the time, eight
passenger cars, four mail cars, and fifty freight cars. The
locomotives were built in England, in Philadelphia, and in
Richmond.1 In 1838 and 1839 a stage line was operated in
connection with the trains and boats. This stage line, al-
though expensive to operate, secured for the road the trans-
portation of mail several years earlier than could other-
wise have been arranged with the government and gave
publicity to the road while still under construction.2 The
distance from Wilmington to Charleston was covered by
steamboats, four of which formed part of the material
equipment in 1840. 3 Congress in that year appropriated
$5000 a year for lighting the Cape Fear River, as naviga-
tion at night was necessary for transporting the mail.
Until then this expense was borne by the railroad com-
pany.4
Upon the completion of the road a great celebration was
held in Wilmington. People came from the northern part
of the state, from Virginia and South Carolina. A great
barbecue was spread at the depot at which 550 people
were served, bells were rung, 161 guns were fired, one for
each mile of fine, for this was the first time a train of cars
1 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 150.
2 Report of Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, May 6,
1839.
8 Report of Chief Engineer Gwynn to Wilmington and Raleigh Rail-
road Company, April 15, 1840.
4 Articles by Senex, Jr. (John MacLaurin) in local newspapers on
"Wilmington in the Forties." Reprinted in Sprunt, Chronicles of the
Cape Fear River, p. 159 ff.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 61
was ever pulled 161 miles continuously on a railroad.
Toasts were offered, letters of congratulation read, and in
the afternoon the ceremony of mingling the waters of the
Roanoke, Tar, and Neuse with those of the Cape Fear was
celebrated.1
The arrival of the Charleston mail and passenger boats,
which ran daily to connect with trains at Wilmington, de-
termined during the first years of the road the time of
departure of the north-bound trains. Since this schedule
was necessarily elastic and varied as much as an hour
according to the tides and weather, it was customary for
Wilmington citizens bound north to continue their daily
affairs until the bell of the approaching steamer was heard.
It is said that a chemist once delayed his departure until
the train reached Boney Bridge, whereupon the conductor
seeing his frantic signal reversed the train and ran back
two blocks to take him on board. Another indication that
train service in those days was more leisurely and personal
than now is the fact that it was the custom of certain offi-
cers of the road on occasions to meet the south-bound
passengers on their arrival at Wilmington and to present
to every lady a bouquet of flowers. Jenny Lind is said to
]iave been one of those thus favored by the secretary and
treasurer, Mr. James S. Green. In the case of passengers
who remained a few days in Wilmington, this preliminary
courtesy was likely to be followed by a series of formal
calls by prominent citizens of the town.2
The equipment of this early road also presented a strik-
ing contrast to that at present to be found on the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad. The engines could not pull even a
light train up a slight incline, so no direct connection with
the boat landing was attempted. Baggage was shot down
an incline to a hand car and rolled to the steamer. Large
trunks, however, were unknown, and it was "the day of
1 Charleston Courier, March 14, 1840.
2 James Sprunt. Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 150.
62 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
bandboxes and bundles to try the patience of husbands or
other male attendants." Baggage checking was also un-
known, and for some time after it was introduced was used
only on special lines. Neither had systems of communica-
tion been perfected. Between Monday noon, July 11, 1842,
and Thursday night, July 14, three heavy trains were lost
between Wilmington and Weldon. The country between
the Roanoke and Tar Rivers had been flooded and three
breaches caused in the roadbed. One train had lost all com-
munication with the outside world by getting between the
rivers, and the other two had been thrown from the track
by fallen trees.1
Relations between the Post Office Department and all
the early roads were anything but friendly, and the Wil-
mington and Weldon made as bitter complaints as did its
Virginia neighbors. The bid put in at the expiration of the
first contract, June, 1843, was rejected by the Postmaster
General, but a slight compromise was thereafter effected.
The result was highly unsatisfactory to the railroad, which
in October, 1844, published a letter to the public stating
its case. In the letter it was declared that the road was
"not to blame for all failures from Maine to New Orleans,"
that the time allowed was a fair weather schedule wholly
inadequate on stormy days, and that the remuneration,
$220 per mile, was insufficient and unfair. For the 336 miles
covered, 161 by railroad and 175 by steamboat, 31 hours
was allowed south and 30 hours north.2 In 1846 an accident
on the road was attributed to the great speed at which
the engines had to run to make schedule time.3
In 1840 the state of North Carolina endorsed the bonds
of the company for $300,000 payable in equal installments
of $50,000 from 1842 to 1847, to enable the company to pay
1 Articles by Senex, Jr. (John MacLaurin) in Sprunt, Chronicles of
the Cape Fear River, p. 159 ff.
2 Report of the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, No-
vember 14, 1844.
3 Ibid., November 12, 1846.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 63
the balance of debts incurred in construction. The first in-
stallment was met, but because of the fire in Wilmington in
April, 1843, destroying much property of the company,
the second could not be paid. The state therefore invested
its Literary Fund in the bonds due in 1843, those due in
1844 were paid by the public treasurer. In 1844 the com-
pany asked the legislature to authorize the endorsement
of new bonds of longer term, stating that since a mort-
gage had been given the state on all property of the rail-
road, the company was deprived of credit and ability to
negotiate loans, on its own account.1 Similar pleas were
made in following years, and in January, 1849, an exten-
sion of ten years was granted.2 To quote President McRae:
As well might the farmer who had built but half of his fence
expect to protect his crop and gather it at harvest time as for the
state to stop short with works in which she conjointly with her
citizens has embarked, before they are completed and expect to
reap the profits. The policy is to go on until one or more enter-
prises undertaken within her limits is finished.3
In the same report President McRae comments on the
adoption of the flat rail as the unfortunate mistake of the
southern roads and the chief cause why they had been
unprofitable to the stockholders. In 1848 the legislature
passed a bill authorizing the mortgage of the road for
$600,000 for the purpose of purchasing iron.4 The agita-
tion for the iron rail once begun was continued until the
entire line of the Wilmington and Weldon was relaid in the
fifties. After the road had been in operation for seven
years, it subscribed $100,000 to be paid in cash to the Wil-
mington and Manchester upon the completion of that line.
The companies composing the inland route had con-
stantly to meet competition from the sea route which could
1 Memorial of the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, to
the General Assembly of North Carolina, December 10, 1844.
2 James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 152.
3 Report of the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, No-
vember 12, 1847.
k * James Sprunt, Chronicles of the Cape Fear River, p. 152.
64 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
afford to set a much lower price than that of the railroads.
To add to the attractiveness of inland travel, through ticket
arrangements were made so that by 1849 tickets could be
purchased in New York for Charleston and in Charleston
for New York. x Passenger fares were regulated by the com-
panies upon the per mile rate, the proceeds of the through
ticket being divided in proportion to distance. In 1851 a
contract was made with the Washington and New Orleans
Telegraphic Company to put up posts for a line of tele-
graphic wires from the junction of the Petersburg Railroad
to Wilmington. By contract the telegraph company was
entitled to free use of the railroad.2
A comparison of the year 1853 with 1841, the first year
after the completion of the road, showed an increase in
earnings from local travel from $8075 to $138,148 and in
freight from $29,726 to $112,582.3 For fifteen years after
its opening in 1840 the Wilmington and Raleigh was the
only conveyance along the seaboard by railroad for pas-
senger travel and United States mail. In 1858 the company
paid semi-annual dividends of 7 per cent and had a large
surplus. The cost of the road and equipment was estimated
at $2,776,404 in that year. When the North Carolina Rail-
road was completed it was arranged that the products of
the West should go to Wilmington through Goldsboro.
All breaks at terminals were as far as possible removed and
a joint arrangement with the Florida Railroad was effected
to secure a large amount of the southern travel. This be-
came then and has remained one of the chief sources of
revenue to the Atlantic Coast Line.
By 1853 the preliminary period may be said to have
come to a close and the act of that year,4 amending the
charter, marks the beginning of a new era. According to
1 Report of the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, No-
vember 8, 1849.
2 Ibid., November 13, 1851.
3 Ibid., November 10, 1853.
4 Acts of North Carolina, 1354-55, ch. 235, p. 302.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 65
the terms of the act, the voting power of the state on the
board of directors was reduced by one third, owing to
the fact that the state had disposed of one third of its
shares.1
Then, too, the name of the road was a misnomer. It was
chartered as the Wilmington and Raleigh, but was built
to Weldon instead of to Raleigh. The name was there-
fore changed to the Wilmington and Weldon.
Besides the line between Wilmington and Weldon, there
had been constructed prior to the Civil War a nineteen-
mile branch to Tarboro. This branch was begun in 1850
and put into operation in August, 1860.
During the existence of the road as the Wilmington and
Raleigh, securities were sold in England. These were begin-
ning now to fall due and it was with difficulty that payment
was met.
The ticket arrangement with the lines to the north was
a constant source of worry to the officials. It was becoming
more and more difficult to procure slaves or free blacks for
freight hands, and resort was had for a time to white men,
but these left when they found their work harder than they
anticipated or when their immediate wants were satisfied.
To improve the labor situation, the chief engineer in 1860
urged the purchase of at least twenty able-bodied young
negroes for use at trains and at warehouses.
Growing competition was another problem of the com-
pany. The Virginia and Tennessee Railroad had been con-
structed and was becoming a competitor at a time when
the naval stores business, which had been one of the main
supports of the Wilmington and Weldon, was falling off. The
outside steamers continued to secure much traffic at Wil-
mington which otherwise would have gone over this road.2
1 The proceeds of the sale were invested in the Wilmington and
Manchester.
2 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, November
11, 1858.
66 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
When the war came "all minor matters were dropped from
consideration and the company began to serve the Con-
federate Government, in the transportation of troops and
munitions of war."
CHAPTER V
THE SOUTH CAROLINA-GEORGIA TERRITORY AND
ITS RAILROADS BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
The railroads of the South Carolina-Georgia territory
which became a part of the Atlantic Coast Line System
were built mostly in the older sections of the states. The
farthest point west reached by any of those in South Caro-
lina was Kingsville on the Charleston and Hamburg, little
more than halfway between the coast and Augusta.
In Georgia there were two roads, one running from Sa-
vannah and the other from Brunswick. These intersected
at what is now Waycross. The one from Savannah was
extended and under another name was constructed into
the Southwest as far as Thomasville.
The purpose of the builders of these Georgia lines was to
connect by rail the Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.
The construction of such a railroad would supplant the old
dirt road cut through the wilderness to obviate sailing
around Florida in order to reach the Gulf cities of Mobile
and New Orleans.
At the time these lines were built transportation condi-
tions in the two states were very similar. Poor roads pre-
vailed here as in Virginia and North Carolina. The old
stage routes formed the main lines of communication. One
of these running between Charleston and Savannah
formed a part of what was known as the "New Southern
Line" from New York to New Orleans.1 This old route
remained in existence well into the railroad era. Passengers
reached Charleston from New York, Philadelphia, and
other northern cities by means of boat, railroad, and stage
coach. From Charleston they went by boat to Brunswick;
1 Charleston Courier, December 21, 1839.
68 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
from Brunswick to Tallahassee by post coach; then through
Apalachicola, Pensacola, and Mobile to New Orleans.1
Roads were at times impassable. Harriet Martineau, in
traveling through the Carolinas and Georgia on a trip of
several days' duration, saw but one other vehicle and that
was a stage returning from Charleston.2 In the winter of
1828 the road from Columbia to Charleston became so bad
that it was impossible for the stages to get through and the
mail was carried on horseback. All sorts of obstructions
existed and it was sometimes necessary to take the wheels
off the stage coaches and lift the different parts one at a
time over a fallen tree.3 The character of some of the drivers
was not above reproach. Drunkenness among them was
common. Under such circumstances only those traveled
who were impelled by curiosity or forced by necessity to do
so; only such surplus products reached an outlet as could
bear the cost of transportation from the interior to a navi-
gable river or those which were produced in the neighbor-
hood of such a river. In the hill country corn was grown,
converted into whiskey, and thus marketed.
Besides the old cities where settlements along the coast
had first been made, there had sprung up along the fall line
a number of what may be called secondary settlements
which had become the chief inland markets. Important
among these was Augusta, up the Savannah River from
Savannah. It became the greatest inland cotton market.
Merchants here bought cotton from farmers as far west as
Athens. Boats plied the Savannah, carried down cotton,
and brought back supplies to be distributed to the
interior.
The two important markets in South Carolina were
Columbia on the Congaree and Camden on the Wateree.
Country products were sent down the two rivers to their
l. Running advertisement in Charleston Courier, 1840.
1 Harriet Martineau, Society in America, vol. n, p. 172.
8 Mrs. Royall, Southern Tour, vol. n, p. 99.
DECLINE OF EXPORTS 69
junction and thence down the Santee and through the
Santee Canal to Charleston. These inland markets, while
important, never reached the point attained by Augusta.
The main difficulty was obstruction to navigation.
While the population of South Carolina was centered
along the valleys of the eastern rivers, rice was the chief
product, but when the upland and hill country to the west
was settled, cotton became the leading product. Tobacco
and indigo had each in turn been the staple of the state in
early times, but had given place to cotton.1 During the
latter part of the eighteenth century corn, wheat, barley,
tobacco, hemp, flax, and indigo were exported, but by 1825
the cotton and rice growers did not raise enough grain and
forage to support their stock. Neither did the eastern sec-
tions raise enough stock to do the work on the planta-
tions, but secured the supply from the western hill coun-
try and mountains, from which the animals were driven
to market.
Compared with agriculture, manufactures played a very
unimportant part in the economic development of the
state. A few mines and forges had been in operation at an
early date. During the Revolution premiums were offered
for the production of iron. In 1840 there were four furnaces
and nine bloomeries turning out about 2500 tons annually.
This production remained about constant for twenty years
and then declined.2
South Carolina was a great exporting state at the be-
ginning of the nineteenth century, with a population in
1820 of 500,000.3 Of the $82,000,000 of commodities which
were exported from the United States in 1816, the share
of South Carolina was $11,000,000. New York State alone
ranked higher.
With the application of steam to the steamship and its
1 Mills, Statistics of South Carolina, p. 153.
2 Swank, History of Iron in All Ages, p. 276.
3 Mills, Statistics of South Carolina^ p. 177.
70 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
improvement, ocean trade currents were shifted. The
steam vessels coming from Europe or going to Europe
now went in a direct line regardless of ocean currents and
winds, whereas the old sailing vessels were dependent upon
them. The route from Europe to America had formerly
been down the coast of Africa into the trade winds, and
across the Atlantic, thence with the Gulf Stream to the
American coast. Charleston, Savannah, and the other
South Atlantic cities were the natural termini of these
sailing routes.
These old coast cities might have been able to hold their
own if they had been in a position to enter into the contest
on an equal footing with those farther to the north. But
at the very period when ocean transportation was being
revolutionized, the manufacturing, commercial, and carry-
ing interests of the section were waning. Moreover, cotton
was fast becoming king and an ever-increasing amount of
attention was being given to agriculture.
As early as 1824 most of the produce leaving southern
ports was being carried in vessels belonging to northern
capitalists. As cotton became the center of interest, manu-
facturing and industrial pursuits declined, shipbuilding
along with the rest. This decline in shipbuilding continued
until the Civil War. In 1840 the South built 138 of the
1022 vessels constructed in the United States. In 1860 this
section built 236 vessels with a total tonnage of 39,478,
or an average of a little more than 166 tons per vessel.
During the same year the North built 835 vessels with a
tonnage of 173,414, or an average of over 180 tons per
vessel. Southern-built vessels were for use on rivers and
in the coastwise trade rather than for transatlantic serv-
ice as were those constructed in the North. The ship-
yards along the Carolina-Georgia coast were becoming of
less importance; those north of the Virginia Capes, more.1
From the foundation of the government to 1860,
1 Edward Ingle, Southern Sidelights, p. 70.
DECLINE OF EXPORTS 71
$12,994,998 were given as bounties on vessels. Of this
amount Massachusetts received $7,926,273, Maine
$4,175,050, the South practically nothing.1 This is not,
however, the only explanation of the decline of shipbuilding
in the South. Agriculture under the system of slavery was
more profitable to this section than shipbuilding even
with a bounty. The decline in shipbuilding was only one
manifestation of the stagnation which was settling on the
South. Along with the decline of shipbuilding came also
a decline in shipping. The produce shipped from Charles-
ton in 1820 amounted to $8,690,000. By 1847 this had
fallen to $7, 783,000. 2
It was estimated that from 1830 to 1850, $500,000 a year
left Charleston and went out of the state to purchase
articles which could have been manufactured at home.
From 1830 to 1840, 83,000 slaves were carried out of South
Carolina to the Southwest by their masters yearly, from
land that produced 1200 pounds of cotton per hand to land
that produced 1800 pounds. This draining of South Caro-
lina and eastern Georgia of their population and resources,
chiefly to the Southwest, checked the development of these
states. In 1820 they produced one half of the cotton grown
in the United States; by 1850 this had fallen to one fifth.3
In both Georgia and South Carolina the early wealth
and culture were centered along the coast.4 When the South-
west opened up and the growth of cotton began to occupy
the chief place, much of the wealth and many of the
farmers moved into this new country. The tide water sec-
tion farther north had almost given up tobacco after the
War of 1812, and slaves were numerous. Many owners
removed to Georgia with their whole households in the
1 Edward Ingle, Southern Sidelights, p. 70.
2 De Bow, Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States,
vol. in, p. 139.
3 Governor Hammond in De Bow, Industrial Resources of the South-
ern and Western States, vol. in, p. 25.
* Smith, Story of Georgia and Georgia People, p. 241.
72 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
expectation of making fortunes by growing cotton. Some
settlers came from as far north as Maryland. Many of
them, when they had lived for a few years in the country,
became dissatisfied, and moved on farther west, and took
up new land in a new country.1
There was another class of settlers who came into
Georgia in large numbers. There were the poor farmers who
could not compete with the big slave-owners from the
older states. They had exhausted their land by a wasteful
system of agriculture and had had to seek their fortunes in
a new country. The small farmers settled for the most part
in the poor, sandy, pine hill section and raised cattle which
could be driven or cut timber which could be floated to
market.2 The earliest settlers of this portion of the state
raised some tobacco and attempted to establish manu-
factures,3 but cotton raising soon became the chief indus-
try. Harriet Martineau estimated in 1831 that the shoe
manufacturing business alone in New York State amounted
to more than the entire commerce of Georgia in that year.4
Manufactures could not develop where cotton culture
monopolized practically all effort and capital. The fifteen
years from 1820 to 1835 was a period of bustle and hurry.
Everybody was growing cotton and fortunes were being
1 A migrant from Maryland met his brother in Columbia, South
Carolina, after a separation of several years. "When they had exchanged
greetings, the South Carolinian was astonished to find that his brother
was on his way to Florida, having sold all his property in Maryland.
Upon inquiring what he would do if he did not find Florida to his liking,
he received the reply: "Why, move along westward, to be sure, and if
I don't find anything to suit me by the way in the state of Georgia or
Alabama, I can easily put my whole establishment, wife, children,
furniture, slaves, and other articles on board a steamboat and proceed
up the Mississippi." His wife added: "We have been doing so all our
lives. You do not know what it is to be married to a gadding husband."
(From Hall, Travels in America, vol. in, p. 128 (ed. 1829).
* Smith, Story of Georgia and Georgia People, p. 299.
3 The first factory in Georgia was established in 1810 and was located
twelve miles out of Washington, Georgia. Smith, Story of Georgia and
Georgia People, p. 237.
4 Harriet Martineau, Society in America, vol. n, p. 229.
DECLINE IN POPULATION 73
accumulated rapidly. The planters spent their own money
and borrowed all they could get. Cotton growing was the
chief activity. A man with an income of $5000 a year lived
in a cabin and fed his family on bacon and corn bread. But
because of difficulties of transportation the system of
growing cotton and buying supplies had not arisen. Most
of the western plantations were self-sufficient.1
While the Southwest was being developed rapidly, the
eastern sections of Georgia and South Carolina were not
prospering. The fertility of the land in the older sections was
being exhausted and population was moving west. The
population of Charleston in 1810 was 24,700 and in 1840
had increased by only 5000. 2 The chief exports continued
to be rice and cotton.3 There was little manufacturing of any
kind and most of the business men were engaged in trade
which they secured by a number of steamboat lines to the
inland towns.4 The position of Savannah was not materially
different from that of Charleston or Wilmington. Its trade
had been in the same commodities. Its population had
grown but slowly. In 1810 there were something over 5000
people living there; by 1840 the population had slightly
more than doubled.5 The town had depended largely on
the cotton and rice export trade for its business prosperity.
The first cotton had been shipped from Savannah between
1770 and 1780. Its cotton export had grown, reached a
maximum in 1844, and then declined. Its rice export began
to decline after 1846.6 Not only was its export trade de-
clining, but it was also becoming more and more depend-
ent for its supplies on the North. In 1848 there were
shipped to Savannah 600,000 pounds of tobacco, valued at
1 Smith, Story of Georgia and Georgia People, p. 352.
2 Bancroft, Savannah, Census and Statistics, p. 2.
3 Hall, Travels in America, p. 189; Mills, Statistics of South Carolina,
p. 389.
4 Mills, Statistics of South Carolina, p. 428.
5 Bancroft, Savannah, Census and Statistics, p. 2; White, History of
Georgia, p. 158.
6 See Appendix, Table V.
74 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
$150,000, most of which came from New York; 5000 bar-
rels of potatoes from New York; and 4000 barrels of apples
from New England. The potatoes and apples were valued
at $10,000.
The condition of shipping may be seen from the clear-
ances for the year 1847-48 : American vessels arrived from
foreign ports, 40, with a tonnage of 6925 ; American vessels
arrived coastwise, 397, with a tonnage of 99,409; foreign
vessels arrived from foreign ports, 51, with a tonnage of
28,766; American vessels cleared to foreign ports, 61, with
a tonnage of 14,340; American vessels cleared coastwise,
39, with a tonnage of 28,012; foreign vessels cleared to
foreign ports, 55y with a tonnage of 30,570. l
With the general decline of the eastern section, chief
interest centered in the western portion of the region. The
aim of the eastern seaboard cities was to reach out and se-
cure, if possible, a foothold in the newer Southwest. By so
doing they would secure the produce of that section, chiefly
cotton and naval stores, for their own market at the
expense of Mobile and New Orleans. Most of the early
railroads of South Carolina and Georgia were built with
this object in view.
Those railroads of South Carolina and Georgia, which
were afterward incorporated in the Atlantic Coast Line
System, had much less influence on the economic develop-
ment of that section than did the roads of Virginia and
North Carolina on the territory farther to the north. There
are two reasons why this was so; first, they were built
later, after other roads had been established, and were,
therefore, subject to more intense competition than had
been the case with those of Virginia and North Carolina;
second, many of them were built to serve the interest of a
particular section. To illustrate: the Cheraw and Darling-
ton was built largely by the people of the upper Peedee as
an all-year outlet for their naval stores. The Northeastern
1 Bancroft, Savannah, Census and Statistics, p. 38.
THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE GROUP 75
of South Carolina was built to revive the failing fortunes
of Charleston. Its purpose was to bring to Charleston trade
which had been diverted by the Wilmington and Man-
chester. The Brunswick and Albany and the Savannah,
Albany, and Gulf were constructed as rival lines into the
growing southwest Georgia territory. The Savannah and
Charleston, variously named after reorganizations, was
built largely in the interest of Charleston. Its main object
was to attract cotton to Charleston whence it might be
shipped. Little success attended any of the roads built at
this time in the Georgia-South Carolina territory.
For purposes of discussion the roads of this section may
be divided into two groups, as follows : first, those forming
eventually the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina;
and second, those forming, after the Civil War, the Sa-
vannah, Florida, and Western.
The Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina Group
In this group of roads were the Wilmington, Columbia,
and Augusta; the Northeastern of South Carolina; and the
Cheraw and Darlington. During the period under consid-
eration they were all independent roads. It was not until
long after the Civil War that they, with others built after
the war, were consolidated into a small system known as
the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina, and as such
incorporated into the Atlantic Coast Line proper.
The Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta Railroad
The first of these roads, the Wilmington, Columbia,
and Augusta, from the time it was chartered in 1846 to its
entrance into the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina
at a much later period, had a checkered career. It under-
went three sales of foreclosure and two reorganizations,
leased another railroad and failing to pay the rental, was
76 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
in its turn leased by it. The road was originally chartered
in 1846 as the Wilmington and Manchester,1 and was
opened in 1854 from Eagle Island opposite Wilmington
to Kingsville, South Carolina, a distance of 172 miles.
Largely because it was unable to secure favorable traffic
arrangements with the Charleston and Hamburg, it was
not successful, and was sold for the first time under fore-
closure in 1857. Though this road was financially unsuc-
cessful, its economic effects were felt. Before its construc-
tion a large part of the freight and passenger traffic from
the north of Wilmington reached the Southwest through
Charleston. When the Wilmington and Manchester was
built, this traffic began to pass over its lines and reach
Columbia or Camden, and from these inland markets to
be distributed to the interior by the wagon routes or over
the Charleston and Hamburg Railroad by way of Branch-
ville.
The Northeastern Railroad of South Carolina
In order to regain this lost business, the people of
Charleston projected a road to run north to intersect the
Wilmington and Manchester at Florence. Such a road
would receive the traffic brought through Wilmington and
carry it south to Charleston. This arrangement would re-
establish conditions as they had been before the Wilming-
ton and Manchester was built, the only difference being
that commodities and passengers would now move from
Wilmington to Charleston by rail, whereas formerly they
had moved by boat.2
The road projected was the Northeastern of South Caro-
lina. It was chartered in December, 1851, with an author-
ized capital stock of $2,000,000 and power to build a rail-
road from Charleston to Florence, a distance of 102 miles.3
1 Acts of North Carolina, 1846-47, ch. 82, p. 175.
2 See map at beginning of chapter v.
a Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1874, p. 350.
THE CHERAW AND DARLINGTON 77
The road ran through a sparsely settled country and its
financial success was doubtful from the first. It was
financed largely by the city of Charleston and the banks
of that city. The cost of construction was $21,000 per
mile. The road was opened for traffic on August 5,
1857. J
With the exception of the traffic which it received from
the Wilmington and Manchester, it was wholly dependent
on local traffic originating in a thinly settled agricultural
region. It had competition even in this field in its early
history, for it crossed the Santee Canal, which connected
the Santee River and Charleston, thus giving water trans-
portation to a large part of the territory which would
otherwise have been compelled to ship over the lines of the
railroad.
The Cheraw and Darlington Railroad
The construction of the Northeastern to Florence on
the Wilmington and Manchester did not give the people
of Charleston the expected relief. They were interested,
therefore, in an extension of the line from Florence, be-
yond the Wilmington and Manchester, into a section not
yet fully developed. The proposed extension was the
Cheraw and Darlington Railroad.
Cheraw is a town located on the Great Peedee River.
The river is open to navigation only half the year, and
it was but natural that the town, which dominated the
trade of the whole surrounding country and even that of a
part of North Carolina, should want a better outlet than
the Peedee. Consequently an attempt was made as early as
1837 to secure sufficient capital to build a road due east
to Conwayboro, situated on the Waccamaw River. This
was the head of navigation, and such a road, together with
the boats plying the river, would have given an all-the-
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. v, p. 265.
78 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
year-round outlet.1 A convention was called at Marion
Court-House in January, 1837, which provided for a survey
for the road. The distance was eighty-five miles, and the
report of the engineers stated that the country to be tra-
versed was level and the soil easy to handle; that the
rights of way could be had without cost; and that
labor would cost about seventy-five cents a day plus
board. The report further says that the road would cost
about $607,232; that the probable earnings would be
$133,000 and the expense $90,000. 2 All the plans, however,
came to nothing, for the panic of 1837 prostrated business
and put an end to improvements.
After a decade a second period of building started in
this section, and the people of Charleston subscribed
$100,000 on the condition that the road should be built to
connect with the Northeastern at Florence. The North-
eastern even subscribed $25,000 to be paid in transporta-
tion. The Cheraw and Darlington Railroad Company was
therefore organized and enough capital secured to begin
the building of the forty miles between Cheraw and Flor-
ence.3 Construction was begun in 1854 and completed in
1855.4 The road cost for grading $77,000; for bridges, etc.,
$22,000; for superstructure $288,200, making a total of
$387,200.5 The rolling stock was rented from other roads.
The road had hardly begun operation when it was badly
damaged by a freshet in 1856. This necessitated borrowing
for reconstruction work, and at the end of 1857 the floating
debt was $85,000. By this time, too, the surrounding towns
had secured railroads and the Cheraw and Darlington had
1 U. B. Phillips, History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt
to 1860, p. 349.
2 Report on the proposed Cheraw and Waccamaw Railroad, by
E. W. White, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 1837.
3 Poors Manual, 1898, p. 286.
4 Reports of the Cheraw and Darlington to the legislature of South
Carolina, 1855, 1856, 1857.
5 Report of the Northeastern Railroad Company of South Carolina,
1854.
THE BRUNSWICK AND ALBANY RAILROAD 79
difficulty earning enough to meet its expenses. It contin-
ued, however, as an independent company until it went
into the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina.1
II
The Savannah, Florida, and Western Group
Besides the roads of the Atlantic Coast Line of South
Carolina group, a second group of roads in South Carolina
and Georgia were constructed in the decade before
the Civil War. These were later consolidated into the
Savannah, Florida, and Western, or what was popularly
known as the "Plant System." Of the large number of
roads which went into this system, before it was pur-
chased outright by the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, only
three came into existence before the Civil War. These
were: The Brunswick and Florida; Savannah, Albany,
and Gulf; and the Charleston and Savannah.
The Brunswick and Albany Railroad
The Brunswick and Albany had its beginning in an
old canal company which secured a charter in 1826. 2 It
failed and a new charter was obtained in 1834 with prom-
ise of aid from the state. At the same time there was under
way an enterprise for a railway from Brunswick to Albany.
This was incorporated as the Brunswick and Florida Rail-
road Company in December, 1835. 3 The charter guaran-
teed that for a period of twenty-five years no competing
company would be chartered by the state to run a line
within twenty miles of its own. The panic of 1837 put an
end to the undertaking. Nothing more was done until the
fifties, when funds were raised and preparations made to
1 U. B. Phillips, History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt
to 1860, p. 349.
2 Ibid., p. 357.
8 Ibid., p. 359.
80 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
build the road. In the meantime the Savannah and Albany
Railroad Company had been chartered in 1847 and by 1855
was ready to begin work on its right of way. The provision
of the charter of the Brunswick and Florida, guaranteeing
it freedom from competition, was brought forward by that
company. This gave the Brunswick and Florida an advan-
tage; but its financial position was weak, and the company
was glad to give up the privilege in return for a subscrip-
tion of $500,000 to its stock by the state. Both roads were
constructed and met at what is now Waycross. After this
agreement a new company was chartered. The Savannah
and Florida, which had in turn become the Savannah and
Albany1 and the Savannah, Albany, and Gulf, now became
the Atlantic and Gulf.
The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad
The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad was designed to extend
from a point near Waresboro on the Satilla River to the
western boundary of the state, at any point between Fort
Gaines and the junction of the Flint and Chattahoochee
Rivers.2 The object in constructing the road was to open
up a direct route with the Gulf of Mexico. Among other
things the charter provided that when $600,000 should be
subscribed in good faith by the public, $500,000 should be
subscribed by the governor on behalf of the state, and if
more than $600,000 should be subscribed by the public,
the governor should raise the state's subscription in the
same proportion, not, however, to exceed $1,000,000. To
pay the subscription of the state, the governor was em-
powered to use any surplus which might be in the treasury,
and if this proved to be insufficient, he was given permis-
sion to issue twenty-year 6 per cent coupon bonds. Any
other road constructed in the state could make physical
1 U. B. Phillips, History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton Belt
to I860, p. 187.
2 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxix, p. 157.
THE CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH RAILROAD 81
connection with this one, provided the stockholders of the
Atlantic and Gulf used their own money in building it.
In addition to this state aid, Congress set aside 400,000
acres of land lying along the proposed line,1 the proceeds
from the sale of which were to be used to aid in its con-
struction. Work on the road began very soon and was pros-
ecuted so energetically that by November, 1860, the line
was completed to Thomasville, 160 miles southwest of
Savannah.2 It was expected that the work would be com-
pleted to Bainbridge, Georgia, by January, 186 1,3 but
difficulty was experienced in securing material, which came
largely from England.4 Some work was continued on this
section of the road until 1864, when further progress be-
came impossible because of the Civil War. Not only was
it impossible to push the new work to completion, but that
part of the road which had been finished suffered greatly
from neglect.5
The Charleston and Savannah Railroad
The third road of importance in this second group of
southern roads was the Charleston and Savannah, char-
tered in 1853. 6 The following year a survey of two routes
was made between Charleston and Savannah. The lower
route was 105 miles, with a maximum grade of 21 feet per
mile. The estimated cost of construction was $20,000 per
mile. This route crossed the numerous rivers flowing into
the Atlantic, below the head of schooner navigation. The
so-called upper route was somewhat longer, being 117 miles
in length. It crossed the same rivers as the other, but above
the head of navigation. The estimated cost of this route
was $17,600 per mile. The surveyor suggested the lower
1 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1874, p. 359.
2 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxxin, p. 1014.
3 Ibid., p. 348. 4 Ibid., p. 893.
5 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. VI, pp. 456-58.
6 Acts of South Carolina, 1853, No. 4142; Acts of Georgia, 1853-
54, p. 406.
82 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
as the more profitable, as it gave direct connection with
points on the Georgia Central Railroad.1 The road was
built and opened for traffic in the fall of I860,2 but was
demolished by Sherman on his march to the sea, so that
all it possessed at the close of the war was a right of way,
a graded roadbed, and a franchise.3
1 Only one man on the entire line gave the right of way, and he after-
ward enjoyed the distinction of having a locomotive named for him.
2 Report of John McRae, American Railroad Journal, vol. xxvn,
p. 550.
3 Poor's Manual, 1881, p, 384.
CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY OF RAILROAD CONDITIONS ALONG
THE ATLANTIC SEABOARD TO 1860
From the foregoing chapters it will be seen that prior to
1860 the roads which were to become the Atlantic Coast
Line System were gradually growing in their dependence
on each other. In 1860 the railroads of Virginia and North
Carolina, which went into the Atlantic Coast Line, together
with the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac, formed
the main link in a direct north and south inland and water
line between Washington and Charleston. Those in South
Carolina and Georgia were of much less importance. They
formed no connecting link between important centers of
trade. Branching off inland at Wilmington, Charleston,
Savannah, and Brunswick, they ran to the southwest.
Moreover, these roads were built too late to secure the
advantages which come to new lines from entering virgin
territory. Competition was keen for what passenger and
freight traffic there was, and the momentum of an early
start gave an advantage to their competitors. The whole
system somewhat resembled a fan and its handle, the
handle extending from Washington to Wilmington and
the fan being that network which spread from Wilmington
toward the southwest.
Chief interest then centers in the three roads which
formed the line of communication between Wilmington and
Richmond. The distance by rail is 245 miles. The thre3
roads, the Petersburg, the Wilmington and Raleigh, and
the Richmond and Petersburg, were all of the same gauge,
but there was no physical connection at Petersburg or at
Weldon. It was, therefore, impossible to transfer cars from
one road to another. All through passengers and freight
had to be transferred by omnibus or by wagon. The Peters-
84 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
burg, tapping the Roanoke country, brought produce to the
Appomattox at Petersburg, where it could be loaded on ship
and sent to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York. The
Wilmington and Raleigh connected the Roanoke country
with that of the Cape Fear. The main purpose held in view
by the builders was to collect the produce of the various river
valleys which the road crossed and take it to a market
within the borders of the state of North Carolina. The
Richmond and Petersburg formed primarily a connecting
link between the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac
and the Petersburg roads. Before it had been in operation
two years it had secured three fourths of the traffic which
had formerly gone via the James and Appomattox Rivers
between the two cities, Richmond and Petersburg.
It was inevitable that the construction of this 245 miles
of road should cause a rearrangement of the north and
south passenger and freight routes. The first visible effect
was in passenger travel between the North and South.
With the completion of the Richmond and Petersburg,
there was only one break in the continuous line of railroad
between New York and Wilmington, that from Washing-
ton to Acquia Creek on the Potomac. The time in transit
over this route, in connection with the line of boats which
the Wilmington and Raleigh operated between Wilming-
ton and Charleston, was the quickest between the northern
cities and Charleston. Competition between the Atlantic
lines of railroad and the ocean packet lines immediately
developed. The railroads, so long as they acted as a unit,
were able to maintain themselves in this contest in spite of
the inconveniences due to the fact that passengers had to
be conveyed from one line to another in omnibuses. In
order to meet competition there were frequent reductions
in the through fare on the part of the railroads.
In the early period the railways were merely supple-
mental to the waterways. In the sense in which the term is
understood to-day there was no through freight. Almost
REARRANGEMENT OF ROUTES 85
no freight originating south of Wilmington was carried
by rail to New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore. Various
roads collected the commodities produced along their hnes
or grown in that territory which had access, by rivers or
by wagon, to them. The Wilmington, Columbia, and Au-
gusta was a naval stores road, and it constructed spurs
branching off the main line and extending into the territory
producing tar, pitch, turpentine, and lumber. These sur-
face lines, as they were called, were of cheap construction.
Cross-ties were cut in the adjacent forests and laid down
without grade or ballast. The rails were for the most part
second-hand iron which had been discarded on the main
line. Some of these branches became permanent in later
years; many of them were abandoned when the lumber and
naval stores business began to decline. These articles were
collected and marketed chiefly through Wilmington. Agri-
cultural products produced on the northern portion were
marketed over the Petersburg. They went to Petersburg
or to Richmond, where they were consumed, forwarded to
other parts of the state, or shipped to home or foreign
markets. Besides handling what products the Wilmington
and Raleigh turned over to it, the Petersburg received
from the Raleigh and Gaston over the Greenesville and
Roanoke a considerable amount of produce from the
interior of North Carolina. Much of this had formerly gone
by wagon overland to Lynchburg.1 This traffic consisted
largely of cotton, tobacco, grain, flour, and occasionally
some live stock.
To the north the Richmond and Petersburg was taking
to Richmond and Manchester from the Petersburg raw
material, especially cotton and tobacco. This was either
used there or else forwarded to Fredericksburg, Lynch-
burg, or other places in the state.2 Besides supplying the
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, May
27, 1840.
2 Report of General Agent to Board of Directors, Richmond and
Petersburg Railroad Company, May 27, 1845.
86 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
local markets and manufactories with raw material, the
road, through its Port Walthall branch, was bringing the
cargo to ships bound for foreign ports. The construction
of a branch to the James River was carrying out still
further the original idea of the railroad, to supplement
the water courses as a means of transportation. From the
opening of the branch in February, 1844, to May, 1845,
37 ships were loaded with the produce which came over
various railroads. 1 The plan of employing branch lines was
furthered by the leasing of the Clover Hill Railroad which
ran to the coal mines in Chesterfield County. The carrying
of coal was for many years the greatest source of revenue
to the Richmond and Petersburg.
Farmers, lumbermen, and the few manufacturers floated
their produce down the rivers and deposited it at the
intersection of railroad and river, or carried it over dirt
roads in wagons to convenient railroad points, whence
it was distributed or taken to the most suitable seacoast
market and from there trans-shipped to the consumer at
home or abroad.
Generally speaking, in the early days the largest revenue
came from the handling of local passengers. A period then
followed during which the main source of revenue was from
through passengers. A few years prior to the Civil War
freight began to take an important place and receipts from
it amounted to about one half of the entire income. For
instance, the income of the Richmond and Petersburg
from passenger traffic during its first year of operation was
$41,713, while that from freight was only $7383.2 Again, in
1844 the receipts for the year preceding were $30,665 from
passenger traffic as compared with $17,205 from freight.
Of the income from passenger traffic, $22,722 was from
local as against $7883 from through, by which was meant
that which originated on another road and passed over the
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, 1839.
2 Ibid., 1844.
GROWTH OF INCOME FROM FREIGHT TRAFFIC 87
Richmond and Petersburg or stopped at some point on it.
There was not much change in 1852. The report of that
year shows receipts from local of $36,478, and from through
passenger traffic $14,062; from freight, of $30,000, exclu-
sive of that from coal from the Clover Hill Railroad which
amounted to $25,591. By 1860 the through passenger
business brought in $66,867, the local only $6000. The
freight business had grown until the local amounted to
$49,000, through to $12,000, and that received from the
Clover Hill to $46,885.
Practically the same was true of the Petersburg. In 1859
its income from freight was greater than that from passen-
gers. The income from freight was $172,838, as against
$138,857 from passengers. The same was also true of the
Wilmington and Raleigh. In 1851 its receipts from through
passenger traffic were $159,509, from local passengers,
$75,350, and from freight, $93,000. Yet by 1860 the same
changes had taken place in its traffic as on the other roads.
The income from freight had outstripped that from pas-
sengers. While the income from freight was rapidly in-
creasing from 1850 to 1860, its character was also changing.
The supply of naval stores in North Carolina was decreas-
ing, and many of those who had been engaged in this were
now turning their attention to cotton and wheat raising.
The amount of cotton handled by the Wilmington and
Raleigh in 1854 was 7088 bales, in 1860, 31,256; the number
of bushels of wheat in 1844 was 1196; in 1860, 84,741. Even
greater development was noticeable in the traffic of the
Petersburg. Its chief articles of freight had always been
agricultural products. The amount of cotton handled by
the road in 1851 was 12,893 bales. Ten years later it han-
dled 24,652 bales. The amount of tobacco handled had
increased from 7959 hogsheads in 1851 to 14,577 in 1860.
The number of bushels of grain handled in 1851 was less
than 4000; by 1860 it was 329,000.
It is evident that freight was becoming the chief business
88 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
of the roads. They had been constructed in a cheap manner
because the revenue at the time was not judged sufficient
to justify a large investment. By 1840 it was clear that the
roads and rolling stock were not heavy enough to take
care of the traffic. In a letter to Governor E. B. Dudley of
North Carolina, dated June 28, 1840, President Bird be-
moaned the fact that the Petersburg was torn up by car-
rying heavier freight than that for which it was intended,
and almost expressed his regret that it was necessary for
his road to carry freight at all. * Attempts were made by all
the companies so to improve their roads as to meet the new
demands made upon them. Physical connection was being
contemplated so that cars could be run the whole length
of the line, obviating the necessity of reloading. The Civil
War prevented this.
The whole situation up to the time of the Civil War may
then be summed up by saying that the roads, formerly inde-
pendent units, had been growing more and more dependent
on each other. The success or failure of any one of them
meant the success or failure of all. Local travel, which had
at first been the main source of income, had become least
important. Through passenger business had been greatly
developed and the railroads were competing successfully in
this field with the ocean steamers. The amount of freight
handled was increasing faster than the roads could take
care of it. Although this freight was in the true sense of
the word local, only physical connection was necessary
between the various lines in order that cars might run
through from Wilmington to New York. The making of
these physical connections was prevented by the war.
Certain problems which have since become familiar in
railroading made their appearance early in the history of
these roads. The first of these was the question of labor to
build them and to operate them when once they were built.
1 This letter is in manuscript among the papers of Governor Dudley
filed with the North Carolina Historical Commission at Raleigh.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS 89
The various states subscribed liberally to the undertakings,
and in return either bonds or stocks of the companies were
issued to them. It was soon necessary to determine whether
the state as such had power to regulate, or whether its
power in the management of the roads was, like that of any
other investor, proportional to the amount of the invest-
ment. Since all the roads were separate, the question of
rates on through passengers and freight had to be settled.
The problem of the short and long haul, in exactly the
same form as it made its appearance later, soon arose. Last
of all, the question of agreements between the roads them-
selves and competition with other roads, especially the
Virginia and Tennessee and the Seaboard and Roanoke,
appeared. Competition with steamship lines on the Atlan-
tic had been present from the beginning.
A considerable part of the labor necessary to build
the roads was obtained from the farmers who lived in the
immediate vicinity. In many cases they did the grading
through their own land with their own slaves. Some of
them received stock in return for work; some were glad
enough to give this much to the company in return for the
advantages which they hoped to receive from it. This was
particularly true of the Wilmington and Raleigh. The ordi-
nary method of getting the roads graded, however, was to
let out sections by contract. The contractors hired slaves
from their owners for a specified sum and board and clothing
for a year. While some of the roads were being built the
price of cotton was low, getting it to market was difficult
and expensive, and owners found it more profitable to hire
out their slaves to contractors than to use them in raising
cotton. Many contractors having secured their tools and
organized their labor force, went from one job to another
as the roads were completed. For instance, gangs which
were employed on the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac were transferred to the Richmond and Petersburg
when the former was completed.
90 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
For the rough work of operating and loading trains
negroes were hired directly by the railroad company. The
contracts or bonds were signed on the first of January. The
usual price for the ordinary unskilled laborer was from $75
to $100 and his "find"; that of the skilled laborer, such as
fireman or brakeman, was often as high as $250 per year.
In the early history of the Wilmington and Raleigh, an
engineer made a comfortable fortune by buying unskilled
laborers at the prevailing price, training them himself, and
letting them to the company, thus receiving a handsome
dividend on his investment.1 For a number of years the
system of using hired slaves was employed with success,
but as agriculture became more profitable, it was increas-
ingly difficult to secure them and resort was had to hiring
white men for the work. This proved unsuccessful as the
class of white men secured was less reliable than the
slaves. As the price of slave labor advanced the roads
began to buy slaves of their own. In 1857 the Wilmington
and Weldon owned thirteen, valued at $15,000, and the
Report of 1860 advises the purchase of twenty more for
use on trains and at warehouses.
The question of the fairness of a higher proportional
charge for a short haul than for a long one soon made its
appearance. It arose first in the Roanoke section of North
Carolina, when the Wilmington and Weldon charged a
higher rate for the haul to Weldon than over the whole line.
The farmers of the section complained of the injustice of
it, but were met by the argument that frequently the regu-
lar through train could not carry all the produce and it was
necessary to run a train empty from Wilmington to within
a short distance of Weldon, and receive pay for the last
thirty miles only. The solution was to make a heavier
charge on those who were receiving extra accommodation.
1 On the authority of Mr. Walker Meares of Wilmington, North
Carolina, who was present when President E. B. Dudley turned the
first shovel of dirt of the Wilmington and Raleigh.
SPECIAL PROBLEMS 91
Complaint arose also along the whole line because a higher
proportional rate was charged for freight originating on the
direct line than for that received from other roads or from
outlying districts. The reply of the road was that it must be
supported by those who were compelled to ship over it.
If they supported it alone, they must necessarily pay a high
freight rate. The carrying of additional freight and passen-
gers attracted from territory which would not have patron-
ized the road otherwise, cost very little more and the in-
come was almost clear gain. This gain could be applied to
paying dividends and operating expenses and the local
rates thereby reduced. The question was whether or not the
regular patrons of the road would support it alone or would
receive assistance from shippers and passengers attracted
by lower rates.
Competition was with through steamers and other rail-
roads, and applied mainly to passengers. New York was
the principal starting-point and Charleston the destination
of most of the north and south travel. l The Atlantic inland
line and the ocean vessels competed for this. Competition
arose also with the Virginia and Tennessee and the Ports-
mouth and Roanoke Railroads.2 In order to have any
chance at securing part of the through north and south
travel it was necessary that there should be at least a
semblance of a through route between New York and
Charleston. This did not exist before 1840. Upon the com-
pletion of the Wilmington and Raleigh what may be con-
sidered as a through inland rail and water route came into
existence. There was a continuous line of railroad from New
York to Washington; a steamboat and a stage line from
Washington to the terminus of the Richmond, Fredericks-
burg, and Potomac; a continuous line to Wilmington bar-
ring the breaks at Richmond, Petersburg, and Weldon;
1 Report of the Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company, No-
vember 8, 1849.
2 Ibid., November 11, 1858.
92 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
and a steamboat line run in connection with the Wilming-
ton and Raleigh from Wilmington to Charleston. In order
to secure a part of the traffic, two things were necessary.
First, this inland route must offer accommodations equal
in a measure to those offered by the steamship. This could
be accomplished by improving the roads, filling in gaps
where no railroad existed, and so arranging a schedule as
to involve a minimum of time. Second, through tickets
must be sold at a price as low as that of the water line. At
least five distinct roads were concerned, and it would have
been little less than a miracle if they had been able to reach
an agreement satisfactory to all. The great bone of conten-
tion was the through ticket and how much each road must
sacrifice to enable all of them together to offer a rate which
would attract patronage. One road which insisted on having
as its share of the through fare its local rate could upset the
whole scheme. The arrangement aimed at was to set a rate
between New York and Charleston which would meet that
of the packet lines, and prorate the amount to each road
according to mileage. This agreement prevailed for the most
part, but not without friction. Whenever any particular
road found itself in a position to throw the burden of adver-
tising and incidental expenses on the others, it invariably
did so.
In spite of the difficulties which arose and the temporary
abandonment of the through ticket from time to time, an
effort was made to meet the ocean competition. It is stated
in the Report of the Wilmington and Raleigh for the year
1842 that a friendly understanding had been reached by
the several companies of the Atlantic route from New York
to New Orleans and that a through ticket had been agreed
on at a rate of fare which would induce travelers to take
this route instead of the ocean packet lines. The fare over
the Wilmington and Raleigh in 1841 was $20, but this was
not sufficiently low and an arrangement was effected whereby
the fare should be gradually lowered until it was reduced to
COMPETITION WITH OCEAN SHIP LINES 93
$12 in 1845. This diverted a great deal of the ocean travel.
The number of through passengers carried in 1845 by the
Wilmington and Raleigh was 60 per cent greater than in
1841. 1 This was only temporary, and it was soon necessary
for the roads to make another reduction.2 These constant
reductions in fare became burdensome. Complaint arose
against the Baltimore and Ohio because it would bear none
of the expense incident to securing the through travel from
which it received as much benefit as the Virginia and North
Carolina roads. During the fifties this was constantly called
to the attention of the Virginia legislature. It was asked to
keep the behavior of the Baltimore and Ohio in mind when
that road applied for concessions for its line in the western
part of the state.
Water competition was very hard to meet. Various ex-
pedients were suggested by the roads to improve the situa-
tion. Each time the improvement suggested was to be made
by some road other than the one making the suggestion.
Officers of the Petersburg believed that the solution was
in building roads south so as to obviate the necessity of the
water journey from Wilmington to Charleston.3 The Wil-
mington and Raleigh was disgusted with the action of the
roads to the north and believed that if the Atlantic line
retained a fair share of the travel, every facility ought to
be offered by which a speedy transit and an unbroken con-
nection should be secured for the passengers. The quarrel
between the roads to the north over the through ticket
drove the Wilmington and Raleigh to the point of separa-
tion, and it threatened to wash its hands of the whole mat-
ter by getting access to the ocean either by building a road
of its own from Weldon to the sea or by securing a part
interest in the Seaboard and Roanoke. This would give
1 Reports of Examining and Accounts Committee of the Wilming-
ton and Raleigh Railroad Company, November 5, 1845, North Caro-
lina State Library.
2 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, 1848.
3 Ibid., 1847.
94 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
the Wilmington and Raleigh access to Norfolk, from which
place its passengers could again resume travel by boat and
reach their northern destination. The threat was not
carried out.
It can easily be seen that the Atlantic line, with its nu-
merous roads and its contentions, was in a poor position
to meet water competition. Travelers bound for Baltimore
upon arriving at Weldon had their choice of going over the
Atlantic line or over the Portsmouth and Roanoke to Nor-
folk and then by boat. The following advertisement,
appearing in the Charleston Courier of December 17, 1839,
sets forth the advantage of the land route:
Travelers going north by the Wilmington and Raleigh Rail-
road and Steamboat Line will find the route through Petersburg,
Richmond, Washington, and Baltimore as expeditious, cheap,
and pleasant as any other. The companies on this route carry the
Great Mail and have a connecting line throughout. The Rail-
roads are in good order, the engines new and of the most approved
construction, the cars are eight wheeled, with private apartments
for ladies, and there is a new and splendid steamboat on the
Potomac. No expense has been spared to make this route the
most perfect in the country.
Travelers wishing to take this route are informed that after
reaching Weldon, the termination of the Wilmington line, they
continue on in the Wilmington cars li miles further to Garys-
burg, where they breakfast, and take the cars of the Petersburg
Railroad Company. Here they pay through to Baltimore and
receive tickets for their baggage which relieve them of all trouble
and expense on that score. They dine in Petersburg, sup in Fred-
ericksburg, sleep on board the Potomac steamboat, breakfast
the next morning in Baltimore, whence they can immediately
proceed to Philadelphia and New York the same day.
Distances by this route:
Petersburg Railroad 60 miles
Richmond and Petersburg Railroad 22 miles
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac 61 miles
Stages to Potomac Creek 9 miles
Potomac Steamboat 50 miles
Baltimore and Washington Railroad 49 miles
DESCRIPTION OF A RAILROAD-WATER TRIP 95
Fare through from Garysburg to Baltimore, $12.50. This in-
cludes all expenses except meals.
Offices of Petersburg Railroad Company, August 17, 1839.
In the same issue in which the advertisement quoted
appeared, the following card was inserted, signed by eleven
passengers who were traveling over this route to the
South :
We, the undersigned passengers on the Railroad Line from
Baltimore to Charleston, hereby state for the information of the
public, and as a caution to Travelers, that we with about thirty
others left Washington City in the evening of the 12th instant
on the steamer Augusta, having had positive assurance from the
agent of the above line at Baltimore and Washington that we
should arrive at Fredericksburg in time for the Richmond cars,
and that we should meet with no delays whatever on the whole
route.
On reaching Fredericksburg we ascertained that the Richmond
cars had been gone but ten minutes and that the conductor was
aware of our coming and our expectations to proceed on our
journey without delay! Thus, more than forty passengers, men,
women and children, were left in the streets of Fredericksburg at
two o'clock in the morning, dependent upon the charity of the
citizens for shelter and for providing a secure deposit for their
baggage! We were conveyed the next day to Richmond in a train
of freight cars with all the inconvenience and discomforts inci-
dent to such a mode of conveyance. At Richmond we had arrived
within fifty yards of the depot for the Petersburg train when the
cars again left us, causing another unavoidable and disagreeable
delay.
We have deemed it our duty to make the above statement of
facts in order that the same wanton deceptions and impositions
may not be practiced upon other travelers. We take pleasure in
stating that the conduct of the agents and conductors on the
remainder of the route to Charleston has been such as to meet
with our cordial approbation.1
However poor the accommodations may have been on
these roads, their competitor, the Portsmouth and Roa-
noke, had no better to offer and the traveler had to choose
1 Charleston Courier, December 17, 1839.
96 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
between the two. Intense rivalry had existed from the
very beginning. The state had subscribed two fifths of the
capital of the Petersburg when it was incorporated in
1830. x When the Portsmouth and Roanoke applied for a
charter in 1832, the Petersburg did everything in its power
to defeat the bill. The Petersburg objected that the state,
if it subscribed to the stock of the Portsmouth and Roa-
noke, would be aiding a competitor of a road in which it
was already interested. This was true and was afterward
a source of great annoyance to the state. The Portsmouth
and Roanoke was chartered and built nevertheless. Upon
its completion keen competition broke out. Each road
was struggling desperately to secure a monopoly of the
Roanoke trade and travel between Weldon and Baltimore.
The Board of Public Works in its Report to the legisla-
ture of Virginia in 1843 took a philosophical view of the
contest, remarking that "all the revenue which has hereto-
fore been derived from those sources of profit are not more
than sufficient for the legitimate and proper wants and
purposes of either one of the companies. Such a state of
things ought not, however, to excite great surprise or to
visit unlimited censure upon the parties. The great error
must be attributed to the policy which sanctioned the
establishment of two improvements of such magnitude to
contend at the same points for trade which has proven
itself so far to be inadequate to the purposes of both." It
then calmly predicts the failure of the Portsmouth and
Roanoke.
It was evident from the beginning that the road could
not succeed. President Bird of the Petersburg Company
wrote to Governor Dudley of North Carolina in 1840 that
he was morally certain that the Portsmouth and Roanoke
could not sustain itself and that poverty was written on it
from one end to the other. Acting on this assumption, the
Petersburg would not make the Portsmouth and Roanoke
1 See chapter in.
FAILURE OF PORTSMOUTH AND ROANOKE 97
a proposition that it could afford to accept for half interest
in the bridge over the Roanoke River at Weldon, thinking
that it was only a question of months till the other road
would have to accept any terms it would offer. The Ports-
mouth and Roanoke held out longer than was expected,
continuing to run its trains till the summer of 1845. Having
failed to secure the bridge, the Petersburg built one of its
own and ran its cars into Weldon in 1843. The Portsmouth
and Roanoke was heavily mortgaged. The mortgage by
some oversight was not recorded in the North Carolina
records, and through this technical error Mr. F. E. Rives
of North Carolina secured possession of the bridge and the
seventeen miles of line lying in North Carolina. He then
attempted to operate this as a separate railroad by borrow-
ing an engine and cars from the Petersburg and by con-
structing a temporary track from the Petersburg to the
Portsmouth and Roanoke. Having done this, he tore up
some two miles of the line so that the Portsmouth and
Roanoke could not run its trains over his road. The presi-
dent of the Portsmouth and Roanoke appeared with a body
of friends, repaired the track, overturned the Petersburg
engine and cars, and continued to run trains. Rives was
arraigned and fined $25 in the Superior Court of Law and
Equity in Northampton County, North Carolina.
In 1845 the Portsmouth and Roanoke ceased to run its
trains. This was an opportunity for the Petersburg. It no
longer needed the Weldon bridge, having built one of its
own. Yet in order to prevent any reorganized company
from using it, the Petersburg made a brutally frank con-
tract with Rives, according to the terms of which the com-
pany was to pay him $60,000 in specified installments
"provided the railroad and bridge remain unused for trans-
portation of persons and produce." The Board of Public
Works opposed the contract with Rives, but it was carried
out and was "productive of great benefits both to the
Petersburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Po-
98 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
tomac." 1 The fact that such a contract could be made in
the state was a sad commentary on its power or willingness
to regulate its railroads. After the Portsmouth and Roa-
noke had been discontinued for a year, an act was passed by
the legislature in February, 1846, requiring the Board of
Public Works to regulate the rates of the roads and to pre-
vent the combination of the inland roads against the
Portsmouth and Roanoke.2 The act authorized the reorgan-
ization of the road as the Seaboard and Roanoke.
The Petersburg was not altogether a fair competitor,
nor did it prove to be a fairer ally for the Richmond and
Petersburg and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Po-
tomac. Upon the completion of the Richmond and Peters-
burg, and before the failure of the Portsmouth and Roa-
noke, a through ticket between Weldon and Washington
had been agreed upon by the inland roads to combat the
so-called Portsmouth and Roanoke and Bay Line. The
agreement, suggested by the Petersburg and agreed to by
the others, provided that the Potomac Stage and Steam-
boat Company should receive $2.25; the Richmond, Fred-
ericksburg, and Potomac, $3.37§; the Richmond and
Petersburg, $1.25; the Petersburg to Garysburg, $3.12j;
the Portsmouth and Roanoke charged $.50 from Garys-
burg to Weldon, lj miles, making a total of $10.50.
During the bridge controversy between the two roads
entering Weldon, the Portsmouth and Roanoke refused to
carry passengers coming south from Garysburg to Weldon.
The Petersburg then put on a boat line and omnibuses to
take passengers into Weldon, for which a fifty-cent charge
was made. While these improvements were going on at the
south, the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac was
completing its line to Acquia Creek on the Potomac. It
gave notice to the other roads of a rearrangement of the
1 Report of President Bird of the Petersburg Railroad Company to
the Board of Public Works of Virginia, November 1, 1845.
2 Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1845-46.
CONTROVERSY OVER THROUGH TICKET 99
through ticket.1 The question having arisen, a committee
of one director from each company was appointed to
reach some agreement. This committee met on December
13, 1842, and adopted the following: 2
The Potomac Boat Line $2. 00
The Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac. $4.00
The Richmond and Petersburg $1 . 37
The Petersburg $3.12
Total fare $10.50
It was further agreed that if the fare was either raised or
lowered the amount should be divided in the same ratio.
Against this ticket the Petersburg Company justly
complained. It had made improvements to accommodate
the travel at a cost of nearly $60,000. Its share of the fare
had not only not been increased, but the fifty cents which
it formerly received for carrying passengers from Garys-
burg to Weldon had been taken away. This was manifestly
unjust. The road accepted the ticket according to a letter
of the president dated July 7, 1844, as better than no ticket
at all, with the intention of insisting on a fairer division
as soon as it lay in its power to do so. About the same time
the board of directors of the Petersburg adopted a resolu-
tion notifying the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac
and the Richmond and Petersburg that it would not issue
through tickets after August 15, 1844, unless the rate of
travel per mile should be equal on all the roads, the rate per
mile on the Potomac River should be equal to one half that
amount, and the expense of advertising and agencies should
be borne by the companies in proportion to the interest
they had in keeping up the same.
In October it was agreed by all the companies to submit
the whole matter to the Board of Public Works for arbitra-
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, 1846.
2 Proceedings of an adjourned meeting of the stockholders of the
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad Company, held in
Richmond, July 21, 1846.
100 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
tion. The board was slow in acting, and before the question
was decided the Portsmouth and Roanoke ceased to run
its trains. This put the Petersburg in a position to dictate
rather than be dictated to. In April of the next year, 1845,
the Petersburg requested that the reference to the board be
withdrawn. The board gave its assent, provided it was con-
curred in by the other roads. They did not agree to this,
whereupon the Petersburg notified the others that since
the Portsmouth and Roanoke had ceased to run its trains
there was nothing to arbitrate, and that it would sell
through tickets only on condition that its share of the ticket
should be its local fare from Weldon to Petersburg. No
settlement of the question was effected.
The Petersburg then opened up another route by means
of its own road, the City Point Railroad, and the James
River and Bay boats. Through tickets were sold over this
line and extensive advertising was done to secure patron-
age. To meet this situation the Richmond and Petersburg
and the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac put on a
line of boats from Port Walthall to Norfolk. Free passes
were used extensively on each of these new competing lines.
This question, together with that of the actions of the com-
panies in establishing the lines, came before the Board of
Public Works. The board realized the "judiciousness" of
it, but "advised" that these routes be discontinued. The
attitude of the roads on the question of passes was that if
law was not violated in giving free passes in return for past
benefits, it could not be violated by giving passes in return
for future benefits. The impotence of the board as repre-
sentative of the state to settle a contest which was so evi-
dently a matter for state intervention shows how little
authority the state had in regulating its railroads.
The question of the through ticket was in constant con-
troversy up to the Civil War. The Petersburg could enforce
its demands so long as it did not have competition. On this
point, however, it had miscalculated. The Portsmouth and
CONTROVERSY OVER THROUGH TICKET 101
Roanoke was reorganized as the Seaboard and Roanoke
and began to run its trains again in November, 1851. This
gave the Richmond and Petersburg rather than the Peters-
burg the commanding position, and the former road now
proceeded to demand a lion's share of the through ticket.
The Wilmington and Weldon in its Report of 1858 com-
plains that it was suffering because the Richmond and
Petersburg had refused to be a partner to through tickets.
The Port Walthall line of boats was taken off and at the
same time passenger trains on the Port Walthall Branch
were discontinued. A conference of all the companies inter-
ested in through ticket problems between New York and
Charleston, for reapportioning rates of fare and arranging
for through checks for baggage, was held and the matter
was finally settled.1
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, 1858.
CHAPTER VII
GROWTH FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 1902
All of the roads stretching along the South Atlantic Coast
were in a similar condition during the Civil War. A period of
increased receipts due to the carrying of soldiers and muni-
tions of war for the Confederate government was followed
by a period of deterioration due to hard use and lack of
material for repairs. Toward the end of the struggle they
fell into the hands of the Federal forces, were used during
a few months for military purposes, and were eventually
turned back to their owners, largely dismantled. The first
tasks undertaken on the return of peace were the rehabili-
tation of the roads and the forming of physical connec-
tions between the various units. This was especially nec-
essary in the case of the small systems of roads in South
Carolina, Georgia, and Florida which had been con-
structed just prior to 1860 and whose growth had been
arrested by the outbreak of hostilities. The physical con-
nections at the north and the improvements in the south
materially changed the nature of the commodities handled
and truck-growing became one of the chief sources of in-
come.
I
The Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia Group
The Richmond and Petersburg Railroad
The Richmond and Petersburg furnishes a good example
of how traffic was increased. It was the main line over
which travel and freight reached the capital of the Con-
federacy and over which soldiers were transported to and
from Richmond. Its receipts were largely in depreciated
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 103
Confederate money which finally became worthless.1 A
contract was entered into for the transportation of the
Confederate States' mail once daily, at an annual com-
pensation of $3675. Throughout the period of the war the
cars were in constant use, very little time was allowed
for repairs, and the number of troops and amount of mu-
nitions of war taxed the road to the utmost.2 Through
traffic arrangements at Richmond were discontinued by
the occupation of the Petersburg Railroad by the Fed-
eral forces early in 1864, and omnibuses were laid up,
and horses sold.3
When the Confederate army abandoned Richmond on
April 3, 1865, it burned the long bridge over the James
River and the depot at Richmond. The treasurer of the
railroad company was wounded in an attempt to secure
the books and records, all of which were consequently
burned with the depot and workshops, though the sheds
and most of the rolling stock were saved.4 The purely
physical loss was estimated at $254,318, nearly a third of
the capitalization of the road.5 E. H. Gill, superintendent
and engineer, gives a graphic account of the events in
April: 6
On Sunday evening the second of April last, a Colonel of the
Confederate army called at my office and directed that trains for
transportation of 3000 troops for Petersburg should be kept in
readiness during the night. I gave the necessary instructions and
the trains were prepared, but as troops did not arrive and as it
was reported that Richmond would be evacuated, the trains were
sent to Manchester as a place of safety early on the following
1 See Appendix, Table VI.
2 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company,
May 27, 1862.
3 Report of President Ellis, November 29, 1864. (Secured by chance
after the fire.)
4 Report of President Ellis at called meeting, July 28, 1865.
5 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, 1872,
p. 60.
6 Report of Superintendent E. H. Gill, October 21, 1865.
104 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
morning. Shortly after, a detachment of the retreating army left
behind for that purpose, as the Lieutenant of Engineers in com-
mand informed me, set fire to the James River bridge and all
access to trains was cut off. The conductors, engineers and agents
having charge of them had to seek places of safety, and while the
cars were thus temporarily deserted in Manchester, they were
robbed of their furniture, head linings, windows and window
blinds, and left mere wrecks or shells. Thus it will be seen that
upon resuming operations we were nearly destitute of everything
but a railroad track, the iron and ties of which were pretty well
worn, a few small engines, a few coaches destitute of seats and
windows, a few box cars and about forty coal cars; but the zeal
and energy of our officers, agents and employees had not de-
serted them, and though it was not in our power to furnish the
traveling public with our usual accommodations, we did furnish
them with transportation by two daily trains between Manchester
and Petersburg.
President Ellis adds : 1
From the third of April to the third of July the United States
Military Railway Corps had charge of the road for government
purposes, collecting the receipts to pay expenses. So soon as it was
returned to the management of the Company's officers, every
effort was made by them to put it in condition to do all the serv-
ice required. The company had during the war purchased of the
Confederate military authorities three captured locomotives;
they have since been restored to the original owners.
The Port Walthall Branch was disused after the evacu-
ation of Norfolk in 1864. Most of the track had been re-
moved to maintain the main line because of the difficulty
of procuring iron and the branch was never rebuilt.
Temporary workshops were established on the south side
of the James River at Richmond. The bridge was immedi-
ately built at a cost of $118,245 and opened on May 25,
1866. The new bridge was 2862 feet long between abut-
ments, divided into nineteen spans, and the track was sixty
feet above low water in the river.2 The earnings for this year
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, July
28, 1865.
2 Ibid., November 27, 1866.
THE RICHMOND AND PETERSBURG RAILROAD 105
were also materially reduced because of the bad condition
of the road, the failure of crops in Virginia, and the preva-
lence for several months during the year of cholera in Rich-
mond. The people possessed neither the means nor the
desire to travel, and years of toil were needed to restore
to fullness the empty warehouses, granaries, and cotton
presses. To quote Superintendent Gill again: T "It is idle to
suppose that by low and unremunerative rates or charges
or by ruinous rates of speed we can draw passengers to
roads when they do not possess means at this time to travel,
or to obtain freight when it does not exist."
In order to tide the road over its difficulties, the legis-
lature passed an act allowing the company to mortgage
its entire property to the amount of $175,000.2 The state
again showed its liberality by making these bonds exempt
from state and municipal taxes. Nevertheless, the road
was hard-pressed and something had to be done to save it
from bankruptcy. The solution seemed to be in making
physical connection with the other roads entering Rich-
mond and Petersburg. This was done in 1867.
For a few months beginning with June 1, 1873, the road
was run with the Petersburg under one management, and
was known as the Petersburg and Weldon Railroad. All
officers and employees, except road and section hands,
performed duties for and were paid by the two companies,
one third by the Richmond and Petersburg and two thirds
by the Petersburg. In 1885 a cooperative arrangement was
made with the Petersburg whereby the workshops of the
Richmond and Petersburg were devoted to repairs of
machinery for both companies, and those of the Peters-
burg to repairs of the cars of both. By this time cut-throat
competition had ceased to be practiced to any great
extent.
1 Report of the Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, No-
vember 27, 1866.
2 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1865-66, ch. 218, p. 336.
106 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
The Petersburg Railroad
The history of the Petersburg during the war was much
the same as that of the Richmond and Petersburg. Con-
stant use, excessive loading of cars, abuse of rolling stock
by Confederate troops, and lack of time, material, and
men for repair played a far more important part in its
undoing than the destruction wrought by the enemy. The
successful blockade of southern ports cut off supplies
with which to repair the road. This, combined with a
number of attacks near the end of hostilities, made use of
the road almost impossible. With the main line of com-
munication between the southern and northern parts of
the Confederacy cut, the end soon came.
Taking into consideration the income and expense only,
there never was a more prosperous period for the railroads
than the first two years of the war. The equipment was in
such good condition that it was possible to run with little
attention to upkeep. The Petersburg Company had on
hand a large supply of material which it had bought just
before the outbreak of hostilities. The ordinary channels
which had supplied the business of the road were utterly
deranged by the war. Receipts from leading articles showed
a great falling off, but other business developed by the war
gave rise to new sources of income.
It was predicted by the officials at the beginning of the
war that the receipts both from travel and from trade
would be reduced because of the "uncertain prospect of
public affairs."1 This prophecy was not fulfilled. The re-
ceipts from passenger traffic in 1861 amounted to $113,470,
from freight $141,402, from troops and horses for the
government $96,880, from mails $13,083, from express
$9689, making a total of $374,526. This was $45,000 more
than had ever been received by the road from all sources.2
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, March 1, 1861.
2 Ibid., February 20, 1862.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 107
The large increase in gross receipts is no indication of the
extent of the increase in the amount of business done, for
the rates granted to the Confederate government and to
the various state governments were greatly reduced. The
sudden increase in business taxed the road to its capacity.
Dissatisfaction having arisen among the railroads as to
freight and passenger rates, a convention of all southern
railroads was held in Chattanooga on October 4, 1861,
and the following uniform rate schedule was adopted:
freight, first class, ammunition, $.45 per 100 pounds
per 100 miles; second class, all freight shipped for govern-
ment except live stock, $.20 per 100 pounds per 100 miles;
third class, five stock, $20 per car load per 100 miles;
fourth class, hay and bran, $15 per car load per 100 miles;
troops, two cents per mile; mail, $150 per mile per year. It
was agreed by the Confederate government that in charg-
ing according to the above schedule the fractional part
of 100 miles should be considered as 100; by the railroad
companies that they would receive in payment for their
services treasury notes or bonds of the government.1
This agreement was carried out until July, 1862, when
all rates were raised 25 per cent. The increase of rates,
together with the fact that Confederate currency was de-
preciating, increased the gross receipts of the road enor-
mously. The income for 1862 was $846,531 as against
$374,526 for 1861, the largest income of the road up to
that time. The expenses for 1862 were $234,746, thus
giving the unprecedentedly low operating ratio of 27J per
cent.2 It would have been far better for the road if its
expenses had been greater and it would have gladly in-
creased them had it been possible to buy material for
improvement. By the spring of 1862 the surplus material
on hand in 1860 had been used and the road was beginning
to feel the pinch of the blockade. As the blockade tight-
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, February 20, 1862.
2 Ibid., for 1863.
108 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
ened, it became more and more difficult to get the needed
supplies. The condition of the road grew constantly worse,
but the real cause of the difficulty was not admitted. It
was complained that the officers of the government were
taking cars off the main line and retaining them rather
than sending them back immediately. The equipment,
both rolling stock and track, was now rapidly deteriorating.
The greatest need was for iron to relay the track which
was worn out by constant use and heavy loads. The govern-
ment was using practically all the iron in the manufacture
of munitions and left little for the repair of the roads.
The misfortune of the Seaboard and Roanoke was again
the good fortune of the Petersburg. When Norfolk was
evacuated the former had no further use for its rolling
stock and was glad to rent it to the Petersburg. This was
done and for a time relieved the necessity of the Peters-
burg. With all that could be done, however, it was almost
impossible to handle the traffic. To lengthen the life of
the rails, which it was impossible to replace, the speed of
all trains was cut down. In many cases troops were hauled
on open flat cars, on platforms of passenger cars, and even
on top of box cars.1 Wounded soldiers were carried fre-
quently on box cars, and temporary windows were made
by knocking out the upright boards which supported the
top. As a result of this the whole upper part of the car was
soon gone, for no time could be given to repair the damage.
In 1864 the condition became desperate. Rates were
increased, but an increase in rates meant little when the
receipts were in Confederate money. Receipts for 1863
were over $1,000,000, for 1865 nearly $2,000,000. Toward
the close of the war rolling stock became so scarce that
the cars were in constant use, and no time was given to
clean them, to say nothing of making repairs. Passenger
cars were taken off the Petersburg and used on other roads;
when finally returned the seats were frequently broken,
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, for 1863.
THE PETERSBURG RAILROAD 109
and cushions, stoves, lamps, dippers, water-coolers were
all carried off by the soldiers for private use. It was stated
by an officer of the company that more harm was done a
car on one of these trips than came from a whole year's
use before the war.1 In order to accommodate the great
crowds of soldiers the ordinary water-coolers in use earlier
in the history of the road were replaced by large casks.
Soldiers would not take time to use the casks, but dipped
their canteens into the top, and as a result the water soon
became too dirty to use. Passengers then emptied the
water, inverted the casks for seats, and the servants were
not allowed to refill them during the remainder of the trip.
The condition became so serious that attempts were made
to run the blockade with cotton to be exchanged for much-
needed supplies. A few of these attempts were successful
and some supplies came in, but not enough to be of any
great benefit.
Up to the summer of 1864 the Confederate army was
able to protect its north and south fine of communication
from the attack of the enemy. The difficulties which the
road met came from sheer inability to repair the deterio-
ration caused by excessively heavy traffic and abuse at the
hands of its friends. In May of this year the Confederates
were no longer able to ward off attacks; and on the 6th of
the month the Federal forces reached the line at Stony
Creek, burned the bridges, cars, and buildings and tore
up a mile and a half of track. This damage was repaired
as soon as possible and trains resumed their regular trips
on May 19. Another attack was made on June 21. The
cavalry divided into parties and tore up the track at a
number of points. At the same time the infantry tore up
about four miles. Repairs were again made and trains ran
as usual till August 17 when the enemy got possession of
the whole northern end of the line. Again in December
attacks were made farther south, and thirty-two miles,
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, January, 1864.
110 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
more than half of the road, were entirely destroyed. Trains
continued to run on that part of the road just north of
Weldon for the benefit of the Confederate government.
When Petersburg was evacuated in April, 1865, all the
rolling stock was carried to the south side of the Roanoke
River; and when it seemed that the bridge at Weldon and
the rolling stock collected there would be burned, the cars
and engines were all floated across to the north side of the
Roanoke at Gaston. The collapse was complete.
In June after Lee's surrender the road was turned over
to the company by the Federal government and the tre-
mendous task of reconstructing it was begun.1 The com-
pany as such had no credit and the only way it could
secure funds was on the individual security of its various
stockholders. The Adams and Southern Express Com-
panies loaned $70,000 which the road was to repay within
four years by hauling packages and freight for them at a
reasonable rate. Squads of workmen were put on the road
at both ends in July, and by the middle of August it was
possible for trains to pass over the whole length of the line.
Yet it was in a very poor condition owing to the fact that
it was impossible to make old rails which had been straight-
ened he so as to form a level track. The repairing of the
track was only one of the difficulties which had to be met.
The financial situation was even more serious and never
improved until the road underwent a reorganization.
n
The Wilmington and Weldon Railroad
The spirit with which the Wilmington and Weldon
officials entered into the war is set forth by President Ashe
in his Report of November 14, 1861. He has the "gratifi-
cation of feeling just and patriotic pride that the company
has been able to render to our beloved country inappreci-
1 Report of the Petersburg Railroad Company, January 1, 1866.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 111
able assistance in repelling from our soil ruthless invaders."
This was much the same feeling that all railroad officials
had at the beginning of the conflict, while their roads had
supplies and while the increased incomes were paid in a
currency which had not yet depreciated. During the first
year of the war there was a great increase in through travel
over the line due to transportation of soldiers. This branch
of the traffic was much heavier than the reports indicate,
for owing to the lack of system in the Quartermaster's
Department of the state many troops were carried for
whom no pay was received.1
When once the pinch of the blockade began to be felt,
there was constant friction between the Confederate mili-
tary authorities and the road because the former insisted
on breaking up the regular schedule of trains and running
them to suit their own convenience. This was no doubt
necessary, but was a constant source of complaint on the
part of the Wilmington and Weldon. Just before the fall
of Fort Hatteras, at the request of the Committee of
Safety of Wilmington, Fremont was appointed Chief of
Corps of State Artillery and Engineers. The general com-
manding in the state assigned him to duty as the Chief
Engineer of Coast Defenses in the southern part of the
state. One of his duties was the superintending of the
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad. Although appointed
by the Confederate government, he complained that his
work was interfered with by the military authorities, and
that if the officers commanding troops could for a moment
appreciate the responsibility they assumed and the risk
they took of crippling the operations of the government,
as well as the extreme danger to life incurred by interfer-
ing with the regular running of trains, they would cer-
tainly leave that duty to the officers of the companies to
whom it properly belonged.
Throughout the whole four years there was little
1 Report of Engineer and Superintendent Fremont, 1861, included in
Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Nov. 14, 1861.
112 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
harmony between the road and the army officials. In a
letter dated February 16, 1863, from Goldsboro, Major
General S. G. French wrote Governor Vance that there
were a number of idle cars both loaded and empty there,
and if this system or what he termed lack of system con-
tinued, it would be a difficult matter to concentrate troops
if that should become necessary.1 The following telegram
from General Lee to Governor Vance dated December 28,
1864, shows the same dissatisfaction.2
I beg leave to call the attention of your Excellency to the great
danger we incur from the condition and management of our rail-
roads, with the hope that you may be able to remove some of the
difficulties under which we labor.
Examples of delays causing great danger to troops,
separation of brigades, transfer of troops from one road
to another even when of same gauge are given:
I trust your Excellency will endeavor to ascertain what can be
done to facilitate transportation by rail and give all the assist-
ance in your power. The delay is not only dangerous and injurious
but has given rise to painful suspicions which in justice to those
connected with the management of the roads should be removed.
As in the case of the other roads in the Atlantic north
and south line, the Wilmington and Weldon soon began
to feel the need for iron. The blockade runners at Wilming-
ton, the most successful along the coast, brought in a
considerable amount, but the government claimed the
specified tonnage of each vessel and appropriated that
brought in to its own use in making munitions.3 Another
complaint of the road against the government was that it
had not received a single car or engine from those cap-
tured, though the neighboring roads had.4 Nevertheless,
1 Letter in Vance Letter File, North Carolina Historical Commission.
2 Copy of telegram in Vance Letter File, North Carolina Historical
Commission.
3 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Novem-
ber 18, 18G3.
4 Ibid., December 14, 18G2.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 113
it is difficult to suppose that the government would allow
its main artery of communication to suffer any more than
was unavoidable. The road was furnished iron which was
taken up from other lines. The old rails were turned over
to the government as they were worn out in exchange for
rails taken up from the North Carolina Railroad and the
Atlantic and North Carolina Railroad.1 The Wilmington,
Charlotte, and Rutherford was entirely dismantled in
spite of the fact that the main food supply of Wilming-
ton came over this road.2 When the Wilmington and Wel-
don learned of the possibility, it immediately applied to
Governor Vance asking for some of the rails. Wrhile there
is no record of the request having been complied with, it
is reasonable to suppose that the most important line in
the state received its share.
The Report of December 14, 1862, congratulated the
company that its road so far had been free from the in-
cursions of the enemy. This cause for congratulation was
removed two days later when the enemy attacked the road,
burned the bridge over the Neuse River, the trestlework
at Goshen, the water station and a number of cars at
Dudley's Station.3 Up to the fall of 1863, it was estimated
that the loss sustained had been about $100,000. From
this time on for the remainder of hostilities, the road was
the prey of both friend and enemy. The enormous income
for two years enabled the company to declare three divi-
dends during 1863 amounting in all to 31 per cent. It was
specifically stated that this, owing to the depreciated
state of the currency, was really no better than in former
years. The dividends would have been even greater but
1 Letter of Fremont, December 26, 1863, to Colonel George Little,
aide-de-camp, Raleigh, Vance Letter File, North Carolina Historical
Commission.
2 Letter of Mayor of Wilmington to President of Wilmington, Co-
lumbia, and Augusta Railroad Company, Vance Letter File, North Car-
olina Historical Commission.
8 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Novem-
ber 18, 1863.
114 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
for $86,486 in taxes levied by the Confederate govern-
ment. The levy was claimed by the company to be illegal
according to the terms of the charter, and the president
was directed not to pay taxes thereafter either to the
Confederate government or to the state of North Caro-
lina.1
By the summer of 1864 the condition of the road was
alarming. Its rails were wearing out and no material for
repair could be secured. The rolling stock was taxed
severely and it was impossible to get labor except of an
inferior class. The continued depreciation in the currency
increased the cost of living enormously, while the salaries
of the officials and wages of employees had not been
raised in proportion. To ease the situation the salary of
the president was placed at $8000 and that of the treas-
urer at $6000 in the fall of this year. The stockholders
ordered an increase in wages aggregating $26,496, but this
was insignificant when the rise in prices is taken into con-
sideration. In April, 1861, machinists were receiving $2.50
per day and were paying from $18 to $20 per month for
board. Flour sold at Wilmington at $6 a barrel, meat at
10 to 12 cents a pound. The company was paying $1 a
gallon for oil and 4 cents a pound for its iron and nails. In
April, 1864, the same machinists received from $12 to $20
per day and paid from $300 to $360 a month for board.
Flour was selling for $350 a barrel, meat at from $5 to $6
a pound. A suit of clothes could not be bought for less than
$1000 or $1500. Oil was costing the company $50 a gallon,
iron from $2 to $3 a pound, nails $4 a pound. Rents in
Wilmington which had been $400 to $500 per year in 1861
were $8000 to $10,000, in 1864. The depreciation became
so great that it was impossible to tell from the books any-
thing whatever about the financial condition of the com-
pany. When the end of the war finally came, an entirely
1 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, November
23, 1864.
THE WILMINGTON AND WELDON RAILROAD 115
new set was opened up without reference to the old. Under
such circumstances it was but natural that the road should
ask the government for an increase in rates for the business
done. The request was granted and the rate for soldiers
was raised to five cents per mile in May, 1864. *
It was evident that it was only a question of time till
the road would have to cease operation. The fall of Peters-
burg and the occupation of the Petersburg Railroad by
the Federal forces made that part of the Wilmington and
Weldon north of Goldsboro practically useless as nothing
passing over it could be delivered to points north now held
by Federal troops. All trains to Weldon except one mixed
train for both passengers and freight were taken off. Events
during the latter part of 1864 and the beginning of 1865
moved in rapid succession and the road was damaged
alternately by the Federal and the Confederate armies.
Wilmington fell on February 22, 1865, and Goldsboro a
month later, and operation of the road ceased altogether.
General Bragg in withdrawing from Wilmington destroyed
the bridges between Wilmington and Goldsboro in order
to cover his retreat. The section of the road south of
Goldsboro fell into the hands of the Federals under General
Terry on March 19. Temporary bridges were built by the
Railroad Construction Corps of the United States Army,
and the road was operated by the Federal authorities until
it was turned over to the company after the cessation of
hostilities.2
The division north of Goldsboro suffered even worse.
The Confederates practically dismantled it, burning
bridges over Fishing Creek, Quanky, and on the Tarboro
Branch, three locomotives and twenty cars, warehouses at
Dudley's and at Goldsboro. Not only was the road de-
stroyed, but the company found itself in possession of
1 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Novem-
ber 23, 1864.
2 Ibid., November 22, 1865.
116 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
$1,500,000 of worthless Confederate securities purchased
early in the war. When peace came the company found
much of its track destroyed, nearly all of its bridges and
warehouses burned. It resumed operations on August 27,
1865, with only four locomotives, eleven box cars, five
platform cars, and no passenger cars fit for service. Besides
this it was confronted with an entirely new labor situa-
tion. The negroes whom it had employed heretofore were
not now available and the white labor employed did not
give more than three fourths the service which the slaves
had formerly given. Altogether the company was con-
fronted by what seemed to be insuperable difficulties.
One of the first tasks which the roads undertook after
the war was the forming of physical connections. From
the beginning it had been necessary to haul freight and
passengers from the stations of the Richmond and Peters-
burg to those of other roads, thus causing much additional
expense in the handling of freight and inconvenience to
travelers. It was evident that these connections must be
made in order to secure the patronage of the public.
There were two ways of reaching northern points from
the South Atlantic seaboard; one by water, the other by
a series of short railroad journeys as far north as Fred-
ericksburg, thence by stage and boat to Washington.
Physical Connections
For success on any large scale a railroad must be able
to switch freight from one road to another without un-
loading, and to carry passengers without the incon-
venience of frequent change of cars.
With this object in view, two companies were chartered
at the 1865-66 session of the Virginia legislature: the
Richmond and Petersburg Connection Company; and the
Richmond and Petersburg, and Richmond, Fredericks-
burg, and Potomac Connection Company. x Only under the
1 Acts of Virginia, 1865-66, ch. 206, p. 328.
PHYSICAL CONNECTIONS 117
charter of the latter of these was any work actually done.
This company was given permission to build a short line
of road connecting the Richmond and Petersburg with the
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad. The
capital was $200,000, and this might be purchased by
either of the railroad companies at a fair valuation, not
before the expiration of ten years nor after twenty. Rates
were fixed above which this short connecting road was
not allowed to charge. These were, for passengers over
the line, not more than fifty cents per man, and for
freight, five cents per hundred pounds per mile. The
line was built and leased jointly by the two railroad
companies,1 according to contracts signed on August
1, 1866, and April 1, 1867. 2 The road was opened in
May, 1867. The two railroad companies guaranteed to
the stockholders of the connection company an annual
rental until they or either of them should purchase the
right, title, estate, and franchise of the connection com-
pany. By resolution of the railroad companies, it was
agreed that during the lease freight and passenger rates
were to be prescribed by them, and that no other road
should be allowed to make a junction with the connecting
line without their consent.3 The other company chartered
at the same time was not organized. Application was made
by the Richmond and Petersburg in August, 1866, to the
common council of the town of Petersburg for aid in get-
ting up a similar company, but no answer was ever re-
ceived from this body.4
Permission had been granted to the Petersburg Rail-
road to extend its fine to the Appomattox River,5 and the
1 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, Septem-
ber 30, 1867.
2 Poor's Manual, 1898, p. 155.
3 American Railroad Journal, vol. XL, p. 576.
4 Report of Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company, Septem-
ber 30, 1866.
6 American Railroad Journal, vol. XL, p. 576.
118 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Richmond and Petersburg now asked to be allowed to
extend its track to the south bank of the Appomattox and
connect with the Petersburg at that point. This was
granted through an enabling act passed by the Virginia
legislature. The same fares and freight rates were pre-
scribed as obtained on the connection road in Richmond.
This act provided that the gross receipts were to be
divided into two equal parts. Three fifths of one part
were to be assigned to the Petersburg Railroad Company
for maintenance and operation of that section which it
should build, and two fifths to the Richmond and Peters-
burg for the same purpose. The other part was to be
divided between the companies in proportion to the
amount spent by each in constructing its part of the con-
necting line. The building of this short line between the
two roads necessitated the building of a railroad bridge
over the Appomattox, and a union station. The work was
completed and the first train was run over the fine on
August 20, 1867. x Thus the railroads running between
northern and southern points escaped the necessity of
having to transfer passengers and baggage through the
streets of Richmond and Petersburg in omnibuses and
wagons, and avoided the danger of losing through travel
to the more comfortable lines.
At the same time that these connections were being
made in Richmond and in Petersburg, a line was being
built from Washington to Brook's Station, on the Rich-
mond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac, and a bridge was
being constructed over the Cape Fear River at Wilming-
ton.2 This bridge was built by the Wilmington Railway
Bridge Company, chartered in June, 1866. 3 The stock of
the company was owned jointly by the Wilmington and
Weldon, the Wilmington and Manchester, and the Wil-
1 American Railroad Journal, vol. xli, p. 974.
2 Ibid , vol. xl, p. 576.
3 Ordinances of North Carolina, 1865-66, ch. 31.
COMPETITION 119
mington, Columbia, and Rutherford, now the Seaboard
Air Line. The bridge with a few miles of road established
the connection of these three companies at Wilmington.
From that time up to the present the bridge has been con-
trolled through stock ownership by the three companies
and their successors. The closing of these gaps made con-
tinuous and comfortable travel between New York and
the South possible.
These connections, which made possible the running of
through passenger and freight trains, increased the traffic.
New industries grew up along the lines, especially truck
farming in North Carolina. The Wilmington and Weldon
was in a position to profit greatly from the increase.
Competition
The Petersburg was still subject to competition at
Weldon with the Seaboard and Roanoke. Much of the
traffic brought up by the Wilmington and Weldon went
over the latter to Norfolk and was shipped from there
north. The Wilmington and Weldon handled all the traffic
originating in the Wilmington section of North Carolina
and going north, regardless of its direction after leaving
Weldon. The Petersburg, on the other hand, handled only
that part which did not go over the Seaboard and Roanoke.
The Richmond and Petersburg received no larger share of
traffic originating in the South than did the Petersburg,
but the former was not dependent on this traffic for its
existence, while the latter was. The Richmond and Peters-
burg still had its coal business from the Clover Hill Branch
to fall back on. Moreover, it had a monopoly of the
passenger traffic between Richmond and Petersburg and
charged a fare of two to six cents per mile. It could there-
fore make expenses even if no connections had been
made. In fact 1867 was the most prosperous year the road
had had up to that time, although the connections were
not completed until the fall of that year. The gross
120 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
earnings for the year were $136,456; its expenses $82,633,
leaving a net revenue of $53,823. The next year the net
revenue increased to $58,101, the largest of any year up to
1875. x Thus the recovery of the Richmond and Petersburg
was rapid.
The Petersburg, almost wholly dependent on traffic
which it received from other roads, recovered slowly. The
country through which it ran was poor, crops light, and
few manufactures were in existence along its line. It came
out of the Civil War badly crippled and struggled along
against competition with the Seaboard and Roanoke.
Moreover, it was poorly managed and reports even gained
circulation that it was dishonestly managed. Under these
circumstances it was impossible to avoid a reorganization.
On May 10, 1877, it was placed in the hands of a receiver
upon a motion made in the United States Court at Nor-
folk.2 Pending reorganization it was operated for four
years by a receiver appointed by the court, with the usual
amount of wrangling among the various classes of security
holders.
A movement was reported in 1878 by which the second
mortgage bondholders intended to buy the road at fore-
closure and form a new management.3 Matters drifted on,
however, and the stockholders and bondholders seemed to
be no nearer an agreement than they had been at first.
Consequently Judge Hughes, of the United States Circuit
Court of the Eastern Division of Virginia, issued an order
in 1880 allowing until January, 1881, for the redemption
of the company.4 The court directed that unless such an
agreement was reached by that time, the road should be
advertised and sold for $60,000, and that the purchasers
should deposit $10,000 as a pledge of good faith. In case of
sale thirty days were to be allowed for exceptions, where-
1 See Appendix, Table VII.
2 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. XXIV, p. 445.
3 Ibid., vol. xxvi, p. 523.
4 Ibid., vol. xxxi, p. 306.
REORGANIZATION OF PETERSBURG RAILROAD 121
upon, if the sale were confirmed, the road was to be turned
over to the purchasers. No agreement was reached by the
creditors and the court advertised the road for sale, sub-
ject to a $500,000 mortgage.1 The sale was to take place
in Petersburg on April 20, 1881, to satisfy a mortgage of
May 1, 1872. Those interested in the road now realized
that something must be done if they would save it. They
got together, reached an agreement and petitioned the
court that the date of the sale be postponed. The peti-
tion was granted and the date of sale set for May 20,
1881. 2 The second bondholders then presented a plan
whereby the sale might be averted.3 A pool committee
purchased all the outstanding second mortgage bonds.
This committee also held 7645 shares of the capital stock.
The scheme provided for the payment in full of the inter-
est due on the first mortgage, and for the funding of a part
due on the second mortgage bonds. The plan was unani-
mously adopted by the bondholders, and the road was by
order of the court restored to the stockholders, and the
receiver, Mr. G. G. Pegram, was dismissed on May 9,
1881.4
The load under which the company had been struggling
may be seen from the financial statement of September 30,
1880:5 capital stock, $1,324,200; funded debt, $1,041,000;
coupons and unpaid interest, $312,840; floating debt,
$133,383; cost and equipment of road, $1,035,750. The
funded debt consisted of $500,000 8 per cent first mort-
gage bonds dated January 1, 1869, due 1879; $487,500
8 per cent second mortgage thirty-year bonds due May 1,
1902; $53,500 8 per cent third mortgage ten-year bonds
due 1885. Both the earnings and expenses of the road
were considerably increased, but the operating ratio was
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xxxir, p. 232.
2 Ibid., vol. xxxii, p. 444. 3 Baltimore Sun, May 3, 1881.
4 Poor's Manual, 1881, p. 360.
6 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xxxiv, p. 377.
122 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
materially lowered during the years the road was in the
hands of the receiver.1
With the physical connection of all the roads completed,
so that through trains might run from Wilmington to New
York, with the Petersburg reorganized and placed on a
firm financial basis, with the ravages of the Civil War
largely repaired, a new era was ushered in. The handling
of freight became far more important than it had ever
been before. Cotton continued to be the chief bulky com-
modity handled. The naval stores business was declin-
ing and shifting to the Southwest. The time was ripe for
the introduction of a new industry which would furnish
sufficient business for the improved facilities. The grow-
ing of garden truck and fruit offered the opportunity.
This industry in North Carolina was an extension of
what had been started before the Civil War around
Norfolk. The so-called "winter garden," which supplies
the northeastern states with fresh vegetables demanded
during the late winter and early spring months, is a narrow
belt stretching along the Atlantic Coast from near Sa-
vannah, Georgia, to the southern portion of New Jersey.2
The soil of this strip is for the most part what geologists
have named the Norfolk fine sandy loam, and is admirably
adapted to the raising of early vegetables. It is estimated
that of the total area of this soil, amounting to some
20,000,000 acres, not one tenth of one per cent is used
even now for truck crop production, and not 25 per cent
is used for any agricultural purpose aside from grazing. So
far as soil is concerned, therefore, the truck-growing in-
dustry is capable of wide extension.
But soil is only one of the necessary factors in the
establishment of the industry. Transportation is equally
important. Not only must the truck crops be grown near a
1 See Appendix, Table VIII.
2 Jay A. Bonsteel, "Truck Soils of the Atlantic Coast Region," Year
Book of U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1912, p. 417.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW BUSINESS 123
primary shipping point, but the railroad must be able to
make quick delivery of products to the place of con-
sumption. This the Atlantic lines were not able to do
before the connection of the various roads. With these
connections completed, however, the business began to
develop. The first efforts were feeble and the crops lim-
ited, but when once a start was made the growth was
rapid. In 1868, the next year after the closing of the gaps,
1200 barrels of fruit and vegetables were shipped from
North Carolina to northern points.1 The work of carrying
these new products was begun in April and continued until
October. This was the season of light traffic for the roads,
and almost the only additional expense in handling the
business was that of changing the cars so as to give proper
ventilation. The income to the road the first year was only
about $6000. The new industry brought into the state
and distributed among the growers over $100,000. This
was sufficient encouragement to induce many farmers to
turn their attention away from the staple crops to truck
gardening.
The railroads were quick to see that in this field they
had a great opportunity to develop a profitable business if
only they could give speedy delivery of the perishable
crops. The roads were not slow to improve their natural
advantages. The Wilmington district is able to mature its
crops twenty- two days on the average earlier than the
older district around Norfolk. But to profit from the in-
dustry absolute harmony among the north and south lines
was necessary. This was one characteristic which the
roads had never shown. Their efficiency had always been
impaired by a want of harmony on the part of the different
managements.2 Made up of short lines, projected to serve
local purposes, the managements had been subordinated
1 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, November
11, 1868.
2 Ibid., November 16, 1870.
124 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
to local policies and prejudices greatly to the detriment of
through business and to the hindrance of increased re-
ceipts. In the marketing of the products of the North
Carolina truck farms they at last found a common interest.
After handling the business as best they could for
nearly twenty years as separate lines, all the roads form-
ing a connection between the North Carolina and the large
eastern seaboard cities entered into a contract and estab-
lished what has since that time been known as the "At-
lantic Coast Despatch." The contract was signed by the
Pennsylvania Railroad, the New York, Philadelphia, and
Norfolk Railroad, and the lines which have since gone
into the Atlantic Coast Line System. All-rail connection
was thus established with the northern markets both by
way of Washington and through Portsmouth. The Atlantic
Coast Despatch was equipped with special fruit and vege-
table cars built by the shops of the Wilmington and
Weldon Road. The expenses of operation were shared in
proportion to the mileage of the contracting lines.1 The
Pennsylvania Road was to furnish thirty cars and the
Atlantic lines seventy. Three fourths of a cent per mile
was to be paid to the owner by that company using the
car. The two routes, that passing through Richmond and
Alexandria and that passing through Cape Charles and
Portsmouth, were to be treated alike. A system of rates
per hundred pounds to Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New
York, from eight cents in the first class to two cents in
the sixth higher than through rates from and to the same
points, fixed by the Atlantic lines in conjunction with their
water connections was agreed upon. A similar arrange-
ment was made for Boston and Providence with higher
differential rates.2
1 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Novem-
ber 23, 1887.
2 Atlantic Coast Despatch Contract, dated August 1, 1887. In vault
of Treasurer's office of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wil-
mington, N.C.
DEVELOPMENT OF NEW BUSINESS 125
These new facilities developed a north-bound move-
ment of early vegetables and fruits "even beyond the
expectations of the most sanguine." * Nor did the develop-
ment of this new business seriously affect the old staple
crop, for in most cases the vegetables are planted early
and between the rows of cotton. The early vegetables
mature and are gathered before the cotton has grown to
sufficient height to interfere with them. Some land near
the lines which had formerly been planted to cotton was
now given up entirely to vegetables and fruits, but not
enough to lessen materially the cotton yield. The extent
to which the truck business had now grown may be seen
by the number of cars put into service. The first year
following the contract 23 fruit and vegetable cars were
built for the Petersburg, 8 for the Richmond and Peters-
burg, 13 for the Northeastern of South Carolina, and 50
for the Wilmington and Weldon itself. The rapid growth
of the industry soon made it impossible for the Wilmington
and Weldon shops to furnish a sufficient number of cars
to handle the business, and the second year of the contract
the Wilmington and Weldon alone bought 300 new cars
from a Baltimore manufacturing concern.2
It was found that other crops could be raised besides
lettuce and Irish potatoes, which had been the chief pro-
ducts of the Wilmington section. Almost by accident it
was discovered that the soil was peculiarly suited to
strawberries. About 1890 two farmers living at Rocky
Point and Faison planted small beds for their own use.
The yield was such that they decided to express a few
crates to Richmond, Washington, and Baltimore. The
fruit was so good that they received exceedingly high
prices for the few crates and decided to grow the next
year for the market. From this small beginning there has
developed the greatest strawberry section in the United
1 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, 1888.
2 Ibid., 1890.
126 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
States. It soon became evident that the express company
could not handle the business. The Atlantic Coast Des-
patch was not suited to this delicate fruit and the Atlantic
Coast Line introduced the refrigerator car. Cars were
secured from the California Fruit Growers Express, popu-
larly known to the strawberry raisers as the "C.F.X."
The facilities of the company were inadequate for the
undertaking and it was necessary to secure the services
of another of the great car line companies, the Armour
Car Lines. The following, taken from the contract be-
tween the Armour Car Lines and the Atlantic Coast Line,
will serve to show the relations between the two :
It [the Atlantic Coast Line] will, through its accounting de-
partment, pay to the Car Line as soon as accounts can be made
up after the end of each month all moneys earned by the Car Line
for furnishing it refrigeration and handling generally under its
supervision the business moving from its rails during the preced-
ing month, at the rates named by the Car Line and not exceeding
the maximum hereinbefore provided, together with any local
cold storage charges in connection with such business as herein-
before provided. It being understood that failure to collect from
shipper or consignee after due diligence the refrigeration charges
referred to in this contract, the Railroad Company will be relieved
from same, provided that in the event part of the rates for trans-
portation or refrigeration or both is collected, the Railroad Com-
pany will pay to the Car Line its pro-rata proportion, on revenue
basis, of charges so collected. It will also pay to the Car Line for
the use of said cars f of one cent per mile run on the lines of the
railroad both loaded and empty; the Car Line to collect direct
from connections the usual mileage earned by its cars beyond the
rails of the Railroad.1
With these adequate facilities and a permanent means
of transportation, strawberry growing increased by leaps
and bounds. The thickly populated section between Rich'
1 Contract between the Armour Car Lines Company and the Atlan-
tic Coast Line Railroad Company, dated October 17, 1906. In Treas-
urer's office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wilmington,
North Carolina. The contract from which this is an excerpt superseded
one entered into in 1903.
WILMINGTON, COLUMBIA, AND AUGUSTA 127
mond and Boston was the chief market, though shipments
were made as far west as Chicago and even into Can-
ada. The sales every season amount to from $750,000 to
$1,000,000, which added to the income from vegetables and
fruit crops increase greatly the prosperity of the section.1
While the truck and fruit industry in the North Caro-
lina section was growing up, the naval stores center was
shifting farther to the south into South Carolina and
Florida and was handled largely by the roads of this sec-
tion which became integral parts of the Atlantic Coast
Line System. Physical connection between the Wilmington
and Weldon and the Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta
was made shortly after the war. There was still one very
great impediment to the free shipping of perishable com-
modities, the difference in gauge of the two roads. This
necessitated unloading at Wilmington. The difficulty was
not removed until 1886 when the gauge of the Wilmington,
Columbia, and Augusta was standardized.2 The extension
of the truck industry toward the south was one of the
chief reasons for making the improvement.
m
The Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina Group
The Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta Railroad
The war ruined practically all of the railroads in the
South Carolina-Georgia territory and the growth of the
Atlantic Coast Line System in these states has taken place
largely since 1865.
During the Civil W7ar the Wilmington and Manchester,
later the Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta, suffered
from the destruction of its track and equipment and from
the inability to procure the necessary materials for repair
1 See Appendix, Table IX.
2 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, Novem-
ber, 1885.
128 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
and reconstruction. When the war was ended the earnings
were so small that it was impossible to put the road in
proper condition. Legal proceedings were commenced and
a second suit of foreclosure was brought in the courts of
North and South Carolina.1 The road was consequently
sold on January 5, 1870, for $525,000 cash and $1,975,828
in its preferred securities,2 and was reorganized under the
name Wilmington and Carolina. For purposes of reim-
bursing the cost of the road and of furnishing means to
build the extension to Columbia and to equip thoroughly
the whole line, the company executed a first mortgage for
$3,200,000 on its road from Wilmington to Columbia,
together with all its personal property, real estate, and
equipment. It was estimated that when the road should
be completed to Columbia, the entire distance being about
200 miles, its value would be some $4,500,000. 3 The pur-
chasers of the old company received a charter in March,
1870, from the legislatures of North and South Carolina,
incorporating them into the Wilmington, Columbia, and
Augusta Railroad Company. One provision of the charter
was that the capital stock was not to exceed $5,000,000.
The company was given permission to build a road from
any point on its line to Columbia, South Carolina.4 This
extension was opened in the winter of 1871-72 and gave
the road an outlet in the Southwest, offering a more di-
rect route to the principal cities in the South Atlantic and
Gulf States.5
On November 20, 1872, the Wilmington, Columbia, and
Augusta leased the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad for
a period of ninety-nine years. The terms provided for:
payment of regular interest on all bonded debt of the
1 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1874, p. 355.
2 Poors Manual, 1870-71, p. 402.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xi, p. 497.
4 Statement filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission by the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
6 American Railroad Journal, vol. xliv, p. 1437.
WILMINGTON, COLUMBIA, AND AUGUSTA 129
company; assumption of all its assets, including stock and
interest in the Wilmington Railroad Bridge Company;
payment of all liabilities other than funded debt; payment
to the company of 5 per cent on capital stock for current
year, 6 per cent the next year, and 7 per cent for each suc-
ceeding year during continuance of lease, said payments
to be free of United States tax. 1 Failing to receive the rental,
the lessor was forced to dissolve the contract in December,
1877. Failure to carry out the terms of this contract was
the forerunner of more trouble, and in October, 1879,
the road was again sold under foreclosure of mortgage and
reorganized in February, 1880. 2 Under the reorganization
plan of this year all securities except the first mortgage
bonds were cut off, and these were exchanged at the rate
of two old $1000 bonds for one new $1000 bond and $600
of stock. The new bonds bore interest at 6 per cent and
fell due on January 1, 1910.
This scaling down of fixed charges relieved the situation.
The reorganization plan provided that profits for a time
should be used to rebuild the track and to improve the
equipment. New steel rails were bought and 75 new cars
were purchased.3 The report of 1881 showed an increase
of $93,510 in gross receipts over the previous year. It in-
cluded a recommendation that a dividend of 3 per cent be
declared, and that all earnings above 6 per cent should be
put back the following year into improvements. In refer-
ence to the rebuilding of the road the report for the year
ending September 30, 1884, says:
It is a cause of congratulation that the day seems at hand in
which the five feet gauges of the various southern roads will be
changed to four feet eight and a half inches so as to make a uni-
form gauge throughout the United States. This alteration to-
gether with change of rolling stock will require, it is estimated,
1 Railroad Gazette, vol. iv, p. 518.
2 Poor's Manual, 1884, pp. 422-23.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xxxm, p. 686.
130 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
an outlay of about $50,000. It is important, as this sum will be
required in cash, that it should be accumulated from the earnings
and set aside for the emergency. There is no similar amount this
company could be called upon to invest from which it would
derive a tithe of the advantage.1
By a curious coincidence, eight years after the dissolu-
tion of the lease of the Wilmington and Weldon, the
lessee became the lessor and vice versa, when on June 1,
1885, the Wilmington and Weldon took a ninety-nine year
lease on the Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta.2 The
terms of this contract were that the Wilmington and
Weldon guaranteed the interest on the bonds of the Wil-
mington, Columbia, and Augusta, and a 6 per cent divi-
dend on the stock.3 The lease continued in operation until
canceled on July 18, 1898, in order that the Wilmington,
Columbia, and Augusta might enter as a separate unit
into the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina.
The Northeastern Railroad of South Carolina
The Northeastern Railroad of South Carolina suffered
great damage to its property during the Civil War, and it
was forced to expend during the years following $215,398
on reconstruction.4 It suffered also because of the total
destruction of the Savannah and Charleston and its
delayed reconstruction after the war. This interfered
greatly with railroad travel from southern points north,
which ordinarily passed over the Northeastern. Such a
result was not surprising, for the disuse of the Savannah
and Charleston formed the only break in a continuous line
from St. Marks, Florida, to Portland, Maine.5 Passenger
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xxxix, p. 706. See Appen-
dix, Table X.
2 Report of Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, September
30, 1835.
3 Contract filed in Treasurer's office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company, Wilmington, North Carolina.
4 American Railroad Journal, vol. xli, pp. 822-23.
6 Report of Northeastern Railroad of South Carolina, 1869.
THE CHERAW AND DARLINGTON RAILROAD 131
traffic was diverted before it reached the Northeastern.
These obstacles were not altogether removed by the re-
habilitation of the Savannah and Charleston, due in large
part to the incompleteness of the connections with that
line and the absence of double daily service over it. For
some time after the Civil War, the country through which
the road passed did not furnish a business sufficient
for its capacity. In order to increase the freight and to
encourage the farmers to produce more, rates were lowered
in 1869, resulting in a falling off of freight earnings.1 In
addition to this disadvantage the lack of capital and
ready money restricted the movement of the people. The
road could not get away from the fact that it was very
unfortunately located to maintain a separate existence. It
was competing on one side with water transportation; on
the other it was the base of a triangle, with another road
bisecting the sides and running parallel to it. The line was
a valuable one to form part of a system, but not successful
when operated alone.2
The Cheraw and Darlington Railroad
The Cheraw and Darlington was a naval stores road
and was designed to give the people of the upper Peedee
an outlet for their forest products. It fulfilled its purpose
in its early history, but later as other roads were built,
much of its traffic was diverted. It continued to make
enough to support itself, and by a series of purchases be-
ginning in 1892 it expanded into a small system of roads.
It bought the Cheraw and Salisbury Railroad in 1892; the
Hartsville Railroad, from Hartsville to Floyds, South
Carolina, in 1895; and Division A of the Charleston and
Northern, from Gibson, North Carolina, to Darlington,
South Carolina, in 1895. 3 This small system went into the
Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina in 1898.
1 American Railroad Journal, vol. xlii, pp. 792-93.
2 See Appendix, Table XI. 3 Poors Manual, 1898. p. 286.
132 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
IV
The Savannah, Florida, and Western Group
The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad
Immediately after the war, the Atlantic and Gulf
without outside aid was restored and extended to Bain-
bridge, work which had been abandoned in 1864. Business
improved and by 1867 the road was getting a share of the
cotton trade at St. Marks, Florida, reached by a branch
line.1 Although its gross earnings up to 1871 and its oper-
ating expenses both increased, the ratio was such that an
increasing surplus could still be set aside.2 After 1870 its
difficulties began again. A failure of the cotton crop of
1871 cut down the number of bales hauled by 43,269, in
consequence of which the earnings fell off $72,555. In ad-
dition to this loss of traffic, the rate had to be reduced
from $.95 to $.70 per hundred to meet competition through
Eufaula and Montgomery to Louisville. Earnings from
passenger traffic also began to decrease owing to the dis-
organized railroad connections in Florida, and the income
from this source fell $14,295 during the year 1872.3 The
road was in a weakened financial condition when the panic
of 1873 came, and although it passed through this and
the years of business stagnation following, it could not
recover its ground. The underlying cause of its difficulties
was that the original plan had never been carried out. No
through route to Pensacola and Mobile had been com-
pleted. One terminus of the road was a good one, the other
was bottled up. The charter had specified that the route
should be selected with distinct reference to a speedy con-
nection with the Gulf of Mexico, and that it was the in-
tention of the state of Georgia to provide a main trunk
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. vi, pp. 456-58.
2 See Appendix, Table XII.
3 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1873, p. 339.
CHARLESTON AND SAVANNAH RAILROAD 133
railway across her territory, connecting the Atlantic
Ocean and the Gulf of Mexico.1 The experience of 1871
was "sufficient to show that the company should not rely
exclusively on its temporary local establishment." The
Georgia state commissioners, appointed to represent the
$1,000,000 of stock held by the state in the Atlantic and
Gulf, reported a strong argument in favor of carrying out
the original design of the road and placing it in connection
with the Gulf at Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans by
the construction of 165 miles of road from Bainbridge to
Pollard, Alabama, where it would connect with finished
lines of railway to all these points.2 But the time for such
palliative measures was past. A receiver was appointed in
April, 1877, and a bill filed in the United States Circuit
Court for the sale of the road to satisfy a second mortgage.
The court ordered the road with all its branches, consti-
tuting altogether 350 miles of line, to be sold in Savannah
November 4, 1879. 3 It was bought by Mr. H. B. Plant,
for $300,000 cash, subject to a mortgage of $2,713,500. He
increased the capital stock to $2,000,000, and reorganized
the company under the name of the Savannah, Florida,
and Western Railway Company.
The Charleston and Savannah Railroad
The Charleston and Savannah was mainly a cotton
carrying road. It had been completed just before the war.
Sherman, on his march to the sea, left it a right of way and
a roadbed. In order to get started it had executed a $1,000,-
000 mortgage in 1858, and the interest on this had not
been paid. An unconditional sale was the only solution of
the difficulties. The trustees therefore sold the road in
October, 1866, for $30,000 cash to Mr. Joseph H. Taylor
representing the bondholders.4 A reorganization then took
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xjv, p. 354.
2 Ibid., vol. xv, p. 219. 3 Ibid., vol. xxix, p. 40.
4 American Railroad Journal, vol. xxxix, p. 1141.
134 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
place, the name being changed to the Savannah and
Charleston Railroad Company. The bonds amounting to
$1,000,000 were converted into the same amount of stock.
The sale had been made subject to a lien by the state of
South Carolina, which had indorsed certain bonds.1 In-
terest to the amount of $157,000 had accumulated on
these bonds and this amount was funded by the new
company. The road, 104 miles, was rebuilt at a cost of
$2,238,290, and opened for business in the spring of 1869. 2
This crisis had just been passed when the panic of 1873
and the subsequent depression in business came and the
road again found itself in difficult straits. The outcome
was a decree of sale in the Court of Common Pleas of
South Carolina. The sale was made absolute and all
parties in the case were barred of any equity of redemption
or other right in the property. It was bought at fore-
closure in the summer of 1880, reorganized under the
name of the Charleston and Savannah Railway Company,
and as such went into the Savannah, Florida, and Western.
The Brunswick and Albany Railroad
The Brunswick and Albany came out of the Civil War
badly crippled and struggled along as best it could till the
panic of 1873. This gave it a blow from which it could not
recover. In 1871 it was engaged in building an extension
from the seacoast to Eufaula, Alabama, 242 miles.3 Con-
struction had been completed as far as Albany, Georgia,
about halfway to Eufaula, when the president, Mr.
Kimball, became involved in financial difficulties due to
losses in the Chicago fire.4 Contracts for the rest of the
road had been let and it was expected that it would con-
nect with the Brunswick and Vicksburg. This collapse
made it impossible to complete the undertaking. An at-
1 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1873, p. 330.
2 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xii, p. 337.
3 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1873, p. 346.
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xm, p. 605.
THE BRUNSWICK AND ALBANY RAILROAD 135
tempt to sell the road under a mechanic's lien was made
in 1872, but the sale was postponed.1 The bondholders
were endeavoring to hold the road for their debt, since the
state of Georgia, which had guaranteed the bonds, had
repudiated its guarantee. The next year it was sold at
auction at Brunswick, Georgia, October 15, 1873, to
J. M. Mayers, who represented the German bondholders.
He paid $530,000 for it.2 This sale was made to satisfy
judgments obtained by creditors. The road, now turned
over to Charles Schlatter representing the stockholders,
was a poor piece of property; it had never earned more
than $1000 per mile and all earnings were absorbed in
running expenses.3 In 1882 it was again sold, this time
by the bondholders to Frederick Wolffe, and was reorgan-
ized as the Brunswick and Western.4 Under this name it
was bought conditionally by the Savannah, Florida, and
Western, the conditions being that the purchasers should
have sixty days in which to investigate the title. At the
expiration of the specified time, the agents of the Plant
System stated that they were dissatisfied and declined
to take the road.5 Upon notification of this decision, the
bondholders filed a bill to compel the specific performance
of the contract. Little else was done imtil the stockholders
met in Frankfort, Germany, and unanimously voted to
dispose of their holdings, 162,400 shares, to the Savan-
nah, Florida, and Western. The German stockholders
received for their holdings in the road £260,000 in 4 per
cent mortgage bonds of the Savannah, Florida, and Western
and £130,000 in income bonds of that road.6 The invest-
ment in 1901 by the Savannah, Florida, and Western in
the Brunswick and Western was not a paying proposition
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xv, p. 773.
2 Vernon s Railroad Manual, 1873, p. 346.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xxxi, p. 535.
4 Ibid., vol. xxxv, p. 637.
5 Atlanta Constitution, September 27, 1S85.
6 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xlv, p. 819.
136 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
financially. It did give the Plant System improved con-
nections which were serviceable to it, and on this ground
alone can the acquisition of the road be justified.1
The Alabama Midland Railroad
The Alabama Midland Railroad Company was char-
tered by the legislature of Alabama in March, 1887, and
by that of Georgia in October of the same year, as
the Alabama Terminal and Improvement Company.2 It
purchased a short line known as the Northwest and
Florida Railroad in 1889, 3 and extended it from Bain-
bridge on the Savannah, Florida, and Western to a
connection with the Louisville and Nashville at Mont-
gomery, a distance of 175 miles. Upon completion of the
road the Plant Investment Company purchased the ma-
jority of the stock from the Alabama Terminal and Im-
provement Company and took charge of it on August 1,
1890. 4 Subsequent to this, a difference arose between the
two companies over certain bonds the interest on which
had been guaranteed by the Savannah, Florida, and West-
ern until November, 1892. 5 The Alabama Terminal and
Improvement Company filed a bill in the Chancery Court
asking that a receiver be appointed for the Alabama Mid-
land.6 The matter was settled out of court and the road
continued as the property of the Savannah, Florida, and
Western up to the time that company was taken over by
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
The territory served by the Savannah, Florida, and
Western has always been predominantly agricultural.
The freight which the road handled came from farms,
forests, and mines along the line, the extractive industries.
It is estimated that in 1900, 300,000 cattle were marketed
1 See Appendix, Table XIII. 2 Poms Manual, 1889, p. 655.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xlvit, p. 532.
4 Ibid., vol. lii, p. 717. B Ibid., p. 898.
6 Ibid., vol. liii, p. 186.
THE ALABAMA MIDLAND RAILROAD 137
from the contiguous territory.1 The chief markets are
Brunswick, Charleston, Savannah, and Jacksonville, at
the last of which the cattle are fed and shipped to Cuban
markets. Cotton also forms one of the chief items of
freight. By no means the least important is the early
vegetable, melon, and fruit traffic from Florida to northern
points. Phosphate rock and fuller's clay were mined along
the route. The forests yielded cross ties, turpentine, and
rosin. The nature of the freight varied with the seasons.
For instance, cotton came to the line in the fall and winter
and one kind of car was needed to haul this; fruit and
vegetables appeared in the spring and necessitated an en-
tirely different kind. Fruit and melons pay a high freight
rate but they are expensive to handle because of the speed
with which they must reach their destination.
The passenger traffic of the road was also seasonal, con-
sisting largely of passengers going south for the winter.
Such travel is spasmodic and must be catered to. It de-
mands more luxurious accommodation than the road
would have otherwise been compelled to furnish. More-
over, the system was subject to two sources of competi-
tion; one to the north and west over the lines paralleling
the Mississippi, the other over the water routes on the
Atlantic. The nature of the traffic subjected the road to
more expense and more risk than the average. In spite of
this it prospered during the years just prior to its purchase
by the Atlantic Coast Line, but it became more remuner-
ative when operated in connection with a larger system.
The risk under these conditions was distributed over a
greater mileage, and better connections and quicker time
were possible, absolute necessities to a road whose traffic
was seasonal. Its purchase therefore by the Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad was a natural outgrowth of its situation.
1 Compendium of Attractions and Business Opportunities along the Plant
System of Railways, 1900, p. 5. J. W. Stephens, Agricultural and Immigra-
tion Agent.
CHAPTER VIII
INTEGRATIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS
"As long as railroads were purely local affairs, each locality
might charter and run its own. The moment any through
traffic grew up, this was found to be a wasteful way of
doing business. If they changed cars at every point of
junction, the expenses were vastly increased. If they did
not change cars, there was still the awkwardness of divid-
ing responsibility, and the evil of having two separate
organizations where one would do the work better." 1 It
was inevitable, therefore, with the development of rail-
roads as the chief means of transportation, that the
separate lines serving the Atlantic seaboard should be
forced into a closer relationship with each other. The more
important the roads became and the heavier the traffic,
the closer the relationship.
The integration of the Atlantic Coast Line shows prac-
tically every phase of railroad development in the United
States, the one notable exception being that of cut-throat
competition. Beginning with a number of short lines scat-
tered throughout the territory, there existed first informal
agreements and understandings which could be terminated
at the will of any one of the parties. Following this there
came the physical connection of the roads and formal
contracts for the handling of through passengers and
freight, the receipts from these sources to be divided ac-
cording to mileage. Next was the holding company period
when one company purchased the majority of the stock of
the roads and exercised a controlling influence over them.
Finally came the time when the more prosperous lines
purchased outright their less prosperous neighbors and
formed small systems. As this tendency grew, the holding
1 Hadley, Railroad Transportation, p. 83.
INTEGRATIONS AND CONSOLIDATIONS 139
company played a less important part and finally disposed
of the majority of its holdings and ceased to exercise any
influence over the management other than in its capacity
as a stockholder. The final step came when the system
thus formed began to buy outright other systems and
incorporate them into itself or to allow the acquired road
to continue a separate management, as in the case of the
Louisville and Nashville.
The main period of consolidation and expansion falls
within the decade following the panic of 1893. This is
just forty years later than the beginning of the consolida-
tion of the New York Central lines. The consolidation of
the Pennsylvania lines also came much earlier than did
that of the Atlantic Coast Line. The roads in the South
most nearly comparable with the Atlantic Coast Line are
the Southern and the Seaboard Air Line, chartered in 1894
and 1900 respectively. They are each the result of a series
of integrations and consolidations similar to those that
took place in the Atlantic Coast Line. The consolidation
of these systems occurred at about the same time as that
of the Atlantic Coast Line, that is, during the decade
following the panic of 1893.
The lateness of the movement in the South is attribut-
able to the Civil War and to the panic of 1873. The war
put a stop to all railroad improvement in this section.
Hardly had the shock of this passed when two thirds of
the railway mileage in the South was thrown into the
hands of receivers by the panic of 1873. Unfortunate
though these catastrophes were, the delays caused by
them enabled the roads of the South to escape the period
of cut-throat competition and rate wars of the late seven-
ties and eighties. Profiting by the experiences of northern
and western roads, they also escaped for the most part
the evils of high finance, and there is no period in the his-
tory of any of them similar to that depicted by Charles
Francis Adams in his "A Chapter of Erie.',
140 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
The Atlantic Coast Line Company
The holding company period in the history of the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad dates from the incorporation
of the American Improvement and Construction Company
on April 29, 1889, under the laws of Connecticut.1 Under
that act of incorporation this company was "given power
and was authorized to acquire, build, own, sell, convey,
equip, lease or maintain and operate by steam or other
power, any railroad, street railway, tramway, telegraph
lines, telephone lines, water works, canals, bridges, steam-
ship or steamboat lines, boats and vessels of all kinds, and
the appurtenances thereof." The right was also granted to
obtain, carry, and transport passengers, mail, express,
freight, and other articles. In addition, the company was
allowed to "acquire, purchase, produce, generate, and
manufacture by mechanical device or other means from
any substance or material, distribute, sell and convey, use,
deal in, and otherwise dispose of gas and electricity." The
original capital of the company was $500,000, divided
into $50 shares and the maximum capitalization was
$10,000,000. By an amendment passed on June 22, 1889,
the maximum capitalization possible was increased to
$30,000,000.2
After four years the name of this company was changed
to the Atlantic Coast Line Company by the act of May 5,
1893. Its shares of stock were then made $100 instead of
$50. An additional right granted at this time is of particular
interest, bringing the company within the scope of the
present history; namely, the power "to hold or acquire or
otherwise get possession of shares of stock in other cor-
porations, bonds, securities, obligations, and to transfer,
sell or otherwise dispose of such obligations." 3 By the ex-
1 Special Laws of Connecticut, vol. x, p. 1175. For informal agree-
ments and early contracts, see chapter v.
2 Special Laws of Connecticut, vol. x, p. 1443.
8 lbid.t vol. xi, p. 404.
THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE COMPANY 141
ercise of this power the company secured the majority of
the stock of many of the roads in this study, including
that of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company itself,
which it retained until 1914.
In January, 1914, at a meeting of the directors, it was
determined to recommend to the stockholders that the
capital stock be reduced one half, from $17,640,000 to
$8,820,000. 1 Each stockholder was to be required to return
to the company his certificate of capital stock, receiving
in exchange on or after March 10, 1914, the new certifi-
cates for the same number of shares but of the par value
of $50 each. In consideration of the reduction of stock,
he should receive two shares of the common stock of the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.2 The stock-
holders decided to accept this recommendation and so
voted on February 20, 1914. 3 The stock of the company
was accordingly reduced by one half, and the stockholders
received for $8,820,000 of Atlantic Coast Line Company
stock, $17,640,000 in the stock of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company. The holding company by means of
this distribution gave up the controlling interest in the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad, owning on June 30, 1915,
only $18,590,000 out of $67,755,700 of the outstanding
stock of that road.4 The financial success of the Atlantic
Coast Line Company can be judged from the fact that in
1898 its capital was increased from $5,000,000 to $10,000,-
000, the $5,000,000 increase being distributed to stock-
holders of record as a 100 per cent dividend, representing
the earnings of the company in financing the various rail-
roads in which it was interested.5
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xcvm, p. 234.
2 Circular to stockholders, dated January 15, 1914.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xcviii, p. 609.
4 Poor's Manual, 1915, p. 1129.
8 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxvii, p. 954.
142 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad of Virginia
The next phase of consolidation began when the pros-
perous roads controlled by the Atlantic Coast Line Com-
pany purchased adjoining roads outright. The first trans-
action was the purchase of the Petersburg by the Rich-
mond and Petersburg, under an act passed by the legisla-
ture of Virginia in 1898, authorizing the consolidation of
the two roads.1 The act provided that the new company
should acquire the stock of the Petersburg par for par,
and that any stock not exchanged on these terms could
be bought outright at a price to be determined in the
Circuit Court in the town of Petersburg, or by a committee
appointed for that purpose. According to this act the
Richmond and Petersburg was to give up the right of ex-
emption from taxation, "except the original exempt prop-
erty now taxed for state purposes only." The act increased
the capital stock to $3,000,000 and changed the name of
the company to that of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company of Virginia.2
This consolidation, resulting in less than a hundred
miles of line, was a mere beginning, for at the next ses-
sion of the legislature of Virginia an act was passed on
January 12, 1900, 3 and approved later by the legisla-
ture of North Carolina, by which the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company of Virginia was given power: to lease,
use, operate, and consolidate itself with other roads; to
change its name to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany; to own stocks and bonds or other evidences of debt;
to guarantee stocks and bonds of other railroad or trans-
portation companies; to increase its capital to $100,000,000.
This act provided further that the company should give
up all rights whatsoever to exemption from taxation. This
1 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1897-98, ch. 635, p. 674.
2 See Appendix, Tables XIV and XV.
3 Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1900, ch. 18, p. 24.
ATLANTIC COAST LINE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 143
was the act under which the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company of to-day grew up. Under it were acquired the
Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina, the Wilmington
and Weldon, and the Savannah, Florida, and Western.
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad of South Carolina
The Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina was organ-
ized on July 16, 1898, x under the provisions of an act of
the legislature of South Carolina passed in 1897. 2 This act
provided that the Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta
Railroad Company, the Northeastern Railroad Company
of South Carolina, the Cheraw and Darlington, the Man-
chester and Augusta, and the Florence Railroad Company
should be consolidated into a new company known as the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company of South Carolina.3
The South Carolina Railroad Commission indorsed the
plan of merger early in 1897, 4 but in order that there
might be no doubt as to the legality of the action, a
friendly suit was brought in the Circuit Court at Columbia,
South Carolina, on April 26, and it was decided on April 27
that the consolidation was legal.5 The outcome of this suit
allowed the consolidation of about 700 miles of line, 600 of
which were located in South Carolina.6 The stockholders
of the five companies voted favorably on the combination
in July, 1898.7 The terms according to which the merger
became effective were that the Atlantic Coast Line of
South Carolina gave to the Safe Deposit and Trust Com-
pany of Baltimore a consolidated mortgage covering the
whole property, against which were issued $8,000,000
fifty-year, 4 per cent bonds.8 The new company also is-
sued $3,000,000 common and $5,000,000 preferred stock.
1 Railroad Gazette, vol. xxx, p. 486. 2 Poors Manual, 1899, p. 394.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxvii, p. 273.
4 Railroad Gazette, vol. xxix, p. 88. 6 Ibid., p. 331.
6 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxiv, p. 887.
7 Ibid., vol. lxvii, pp. 179-80.
8 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxi, p. 1116.
144 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Holders of the bonds of the old companies were given until
November, 1898, to exchange their bonds for an equal
amount of those of the new organization, and out of
$2,895,000, $2,500,000 were exchanged.1
The life of the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina
during the two years of its independent existence was un-
eventful. The only important fact was the securing of a
lease, jointly with the Louisville and Nashville, of the
property of the Georgia Railroad. This road had been
originally leased by the Central of Georgia and the Louis-
ville and Nashville jointly.2 The former forfeited its interest
by a failure to pay its share of the rental, whereupon the
latter operated the whole of the Georgia Road for a year
and then disposed of one-half interest in the contract to
the Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina.3 This company,
together with three others,4 was consolidated on April 23,
1900, into the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company of
Virginia, and the name of the latter changed to the Atlantic
Coast Line Railroad Company.5
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
The absorbing road, the Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia,
though less than a hundred miles long, acquired over 1500
miles of line. The stock per mile of the purchasing company
was greater than that of any of the other roads. Though its
bonded debt per mile was almost twice that of any other,
its earning power was also double. With such conditions as
these it is not strange that this road, short though it was,
should become the parent company.
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxvii, p. 954.
2 Appendix to Report of State Corporation Commission of Virginia,
1913, p. 14.
3 Statement issued September, 1899, by August Belmont, Chairman
of Board of Directors of Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company;
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxix, p. 591.
4 The three were: the Southeastern of North Carolina; the Norfolk
and Carolina; and the Wilmington and Weldon.
6 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxx, p. 791.
THE SAVANNAH, FLORIDA, AND WESTERN 145
Purchase of the Savannah, Florida, and Western Railway
The next acquisition of the Atlantic Coast Line Rail-
road was the Savannah, Florida, and Western Railway
Company in April, 1902. l The road consisted of a main line
running from Charleston, South Carolina, to Tampa, Flor-
ida, with numerous branches, amounting to 1665 miles.
This system was itself the result of the acquisition of a
number of small roads, the most important of which were
the Atlantic and Gulf, the Charleston and Savannah, and
the Brunswick and Western, the history of which has al-
ready been given. After a conference held in New York on
April 4, 1902, between the representatives of the Atlantic
Coast Line and the Plant systems, the following statement
was issued: "Negotiations have been completed under
which it is arranged that the Plant System will on or be-
fore July 1, 1902, be consolidated with and become the
property of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
The negotiations contemplate that other properties of the
Plant System will pass under the control of the Atlantic
Coast Line."2
It was possible to arrange this consolidation only after
considerable litigation over the Plant will. Practically all
the stock of the Savannah, Florida, and Western had been
owned by Mr. H. B. Plant, and it was his desire that there
should be no partition in his property until the majority
of his great grandson, a lad then four years old. To accom-
plish this he had tried to become a citizen of Connecticut in
order to take advantage of certain laws in that state which
would permit him to make such a provision in his will. The
will was contested by his widow and he was declared a
1 Supplement to Commercial and Financial Chronicle, April, 1902,
p. 127.
2 Statement of W. G. Elliott, president of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company and R. G. Erwin, president of the Savannah, Flor-
ida, and Western Railway; Railroad Gazette, vol. xxxiv, p. 278; Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxiv, p. 774.
146 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
citizen of New York and therefore unable to include such
a provision in his will. l When this point was settled there
was no legal hindrance to the consolidation. The Atlantic
Coast Line stockholders voted favorably on the proposition
on May 12, 1902. The terms of agreement provided that
the Atlantic Coast Line assume all the debts of the Savan-
nah, Florida, and Western including $12,451,000 4 per cent
bonds dated April 1, 1902, with the understanding that the
mortgage remain on the same physical property as formerly
and that holders of preferred stock of the Plant System
should receive in exchange 50 per cent of their holdings in
the common stock of the new company, and holders of the
common stock should receive 25 per cent.2 Any holders who
did not care to make the exchange on this basis were to be
paid at an agreed valuation in 6 per cent mortgage bonds
of the consolidated company, or in cash, or if no agree-
ment could be reached, at such price as the law might de-
termine.3
The United States Trust Company of New York acted
as trustee. The stockholders of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company gave assent on June 16, 1902, to the
issuing of an $80,000,000 mortgage on all lines owned at
the time or to be built by it, provided that the mortgage
should not exceed $20,000 per mile of line.4 Among other
purposes set forth in this mortgage, $12,451,000 of bonds
of the Savannah, Florida, and Western were to be retired,
after which this became a first mortgage on 570 miles of
line, and a first mortgage on all the lines owned by the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad Company and any railway prop-
erty which should be constructed by means of the fund.
1 Railroad Gazette, vol. xxxiv, p. 278.
2 Agreement of consolidation between Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company and Savannah, Florida, and Western Railway Company, April
10, 1902. Filed in the office of the Secretary of the Commonwealth of
Virginia.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxiv, p. 1039.
4 First consolidated mortgage, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany, 1902, p. 4.
THE LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD 147
Thus the Savannah, Florida, and Western which operated
on May 16, 1902, the date of the agreement, 1702 miles of
road, was merged with the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company which operated at this date 1676 miles.1
The acquisition of the Plant System was the last of the
important mergers and consolidations by which various
lines and systems of roads became integral parts of the At-
lantic Coast Line. Another event of far-reaching effect was
the acquisition of the majority of the stock of the Louis-
ville and Nashville. The company came into possession of
this stock by accident; it bought the control over this large
and important road as a matter of self-defense.
Purchase of majority of Stock of the Louisville and
Nashville Railroad
In January, 1902, John W. Gates began buying on the
New York Stock Exchange shares of Louisville and Nash-
ville stock. This silent buying continued throughout Feb-
ruary and March.2 The activity in Louisville and Nash-
ville stock was noticed and reports of every kind gained
circulation.3 The most common one was that the shares
were being bought by the Southern Railroad interests, and
that the two roads would be merged into one system. An-
other, which proved to be the true one, was that Gates had
organized a syndicate to speculate in Louisville and Nash-
ville stock. Matters reached a crisis early in April. A wild
scramble began on the Exchange on April 8 when 58,000
shares changed hands. The next day, April 9, 144,000 shares
changed hands, and the following day, 280,000 shares. The
prices which prevailed were five points above the record
price of these stocks on the Exchange, with the single ex-
ception of 1880, when cash dividends and a 100 per cent
1 First consolidated mortgage, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany, 1902, p. 1. See Appendix, Table XVII.
2 Railroad Gazette, vol. xxxiv, p. 759.
3 New York Times, Thursday, April 10, 1902.
148 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
script dividend was declared, at which time the price
ranged from 86 in January to 174 in November.1 Gates had
acquired almost half of the stock of the company, although
so far as was publicly known, he had not the slightest idea
of buying the road. He was a speculator and not a practical
railroadman.2
On April 5, 1902, August Belmont and Company, in or-
der to take advantage of the prevailing high price, placed
in the open market $5,000,000 in stock which had been in
the treasury of the Louisville and Nashville Company
since November, 1893. 3 The purpose of issuing this amount
was to secure a majority of the stock of the Atlanta, Knox-
ville, and Northern Railroad Company, for the construc-
tion of a line to join this road with the main line, and to
build a road from Knoxville to Jellico, Tennessee. Mr. Bel-
mont, chairman of the Louisville and Nashville board of
directors, acting on their instructions placed the stock on
the market. Gates had to buy or else this amount would
force the price down, causing loss on what he already had.
Since the stock could not be delivered until listed on the
Exchange for thirty days, the company found itself short
and was unable on account of the state of the market to
borrow against the sales. It was thus compelled to go into
the open market and buy at a higher figure than the stock
so sold.4 The price of Louisville and Nashville stock varied
during the week from 108 J to 122§.
Up to this time the public had not definitely known who
was buying the Louisville and Nashville stock, but the
matter was cleared up on April 16 by statements of the
parties concerned. The real battle for control came on
April 10, when 280,000 shares changed hands. The out-
come was that Gates secured a majority of the stock and
thus acquired control of a great railroad system, when
1 New York Times, April 16, 1902.
2 Railroad Gazette, vol. xxxiv, p. 759.
3 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxiv, pp. 775-76.
4 New York Times, April 11, 1902.
THE LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD 149
he intended only to engage in a speculative "spree." He
had secured a practical corner on the stock, and the shorts
had to make terms. A period of great excitement in railroad
circles followed. Railroad men were afraid of Gates and
Hawley. It was feared that they would cut rates, gut the
road, and get out. The Gates-Hawley syndicate realized
their advantage and were in a position to dictate terms.
Numerous conferences between the interested persons were
held, and an agreement was reached on April 15. Peace was
declared and a number of statements given out, among
which were the following:
J. W. Gates on Tuesday, April 15, 1902, said:
We have bought control of the Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road. We did not buy it on speculation, but for investment, be-
lieving absolutely in the present and future value of the property.
There will not be any corner on the stock. We have placed the
entire matter in the hands of J. P. Morgan and Company, and
requested them to act as arbiter in the situation, because of the
prominence of the property, and our desire not to disturb in any
way the general market conditions, and because we know they
have no interest whatever in the property or recent purchases.
J. P. Morgan and Company on Wednesday, April 16,
1902, said:
At the request of Messrs. Harris, Gates, and Compam7, who on
their own independent account have recently made large pur-
chases of Louisville and Nashville Railroad stock, Messrs. J. P.
Morgan and Company, as bankers, have consented to take control
of the stock so purchased and to receive the same on deposit.
They have so consented solely to relieve the general financial
condition, and not for the benefit of any railway company. The
Southern Railway has no interest, direct or indirect, present or
prospective, in the stock or its purchase or deposit. Messrs. J. P.
Morgan and Company are acting with the cordial consent of
Messrs. August Belmont and Company.
Mr. August Belmont, chairman of the board of directors
of the Louisville and Nashville, referring to the above
statements, said:
150 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
I have been aware of the negotiations by which J. P. Morgan
and Company have consented to take control and deposit of the
stock of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, pur-
chased by Harris, Gates, and Company. The statement of Messrs.
J. P. Morgan and Company just made public, has my unquali-
fied approval and there will be no contest for the control of the
Louisville and Nashville Railroad.1
President Spencer of the Southern Railway and Presi-
dent Williams of the Seaboard Air Line also issued state-
ments to the effect that their roads were in no way inter-
ested in the deal.
The matter rested here until October, when announce-
ment was made that J. P. Morgan and Company had ar-
ranged to sell their holdings in the Louisville and Nashville
to the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.2 These
holdings consisted of 102,000 shares of common stock
bought outright from J. W. Gates, Edwin Hawley, and
associates at a price reported to be 130, and 204,000 shares
bought at 150 of the Gates-Hawley syndicate under an
option of April. The Atlantic Coast Line paid $50,000,000
for the Morgan interest in the Louisville and Nashville,
giving $35,000,000 in 4 per cent, fifty-year collateral trust
bonds of the Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia, secured by
the deposit of Louisville and Nashville stock, $5,000,000
in Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia stock, then selling at 180,
and $10,000,000 in cash. The stockholders of the Atlantic
Coast Line, at a meeting held in Richmond, November 17,
1902, voted unanimously to approve the action of the
board of directors in their purchase of 306,000 out of 600,-
000 shares of Louisville and Nashville stock outstanding.3
Though the Atlantic Coast Line came into possession of
the majority of the stock more by force of circumstances
than otherwise, its acquisition has proved a source of pro-
1 Statements given to the press and quoted in Commercial and Finan-
cial Chronicle, vol. lxxiv, pp. 830-31.
2 Ibid., vol. lxxv, p. 733.
3 Report of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, June 30, 1903.
THE LOUISVILLE AND NASHVILLE RAILROAD 151
fit. In 1912 the capital stock of the Louisville and Nash-
ville was increased from $60,000,000 to $72,000,000, and
the Atlantic Coast Line increased its holdings by $6,000,-
000 in order to take advantage of the privilege of Louis-
ville and Nashville stockholders of taking one new share
for every five already held.1 The advantages which came
to the road through this control can be illustrated by con-
ditions during 1912. As a part of the purchase price, the
Atlantic Coast Line gave $35,000,000 of its own collateral
trust bonds which carried a 4 per cent interest. The Louis-
ville and Nashville that year paid a 7 per cent dividend al-
though considerably more than this was earned. The divi-
dend which the Atlantic Coast Line received amounted to
$2,142,000, against which must be balanced the interest
on the collateral trust bonds, $1,400,000, leaving a surplus
of $742,000. 2 This surplus would amply provide for the in-
terest charge on the $10,000,000 of cash which was also a
part of the purchase price, and leave a margin. This ad-
vantage comes directly in money and does not include the
very favorable traffic arrangements which might not other-
wise exist.
The amount of fine built and acquired by the Atlantic
Coast Line since the acquisition of Louisville and Nash-
ville stock is of relatively small importance. It is one of the
great systems in the country and its problems for the past
fifteen years have been those which have confronted all
other large systems during that time. The chief of these
has been to keep the increase in operating expenses from
exceeding the increase in receipts. Another has been to de-
velop such a traffic along its line that it might have a more
uniform freight flow and might be less dependent on fruit
and early vegetables at one season of the year and on cot-
ton at another.
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xcv, p. 967.
8 Ibid., p. 1364.
152 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Present Condition of Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
The gross earnings of the road have very greatly in-
creased since 1900; the expenses have increased and that
too at a more rapid rate; in other words, the operating ra-
tio has been constantly growing. The road and its equip-
ment have been steadily improved. The amount spent on
maintenance of way and structures and maintenance of
equipment per mile has just about doubled within the last
ten years.1 This fact alone would raise the operating ratio,
but not to such a point as it has reached. The cause lies
deeper. During the year 1904-05, the earnings of the road
were sufficiently large to pay the regular 5 per cent divi-
dend amounting to $1,918,835, and to leave a surplus of
$2,364,647. 2 In addition to the regular dividend, the board
of directors this year declared an extra one of 25 per cent
payable 20 per cent in the common stock script of the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad Company, and 5 per cent in cer-
tificates of indebtedness of the Atlantic Coast Line Com-
pany of Connecticut. This dividend represented money ap-
propriable to the payment of regular dividends which had
been used in the development of the property.3 The sur-
plus of $2,364,647 on the operations for the year 1903-04,
together with that already accumulated, brought the en-
tire surplus on June 30, 1904, up to $13,712,994.4
The reports of the president continued to be optimistic
in tone up to and including that of June 30, 1906. In that
report, however, attention was called to the fact that the
earning power of the road had been cut down because of
the inability of the company to secure certain equipment
which had long been overdue. But one is tempted to at-
tribute a part of the difficulty at least to the fact that the
purchasing agent reported a 15 per cent increase in the
price of thirty of the most important articles used by the
road. From this time on the road was constantly struggling
1 See Appendix, Table XVIII.
2 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxix, p. 2177.
3 Ibid., p. 2204. 4 Ibid., p. 2177.
PRESENT CONDITION OF THE ROAD 153
to keep down expenses. The traffic and gross earnings dur-
ing 1906 were increased, but against this there was an in-
crease of almost $1,500,000 in the cost of conducting trans-
portation alone. The gross earnings that year had increased
12 per cent over those of the year before, but this was more
than offset by a 19 per cent increase in expense.1
This was for the Atlantic Coast Line the beginning of a
series of lean years which practically all railroads have ex-
perienced for the last decade. The only difference was that,
thanks to its accumulated surplus, it was in a better posi-
tion to live through them than most roads were. The year
1907 was an especially hard one. It was a repetition of 1906,
except that the discrepancy between increase in earnings
and expenses was still greater. The increase of earnings of
the road over the previous year were $1,903,080, or 7.5 per
cent, while the increase in operating expenses mounted up
no less than $3,549,827, or 21 per cent.2 The capital invest-
ment was growing all the while, owing to necessary im-
provements due to additional patronage; the capital stock
of the company had been increased in 1904 to $50,000,000. 3
This increase included the stock dividend mentioned above.
This necessitated, however, a greater expense in dividends
in the following years, since the company had to maintain
a proper rate of dividend in order to support its credit.
The difficulties of 1907 were due not only to an increase
in expense but also to the panic which demoralized busi-
ness the latter part of the year. Not only did the road
have to face a disorganized business condition, but it had
to put into effect a lower freight and passenger rate in a
number of southern states.4 The company had foreseen
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 1263-64.
2 Ibid., vol. lxxxv, p. 1305.
3 Report of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, June 30, 1905.
4 Decrease in passenger rates:
Virginia 3 to 2 cents, effective Oct. 1, '07
North Carolina Sh to 2| " " Aug. 8, '07
Georgia 3 to 2i " " Sept. 1, '07
Alabama 3 to ih " " Oct. 1, '07
(Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxv, pp. 1342-43.)
154 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
difficulties and had provided against them by the issue of
$5,000,000 short-term notes,1 but there was no way to
foresee the panic or guard against its effects. As a result,
when the dividends payable on January 10, 1908, came
due, arrangements had to be made for them. The directors
had taken no action with reference to the matter at their
regular meeting on November 19, 1907. 2 At this date
there was outstanding $47,537,600 common stock, on
which there had been paid the year before a 6 per cent
dividend, and for several years previous 5 per cent.3 The
regular 3 per cent semi-annual dividend was declared on
January 10, as usual, but was paid in 4 per cent certificates
of indebtedness of the company, which it had bought
in the open market as an investment between June 30,
1904, and June 30, 1907. 4 This was the hardest year in
the history of the road from the time of consolidation up
to the outbreak of the Great War.
The year 1908 was somewhat more successful. Owing to
the Jamestown Exposition, the gross receipts from passen-
ger traffic increased slightly, in spite of a flat two cent rate
which had been put into effect by agreement with the rail-
road commissions of the various states through which the
road operates.5 There was a decrease in earnings in 1909,
however, owing to the two cent rate.6 The gross earnings
in 1910 were the greatest in its history up to that time,7
while the expenses for that year had been exceeded by
those of two others. Owing to efficient management the
Atlantic Coast Line was one of the few roads in the coun-
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxiv, p. 506.
2 Ibid., vol. lxxxv, p. 1338.
3 Dividends of the company since its formation:
'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14
ii Si 5 5 5 6 6 5i 5i 6 6 7 7 5
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxv, p. 1517.
3 Report of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, June 30,
1908.
• Ibid., June 30, 1909. ■ Ibid.t June 30, 1910.
PRESENT CONDITION OF THE ROAD 155
try which were able during this year to make a net earning. l
In 1909 the salaries of all officers receiving more than $3000
a year had been cut down 10 per cent.2
The most important of the savings, however, has been in
the size of the train load. The average number of tons of
freight moved per train mile had been in 1905, 167 tons.
This had increased to 201 tons in 1910, and has, according
to the report of the road for June 30, 1915, gone up to 223
tons. The increase has been due to the effort which has been
put forth to develop the territory situated along its lines.
An Immigration and Agricultural Department is main-
tained by the road, the duty of which is to encourage set-
tlement along the line, and the establishment of manu-
facturing industries in the towns and cities served.3 In addi-
tion to this, the road has operated agricultural trains over
its lines in order that the activity of its patrons may be
increased. It has also sent special cars to the various state
fairs throughout the northern and western states and Can-
ada, exhibiting the products which are grown along the line.
In this way it has done much to increase its traffic. In spite
of its efforts, however, and in spite of rigid economy, the
last few years have been hard ones for the Atlantic Coast
Line, as they have been in fact for most railroads. It has
had to battle against passenger rates which were unusually
low, and against the expenses incident to the physical valu-
ation, a movement the wisdom of which is doubtful in the
minds of many railroad students.
On November 19, 1909, the stockholders authorized a
$200,000,000 mortgage bond issue, carrying a 4 per cent
interest charge.4 The purpose of these bonds was to retire
underlying bonds, to take up certificates of indebtedness
and such other obligations as the board of directors should
from time to time see fit. This bond sale remained open un-
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxix, p. 1313.
2 Ibid., p. 1314. 3 See Appendix, Table XIX.
4 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. lxxxix, p. 1141.
156 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
til April 1, 1914, when it was decided to close it. The money
market was in such a condition that a bond guaranteeing
4 per cent as a maximum could not be sold to advantage.
Instead of these bonds, general unified mortgage bonds of
a similar amount were issued, the interest to be adjusted
as the conditions might seem best to the board of directors.
This was the state of affairs on the eve of the outbreak of
the Great War.
Many of the questions which arose in the early railroad
era in the United States appeared in the growth of the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad. Some of these have been set-
tled, but others have arisen to take their place. Important
among them was the question of taxation. The charters of
most of the constituent units granted exemption from taxa-
tion. In most cases the roads gave up voluntarily this privi-
lege in return for others from the various states. In a few
instances the question was settled only after long struggles
in the courts. ! The road now pays taxes regularly in all the
states through which it passes, but there is little uniform-
ity in the method of assessment or collection. This situa-
tion, as well as the conflicting legislation between the states
on the one hand and the federal government on the other,
and among the states themselves, has brought unnecessary
hardship upon the Atlantic Coast Line.
Taxation
A resume of the tax laws of the six states through which
the line passes shows an entire lack of uniformity.2 No one
principle of taxation is adhered to throughout, though the
general property tax predominates. The dates on which
returns have to be made vary. In Virginia a state franchise
tax of li per cent is levied on the gross transportation re-
1 See Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company vs. Allsbrook, 146
U.S. 279; 110 North Carolina 137; Wilmington and Weldon Railroad
Company vs. Reid, 13 Wall. 264.
2 An unpublished manuscript by Mr. C. J. Joseph, Tax Agent of the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
TAXATION 157
ceipts of the road. Municipal taxes are levied on the tan-
gible personal property at the same rate as the general prop-
erty tax. In addition there is a state tax on rolling stock
and an annual registration fee of $25. In North Carolina
the general property tax prevails and there is a state privi-
lege tax of $10 per mile when the annual earnings exceed
$5000 per mile. The railroad pays to the state of South
Carolina a corporation license tax of $.003 on the gross in-
terstate receipts. The entire expense of assessment and the
salaries of the railroad commissioners are also paid by the
railroad. In Georgia the value of the entire property of
the road is determined, the value of the franchise is calcu-
lated, and the sum total of these is taxed. The road pays
an occupation tax of $200. The state of Florida demands
a license tax of $10 a mile, half of which goes to the vari-
ous counties through which the road runs. Municipalities
tax the personal property of the roads within their limits,
making the levy themselves or accepting that of the state.
In Alabama 60 per cent of the personal property of the
road is taxed at the same rate as other personal property.
The value of the franchise is calculated and the state
board apportions the valuation of the state franchise to
each county or municipality according to mileage, and
taxes it at the rate which is levied on real and personal
property. Under these laws the Atlantic Coast Line paid
for the calendar year ending December 31, 1916, the fol-
lowing taxes :
Aggregate taxes Aggregate average
paid per mile tax rate
Virginia $686.57 $1.69
North Carolina 493 . 15 1 . 35
South Carolina 403 . 15 2 . 48
Georgia 389.23 1.77
Florida 341.26 3.65
Alabama 328.47 1.62
158 THE ATLANTIC COAST LINE RAILROAD
Conflicting Federal and State Regulation
The regulation of railroads by federal and state authori-
ties is no more uniform than the tax laws in the various
states. The Constitution of the United States gives to Con-
gress power to regulate commerce among the several states.
Purely intrastate commerce is left to the regulation of the
states so long as the regulation does not burden interstate
commerce. Congress has given to the Interstate Commerce
Commission power to regulate railroads so far as interstate
commerce is concerned, but has especially provided that
the regulations shall not apply to the transportation of
passengers or property or to the receiving, delivering, stor-
age, or handling of property wholly within one state and
not shipped to or from any other state or territory. The
several state commissions undertake to regulate the rail-
roads as to intrastate matter, and a railroad which extends
through several states, as is the case of the Atlantic Coast
Line, is therefore regulated by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and also by the commissions of the states.
Under this system and in view of the many nice distinc-
tions as to what constitutes interstate commerce, it is to be
expected that conflicting regulations will arise.
The most sensitive point of contact between the rail-
roads and the public is that which concerns rates, and it is
with regard to rates that the conflict has been most pro-
nounced. State authorities have prescribed a scale of state
rates designed to give to the citizens of that state prefer-
ence as to state markets over citizens of adjacent states,
making the state rate lower than the interstate rate.
But the conflict is not confined to questions of rates. It
is but one phase of the underlying conflict between the idea
of a centralized government as opposed to that of the sev-
eral states. Conflicting regulations appear practically in
every case where there is possibility of distinguishing the
interstate from the intrastate character of the activity to
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APPENDIX
TABLE I
Dividends paid by the Petersburg Railroad Company
from 1835 to 1862
Date Per cent Amount
Nov. 1, 1835 5 $30,125
May 1, 1836 5 30,275
Nov. 1, 1836 5 30,275
No dividend till June 1, 1838.
June 1, 1838 4 24,220
Nov. 1, 1838 3§ 21,192.50
June 1, 1839 3| 21,192.50
Dec. 1, 1839 3 18,165
June 1, 1840 3 18,165
June 1, 1841 4 24,220
Dec. 1, 1841 3 . 18,165
No dividend till July 1, 1844.
July 1,1844 1| 11,535
Jan. 1, 1845 if 11,535
July 1, 1845 2 15,380
Jan. 1, 1846 3 23,070
July 1, 1846 3 23,070
Jan. 1, 1847 3 23,070
July 1, 1847 3£ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1848 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1848 3£ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1849 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1849 4 30,760
Jan. 1, 1850 3 23,070
July 1, 1850 4 30,760
Jan. 1, 1851 3f 26,915
July 1, 1851 3| 26,915
Jan. 1, 1852 3 23,070
July 1, 1852 S\ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1853 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1853 3£ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1854 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1854 3£ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1856 If 13,161
July 1,1856 If 13,215
Jan. 1, 1857 3 26,454
July 1, 1857 3 26.496
Jan. 1, 1858 3 26.496
July 1, 1858 3 26.496
Jan. 1, 1859 3£ 30,912
July 1, 1859 4 35,328
Jan. 1, 1860 5 44,160
July 1, 1860 5 44,160
Jan. 1, 1861 5 44,160
July 1, 1861 4 46,964
Jan. 1, 1862 12| 146,762
APPENDIX
APPENDIX
TABLE I
Dividends paid by the Petersburg Railroad Company
from 1835 to 1862
Date Per cent Amount
Nov. 1, 1835 5 $30,125
May 1, 1836 5 30,275
Nov. 1, 1836 5 30,275
No dividend till June 1, 1838.
June 1, 1838 4 24,220
Nov. 1, 1838 3£ 21,192.50
June 1, 1839 3£ 21,192.50
Dec. 1, 1839 3 18,165
June 1, 1840 3 18,165
June 1, 1841 4 24,220
Dec. 1, 1841 3 18,165
No dividend till July 1, 1844.
July 1, 1844 H 11,535
Jan. 1, 1845 l£ 11,535
July 1, 1845 2 15,380
Jan. 1, 1846 3 23,070
July 1, 1846 3 23,070
Jan. 1, 1847 3 23,070
July 1, 1847 3£ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1848 3| 26,915
July 1,1848 3^ 26,915
Jan. 1, 1849 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1849 4 30,760
Jan. 1, 1850 3 23,070
July 1, 1850 4 30,760
Jan. 1, 1851 3£ 26,915
July 1, 1851 3| 26,915
Jan. 1, 1852 3 23,070
July 1,1852 3| 26,915
Jan. 1, 1853 3£ 26,915
July 1,1853 3i 26,915
Jan. 1, 1854 3£ 26,915
July 1,1854 3| 26,915
Jan. 1, 1856 1± 13,161
July 1,1856 1| 13,215
Jan. 1, 1857 3 26,454
July 1, 1857 3 26.496
Jan. 1, 1858 3 26.496
July 1, 1858 3 26,496
Jan. 1, 1859 3£ 30,912
July 1, 1859 4 35,328
Jan. 1, 1860 5 44,160
July 1, 1860 5 44,160
Jan. 1, 1861 5 44,160
July 1, 1861 4 46,964
Jan. 1, 1862 12| 146,762
168
APPENDIX
TABLE II
Financial Condition of the Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad from 1839 to the Civil War
Year
Cos:
Earnings from
Total
Total ex-
Oper-
ating
ratio
Net
Passen-
gers
Freight
Mails
earnings
penses
ings
1839
$743,410
$41,713
$7,383
$5,863
$54,959
$30,504
65
$24,455
1840
772,915
43,144
18,755
7,243
68,289
36,194
53
32,095
1841
783,082
43,655
21,797
5,628
71,080
43,266
61
27,814
1842
789,305
40,311
20,007
5,812
66,131
43,190
65
22,941
1843
793,012
28,462
19,917
5,489
53,808
88,710
72
15,158
1844.
794,091
30,655
17,205
6,341
54,203
35,689
66
18,514
1845
794,440
31,729
21,372
6,101
59,203
41,957
71
17,246
1846
914.8931
36,716
35,590
6,561
78,868
45,282
57
33,586
1847
925,793
38,513
47,437
10,359
96,310
58,319
61
87,991
1848
929,750
37,188
59,393
11,966
108,554
74,130
68
34,424
1849....
933,658
36,554
52,273
10,614
99,441
72,810
73
26,631
1850....
941,195
60,913*
71,473
12,977
145,363
107,686
74
37,677
1851
945,137
52,740
51,640
11,970
116,352
79,110
68
37,242
1852
945,822
50,537
55,879
12,404
118,721
75,971
64
42,750
1853
983,335
57,236
62,084
14,616
130,936
88,663
68
42,273
1854
1,095,812
62,006
67,863
13,785
143,474
74,779
52
68,695
1855
69,867
95,000
8
145,702
72,664
50
73,038
1856
1,205,030
81,255
65,280
10,649
151,947
78,713
52
73,234
1857....
84,422
63,327
s
157,409
82,663
53
74,746
1858
1,205,411
80,521
62,226
14,282
156,908
71,728
46
85,180
1859....
1,250,186
83,227
59,460
14,854
157,542
75,056
48
82,485
I860....
....
80,260
56,743
14,912
151,905
67,024
44
84,881
i Including Fort Walthall Branch. ' These returns are for 17 months.
_ 3 Included in freight earnings.
APPENDIX
169
TABLE III
Amount of Freight received at Wilmington and at
Weldon from 1854 to 1860 x
Year
Bacon
Corn
Cotton
Flour
Wheat
Rosin
Turpen-
tine
bbls.
Tar
lbs.
bu.
bales
bbls.
bu.
bbls.
bbls.
1854
499,812
15,973
7,088
270
1,196
113,888
13,469
6,944
1855
527,426
25,807
13,575
4,991
3,052
100,244
18.721
8,798
1856....
527,578
31,918
12,935
15,084
67,510
73,430
19,005
11,028
1857....
372,882
9,856
12,954
20,248
71,611
87,676
12,875
4,491
1858....
650,347
12,547
19,058
14,065
84,295
93,639
19,712
2,173
1859 ....
275,078
20,363
23,553
12,952
52,112
76,222
24,204
10,039
1860* . . .
379,610
12,713
31,256
11,215
7,416
63,573
18,056
7,732
1 Report of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company, November 8, 1860.
1 Number of through passengers for the year ending September, 1860, 25,595, num-
ber of way passengers, 81,051.
TABLE IV
The Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company from
1841 to 1899
Year
Receipts
Expendi-
tures
Profits
Price of
through
ticket
Number
through
passengers
Number
way pas-
sengers
1841
$297,228
a 211,977
286,172
269,523
288,493
317,822
331,480
$241,945
180,892
148,166
203,633
212,091
289,682
259,912
$52,283
31,084
78,006
85,900
76,402
28,140
71,567
$20
18
13
13
12
12
10
9,742
8,45*0
10,358
11,018
11,885
12,997
5,498
1842
1843
13,574
1844
16,041
1845
16,393
1846
20,493
1847
25,396
170
APPENDIX
TABLE IV (continued)
Earningi
r
Year
Expenses
Operat-
Through
Local
Freight
Mails
Total
ing
ratio
-passengers
passengers
1848
$113,078
$53,092
$51,534
$87,288
$317,459
$275,328
86%
1849
108,962
50,173
57,014
85,029
310,397
245,698
79
1850
193,706
62,382
71,051
80,626
422,325
274,764
65
1851
195,509
75,350
93,348
116,626
497,219
277,255
55
1852
200,425
98,935
110,194
82,063
510,038
325,909
63
1853
214,135
138,148
112,582
86,424
568,899
348,307
50
1854
151,034
132,511
130,463
63,296
482,880
291,220
60
1855
151,377
96,644
142,348
51,672
441,994
268,818
60
1856
162,341
108,408
154,158
48,600
479,349
273,895
50
1857
177,549
103,365
157,451
48,600
494,508
295,331
60
1858
126,857
96,529
157,832
48,600
446,583
248,518
55
1859
144,630
109,795
161,666
48,600
477,554
242,353
51
1860
133,896
118,347
185,204
48,600
500,209
325,338
65
1861
195,238
139,786
180,143
44,550
571,236
247,106
43
1862
454,845
184,496
246,348
24,300
955,348
295,693
32
1863
293,008
563,671
480,449
25,900
1,402,831
593,178
41
1864
784,870
688,051
1,434,378
25,308
3,010,039
1,864,224
61
1865
67,676
687,176
519,036
12,550
1,298,469
905,104
70
1866
110,814
128,351
611,599
18,273
611,599
892,634
113
1867
134,731
141,574
248,379
59,151
583,836
278,891
47
1868
108,896
110,109
299,640
76,523
596,169
296,149
48
1869
112,023
108,263
295,763
102,607
594,221
346,570
58
1870
102,913
123,538
331,578
36,190
550,934
305,665
51
1871
92,411
114,419
321,001
24,945
579,583
351,896
60
1872
92,759
131,255
366,176
24,945
635,870
405,037
63
1873
111,435
139,550
453,326
24,945
739,577
458,957
60
1874
104,399
106,843
467,246
24,945
711,409
398,440
56
1875
106,778
103,770
403,746
38,812
661,295
391,786
59
1876
110,995
90,472
359,165
28,886
604,698
365,721
60
1877
87,779
73,081
341,443
26,550
548,462
340,107
62
1878
89,715
81,993
274,486
28,128
487,815
267,389
54
1879
77,788
79,443
302,855
28,466
505,957
330,284
62
1880
86,314
91,937
365,506
38,564
603,175
414,260
69
1881
108,484
102,427
449,914
67,858
750,916
447,083
59
1882
125,361
126,470
429,937
72,391
783,790
574,318
73
1883
143,745
119,495
426,132
73,253
797,428
601,549
75
1884
154,121
117,339
412,992
75,716
788,014
493,382
63
1885
170,422
119,429
425,978
83,000
824,956
451,815
55
1886
173,946
117,822
449,073
84,253
861,639
487,539
57
1887
179,360
135,590
513,665
85,122
946,762
548,450
58
1888
205,227
153,280
651,856
88,719
1,135,232
587,102
52
1889
145,279
118,750
629,751
70,498
993,037
532,505
54
1890
212,234
171,471
808,093
96,149
1,350,853
681,137
50
1891
239,988
183,606
939,857
98,226
1,535,714
855,678
56
1892
238,478
171,954
863,953
88,628
1,452,012
802,884
52
1893
266,831
169,324
957,596
111,153
1,569,295
896,656
57
1894
241,317
168,598
1,067,263
92,486
1,618,800
948,526
58
1895
237,567
167,560
1,070,320
96,578
1,628,076
971,553
60
1896
248,968
185,724
1,202,427
96,700
1,803,196
1,067,207
59
1897
229,464
195,308
1,235,289
105,911
1,854,005
1,088,840
59
1898
237,447
216,666
1,494,2(57
109,495
2,179,081
1,240,450
57
1899
305,683
244,667
1,508,857
110,747
2,311,464
1,268,887
55
APPENDIX
171
TABLE V
Condition of the Foreign Trade of Savannah at the
Beginning of the Railroad Era *
Cotton (bags)
Rice (tierces)
Lumber (1000 feet)
Year
Foreign
Coast-
wise
Total
Foreign
Coast-
wise
Total
For-
eign
Coast-
wise
Total
1825....
64,906
72,789
137,695
2,154
5,081
7,236
1826
108,486
82,092
190,578
4,978
6,477
11,455
1839
199,176
21,332
1840....
284,249
24,392
1841....
147,280
23,587
14,295
1842....
142,386
79,868
222,254
5,933
16,131
22,064
5,919
2,471
8,390
1843....
193,099
87,727
180,826
10,675
15,606
26,281
5,533
1,987
7,520
1844
130,964
113,611
344,575
10,307
18,236
28,543
3,034
2,899
5,933
1845
182,073
122,471
304,544
11,712
17,505
29,217
3,334
4,937
8,271
1846....
77,852
108,454
186,306
5,025
27,122
32,147
3,366
5,220
8,586
1847....
119,321
114,830
234,151
10,218
21,521
31,739
4,886
5,845
10,730
1848....
55,801
70,293
126,094
7,410
15,548
22,958
5,545
5,197
10,732
1 Bancroft, Savannah, Census and Statistics, p. 37 ff.
TABLE VI
Increase of Traffic of the Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad during the Civil War; Receipts paid
in Confederate Money *
Year
Freight Earnings
Passenger Earnings
Total Earnings
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
$58,063
97,036
174,556
295,006
11,474
$74,985
167,984
333,365
378,986
19,435
$153,432
300,981
545,659
741,596
33,100
Poor's Manual, 1870-1871, p. 85.
172
APPENDIX
TABLE VII
Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company
Year
Gross Earnings
Expenses
Net Revenue
1867
$136,456
$82,633
$53,823
1868
146,985
88,974
58,010
1869
160,945
123,601
37,344
1870
170,693
120,315
50,377
1871
148,139
139,098
9,040
1872
160,319
114,374
45,945
1873
160,227
145,407
14,819
1874
147,220
113,552
33,667
1875
164,935
86,684
78,251
1876
137,116
77,312
60,094
1877
137,116
89,844
47,271
1878
140,068
77,515
62,553
1879
154,622
81,551
73,071
1880
164,198
85,099
79,099
1881
185,905
99,978
85,926
1882
174,378
117,881
56,596
1883
182,820
104,575
78,245
1884
195,369
108,299
87,069
1885
192,650
97,481
95,168
1886
207,454
111,855
95,598
1887
224,389
128,375
96,014
1888
254,164
168,748
85,415
1889
217,790
141,722
76,068
1890
325,304
224,481
100,822
1891
325,268
254,848
70,420
APPENDIX 173
TABLE VIII
Financial Condition of the Petersburg Railroad Company
while in the hands of receiver, 1880-1881 *
Earnings
1880 1881
Passengers $65,448 $75,792
Freight 134,737 168,835
Mail and express 20,427 33,575
Miscellaneous 9,046 8,052
Total $229,658 $286,254
Expenses
1880 1881
Maintenance of way and structures $59,749 $55,129
Rolling Stock 42,045 45,869
Transportation 46,600 49,135
Miscellaneous 20,878 39,147
Total $169,272 $189,280
Operating ratio 74% 66%
Net earnings, 1880 $60,386 26%
Net earnings, 1881 $96,974 33%
1 Reports of Petersburg Railroad Company, in Poor's Manual for 1881-1882.
TABLE IX
Number of Cars of Strawberries shipped annually
from North Carolina from 1897 to 1916 *
Year Number of cars Year Number of cars
1897 423 1907 1,065
1898 856 1908 1,282
1899 991 1909 1,461
1900 1,127 1910 1,356
1901 1,218 1911 978
1902 1,301 1912 1,067
1903 1,080 1913 1,144
1904 1,416 1914 1,022
1905 1,296 1915 988
1906 2,376 1916 1,078
1 From an unpublished manuscript on "The Strawberry Industry of Eastern North
Carolina" and especially along the various divisions of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad,
by Z. W. Whitehead.
174
APPENDIX
TABLE X
Financial Condition of the Wilmington, Columbia, and
Augusta Railroad for a Period of Three
Years after its Reorganization
Passenger earnings
Freight
Mail, etc
Total
Operating expenses and taxes
Net earnings
Interest
Dividend, 6%
Total
Surplus
1883
$195,701
403,415
119,483
718,599
513,308
205,291
97,734
57,600
155,334
59,860
1884
$195,945
370,236
86,684
652,869
455,384
197,486
96,000
57,600
153,600
58,720
1885
$367,991
204,750
99,052
671,793
455,405
216,388
96,000
57,600
153,600
88,934
APPENDIX
175
TABLE XI
The Northeastern Railroad of South Carolina
Year
ending Feb. 28
1857
1858
1859
1860
1861
1862
1863
1864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
8j H Gross earnings
Passenger
$15,360
42,644
78,689
89,428
89,045
65,355
104,310
225,283
88,*283
120,018
92,088
84,203
87,667
101,710
97,659
121,685
116,624
107,325
97,674
72,503
83,531
86,007
100,309
128,883
146,052
164,086
164,671
179,726
185,156
187,782
205,873
9 mont
en
224,388
247,920
232,398
201,524
168,906
156,379
158,329
148,027
Freight
Other
$15,425
$1,558
47,383
9,375
108,271
33,053
149,782
37,903
137,168
37,495
98,050
88,143
89,712
245,481
308,557
325,423
. .
No repor
95,345
18,656
176,381
21,455
172,648
14,495
151,844
18,115
172,465
19,965
200,472
19,368
190,067
17,725
255,248
18,430
270,516
16,710
292,348
17,271
271,904
12,700
233,662
13,905
265,607
14,505
245,068
15,192
284,745
19,338
333,686
22,191
386,141
28,035
415,828
38,833
849,202
55,594
329,622
60,708
305,910
68,568
301,983
64,488
328,243
66,961
hs fiscal ye
ar now
ds June 30
370,733
80,901
393,777
92,945
348,994
77,864
338,876
79,906
325,907
67,450
302,405
66,617
302,376
70,055
313,742
70,759
Total
$32,347
99,403
222,013
277,113
263,707
237,550
439,514
859,264
t made th
202,285
317,775
279,232
254,164
280,097
321,551
305,452
395,463
403.851
416,956
382,278
320,071
363,644
346,267
404,894
484,760
560,228
618,747
569,470
570,058
558,633
554,253
601,077
489,026
676,062
734,642
659,256
620,306
562,263
525,401
530,760
532,528
Operating
Operat-
ing
ratio
expenses
$6ljl*S2
«%
123,868
56
154,850
56
159,411
60
134,347
57
141,992
32
337,320
39
is year
131,591
65
251,088
79
173,655
62
145,439
58
159,560
57
230,747
72
203,799
67
235,695
59
258,635
64
241,514
58
220,435
58
192,088
60
201,144
76
210,903
61
219,234
54
346,896
71
378,110
68
433,923
70
404,523
71
407,238
71
436,868
78
399,814
61
440,348
73
390,666
78
458,729
68
460,595
63
500,411
76
451,905
73
428,838
76
417,795
80
366,347
69
370,218
70
Net
earnings
$38,271
96,144
122,263
104,296
117,202
297,522
521,943
70,697
66,687
105,576
108,725
120,537
90,804
101,653
159,767
145,215
175,441
161,843
128,032
162,500
135,364
185,659
137,864
182,118
184,824
164,946
162,819
121,765
154,439
160,729
98,360
217,333
274,047
158,845
168,401
133,425
107,606
164,413
162,310
176
APPENDIX
TABLE XII
The Atlantic and Gulf Railroad !
1867
1868
1869
1870
1871
1872
1873
Total _
earnings
Total
expense
Operating
ratio . . .
Surplus . . .
$619,874
$603,059
$784,329
$1,031,971
$1,044,667
$,983,966
$1,005,947
475,113
453,217
£20,446
643,729
685,680
664,426
700,819
76%
144,761
75%
149,841
66%
263,883
62%
388,241
66%
358,987
65%
339,539
69%
305,127
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, vol. xiv, p. 354.
Vernon's Manual, 1874, p. 360.
TABLE XIII
Comparative Statement of the Brunswick and Western
1893-1900
1893
1894
1895
1896
Miles operated
127
$625,397
470,027
75%
$155,370
14,624
169,994
103,040
20,575
S 46,379
127
$611,410
472,396
77%
$138,814
10,319
149,133
103,390
22,481
D 16,738
127
$531,766
439,283
80%
$112,483
9,902
122,385
103,390
21,256
D 42,261
127
Gross earnings
$536,726
Operating ratio
429,530
80%
$107,196
Other receipts
7,326
Other payments
Surplus and deficits ....
114,452
103,390
20,037
D 8,975
1897
1898
1899
1900
Miles operated
127
$572,048
416,856
73%
$155,192
10,220
165,412
103,390
23,108
S 38,914
127
$629,398
526,506
83%
$102,892
8,090
110,982
103,390
23,548
D 15,956
127
$658,820
520,397
80%
$138,423
8,550
146,973
103,390
85,608
D 42,025
127
Gross earnings
$672,293
Operating ratio
556,404
82%
Net earnings
$115,889
Other receipts
4,257
120,146
103,390
25,163
D 8,407
APPENDIX
177
TABLE XIV
compaeative financial statement of the petersburg and
the Richmond and Petersburg Railroads at the Time op
their Consolidation into the Atlantic Coast Line of
Virginia
Miles of road operated ,
Tons of freight moved.
Earnings:
Passengers ,
Freight ,
Mail, express
Miscellaneous
Total
Expenses:
Maintenance of way
and structure
Equipment
Transportation
General
Total
Gross earnings per mile
of line
Operating expenses per
mile
Operating ratio
Petersburg
1898
67
85,494
$115,551
415,860
62,876
6,457
$600,744
$41,931
62,881
173,331
16,960
$295,103
$9,904
t,554
49%
Richmond and
Petersburg
1898
27
238,398
$109,501
221,380
28,199
61,430
$420,510
$37,875
33,666
150,838
14,022
$236,401
$15,291
$8,596
55%
Total, 1898
94
323,892
$225,053
637,240
91,075
67,888
$1,021,256
$79,806
96,547
324,170
30,983
$531,506
$10,763
$5,601
52%
Total, 1897
93
322,945
$235,325
579,036
79,539
56,602
$950,502
$81,808
83,698
337,156
28,067
$530,729
$10,145
$5,664
57%
178
APPENDIX
TABLE XV
The Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company of Virginia
Mileage
Stock
Stock per mile . . .
Bonds
Bonds per mile . . .
Gross earnings . . .
Earnings per mile
Expense
Expense per mile .
Operating ratio . . .
Absorbed road,
Absorbing road,
Petersburg R.R.
Richmond and Petersburg
June 30, 1897
June 30, 1897
66
27
$1,284,300
$1,000,000
19,473
37,080
1,694,000
640,500
25,680
23,720
559,291
391,212
8,381
14,226
313,905
232,476
4,704
8,453
56%
59%
APPENDIX
179
TABLE XVI
Condition of the Various Lines at the Time of Consoli-
dation into the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
Absorbing
road
Absorbed roads
Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co.
of Virginia
Atlantic Coast
Line R.R. Co.
of S.C.
Norfolk and
Carolina
Wilmington
and Weldon
June 30, 1899
Mileage
94
$3,000,000
31,600
2,308,500
24,255
1,165,606
11,958
682,626
7,003
59%
676
$4,426,200
6,535
7,649,000
11,300
2,041,536
2,845
1,233,634
1,719
60%
111
$2,500,000
22,530
1,720,000
15,495
707,851
6,358
398,344
3,578
5Q%
168
Stock
$3,000,000
17,858
9,580,000
56,353
2,311,464
13,597
1,268,887
7,464
55%
Stock per mile . . .
Bonds
Bonds per mile . . .
Gross earnings . . .
Earnings per mile
Expenses
Expenses per mile
Operating ratio . . .
TABLE XVII
Comparative Statement of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company and the Savannah, Florida,
and Western Railway Company in 1900
Absorbing road
Atlantic Coast Line
R.R. Co.
Absorbed road
Savannah, Florida,
and Western
Ry. Co.
June 30, 1900:
Mileage owned
1,716
$34,280,500
19,950
24,526,500
13,640
7,586,745
4,306
4,311,598
2,450
57%
1,025
$9,432,900
9 205
28,906,'50O
28,201
4,390,650
4,283
3,202,153
3,123
73%
Stock
Stock per mile
Bonds
Bonds per mile
Gross earnings
Earnings per mile
Expense
Expense per mile
Operating ratio
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APPENDIX 181
TABLE XIX
Results of Work of Immigration and Agricultural
Department of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company
jr Number of heads of Number of new businett
families located enterprises located
1905 573 188
1906 241 334
1907 578 177
1908 667 154
1909 1,151 140
1910 2,966 168
1911 3,521 229
1912 3,844 215
1913 2,844 189
1914 2,913 207
1915 3,084 315
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
In few fields of investigation are the sources of information sd
widely scattered as in that of transporation. Those of the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad are no exception, and it has been
necessary to consult most of the libraries and collections located
in the states through which the road passes, as well as the Con-
gressional Library and the collection of the Bureau of Railway
Economics in Washington. The collection of manuscripts of
Lieutenant Maury and Governor Hammond in the manuscripts
division of the Congressional Library give an insight into the
economic conditions of Virginia and the Carolinas respectively.
The State Library of Virginia has a complete file of the Reports
of the Board of Public Works of that state. This file is invaluable
in any work connected with the internal improvements of the
state. This collection contains a complete set of Reports of the
Richmond and Petersburg and the Petersburg Railroads. This
is the only complete set of Reports of the former road. The copies
belonging to the road itself were destroyed when the Confederate
army evacuated Richmond in April, 1865. The only other set of
Reports of the latter road are in the office of the treasurer of the
company at Wilmington, North Carolina. This office has a com-
plete set of Reports of the Wilmington and Weldon Railroad
also. The next most valuable source of information in the
Virginia State Library is the file of newspapers. Unique among
these are the bound copies of the Railroad Advocate, published in
the early thirties at Rogersville, Tennessee, by an "association
of gentlemen." So far as is known this is the only file in existence.
The sole object of the paper was to champion the cause of rail-
roads against water transportation. The little town of Rogers-
ville is situated in the territory which would have been bene-
fited by the building of the Charleston and Cincinnati Railroad.
The Virginia State Library has also great numbers of manu-
scripts, but as yet they are not so arranged as to be of material
use to the investigator.
The North Carolina State Library has perhaps the best news-
paper file to be found anywhere on the South Atlantic Coast.
The North Carolina Historical Commission is bringing to light
many valuable documents and arranging them chronologically
under the heading of the name of the official. From these much
186 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
of the information with regard to the early rate controversies
and friction between the railroads and the Confederate govern-
ment, was secured.
The treasurer of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company
has in his office files of the Reports of many of the constituent
roads and copies of all contracts into which the road has entered.
Complete access was given to all of these. The officials have been
generous in furnishing all the information at their disposal and
documents in their possession.
The best single source of facts with reference to Georgia is to
be found in the DeRenne private library at Savannah, Georgia.
The books in this library have been catalogued alphabetically
according to subject and the catalogue published. The Univer-
sity of Georgia Library is particularly rich in early newspapers
of the state. The files run roughly from 1785 to 1845.
The chief single source of information with regard to the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad is, of course, the Reports of the
constituent roads. Many of these are not now in existence, hav-
ing been destroyed in the Baltimore and other fires. Enough,
however, have been preserved in the various railroad and finan-
cial publications and manuals, such as the Commercial and Fi-
nancial Chronicle, Railroad Gazette, American Railroad Journal,
Poor's Manual, and Vernon's Railroad Manual, to show the
changing financial condition of the roads.
Finally, many interesting sidelights were thrown on the history
of the road by personal interviews with men who have lived on
it and seen its development.
A Partial List of Sources Consulted
American Geographical Society, Bulletin of.
American Railroad Journal.
American State Papers.
Armour Car Lines Company. Contract with Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad Company, October 17, 1906, superseding one of 1903.
Treasurer's office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
Atlanta Constitution.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company Reports.
Atlantic Coast Line of South Carolina Reports.
Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia Reports.
Atlantic Coast Despatch contract, August 1, 1887. Treasurer's
office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wilmington,
N.C.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 187
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company.
Statement filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Reports of the Immigration and Agricultural Department.
Circular issued by Secretary Borden, December, 1907.
Circular to stockholders, January 15, 1914.
Agreement of consolidation with Savannah, Florida, and
Western Railway Company, April 10, 1902. Filed in office of
Secretary of Commonwealth of Virginia.
First consolidated mortgage, 1902.
Atlantic and Gulf Railroad Company Reports.
Baltimore Sun.
Bancroft, Joseph: Savannah, Census and Statistics.
Bonsteel, Jay A.: "Truck Soils of the Atlantic Coast Region."
Year Book of the United States Department of Agriculture, 1912.
Boston Courier. (1830.)
Brunswick and Western Railroad Company Reports.
Byrd, Colonel: History of the Dividing Line between Virginia and
North Carolina. Westover Manuscripts.
Callender: "Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of
the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations." Quarterly
Journal of Economics, November, 1902.
Carnegie Institution of Washington Publications, 1917. History
of Transportation in the United States before 1860. Prepared
under direction of B. H. Meyer by Caroline E. MacGill and
staff of collaborators.
Charleston and Savannah Railroad Company Reports.
Charleston Courier. (1839-40.)
Cheraw and Darlington Railroad Company Reports to legis-
lature of South Carolina, 1855-57.
Cole Collection of Acts of State Legislatures. Yale Law School
Library.
Commercial and Financial Chronicle.
Connecticut, Laws of.
Constitutional Whig, Richmond.
De Bow : Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States.
Fayetteville Journal, Fayetteville, North Carolina. (1829.)
Florida, Acts of.
Forrest, W. S. : Historical and Descriptive Sketches of Norfolk.
Gallatin's Report on Public Roads and Canals, 1808.
Georgia, Acts of.
Hadley: Railroad Transportation.
Hall: Travels in North America.
Hepburn, A. B. : Artificial Waterways and Commercial Development.
188 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Hodgson: Letters from North America.
House Miscellaneous Documents, Number 70, 41st Congress,
3d session, 1872-73. This document gives a complete history
of the James River and Kanawha Canal.
Howe : Historical Collections of Virginia.
Howinson; History of Virginia. Richmond, 1848.
Hulbert : Historic Highways of America.
Hunt's Merchant Magazine.
Internal Improvements Documents and Reports. North Caro-
lina State Library.
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports.
Johnson, Emory R. : History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce
of the United States.
Joseph, C. J., Tax Agent of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company: Unpublished manuscript on the tax laws of the six
states through which the road passes.
Kettell, in Eighty Years of Progress.
Latrobe: First Steamboat Voyage in Western Waters.
Lorraine, Edward, Chief Engineer: Report in Executive Docu-
ments, 41st Congress.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company Reports.
Lousiville and Nashville Railroad Company. Statements given
to the press by the officials of various railroads, 1902.
MacLaurin, John: Articles by Senex, Jr., in local newspapers on
"Wilmington in the Forties," reprinted in Sprunt, Chronicles
of the Cape Fear River.
Martin, Joseph : New and Comprehensive Gazetteer of Virginia.
Martineau, Harriet: Society in America.
Maury, Lieutenant, Executive Documents : 44th Congress, 1870-
71.
Meares, Walker : Wilmington, North Carolina. Personal interview.
Mills : Statistics of South Carolina.
New York Times.
Niles' Register.
Norfolk Herald.
North American Review. (1821.)
North Carolina, Acts of.
North Carolina Historical Commission, Raleigh.
Hoyt: Papers of A. D. Murphey.
Reprint of pamphlet on committee of investigation, 1815.
Dudley Letters.
Vance Letter File.
Letters of H. D. Bird.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 189
Northeastern Railroad Company of South Carolina Reports.
Olmsted: Travels in the Seaboard Slave States.
Petersburg Railroad, map of. State House, Richmond.
Petersburg Intelligencer.
Petersburg Railroad Company Reports.
Petersburg Times.
Phillips, U. B.: History of Transportation in the Eastern Cotton
Belt to 1860.
^oor's Manual.
lailroad Advocate.
Railroad Gazette.
Richmond Enquirer.
Richmond Times.
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad Company
Reports.
Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company Charter.
Richmond and Petersburg Railroad Company Reports.
Ringwalt: Development of Transportation Systems in the United
States.
Robinson, Moncure, Chief Engineer: Report of. Richmond, Vir-
ginia, 1836.
Royall, Mrs. : Southern Tour.
Savannah, Florida, and Western Railway Company Reports.
Smith : Story of Georgia and Georgia People.
South Carolina, Acts of.
South Carolina State Gazette and Columbia Advertiser. (1831.)
Southern Literary Messenger.
Sprunt, James: Chronicles of the Cape Fear River.
Star and North Carolina Gazette. (1828.)
Stephens, J. W., Agricultural and Immigration Agent: Com-
pendium of Attractions and Business Opportunities along the
Plant System of Railways. (1900.)
Swank : History of Iron in all Ages.
Tanner, H. S. : Description of the Canals and Railroads of the
United States.
United States Court Decisions:
230 U.S. 352. Minnesota Rate Case.
146 U.S. 279. Wilmington and Weldon Railroad vs. Alls-
brook.
13 Wall. 264. Wilmington and Weldon Railroad vs. Reid.
242 Fed. Reporter 300. Eastern Texas Railroad vs. Railroad
Commission of Texas
Vernon's Railroad Manual.
190 BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Virginia, A Geographical and Political Summary, published by
the Board of Immigration, 1876.
Virginia, Acts of General Assembly of.
Virginia, Appendix to Report of State Corporation Commission
of 1913.
Virginia, Reports of Board of Public Works to the General
Assembly of.
Weaver, C. C. : Internal Improvements in North Carolina to 1860.
Johns Hopkins University Historical Studies, 1903.
Weld, L. D. H.: Private Freight Cars and American Railroads.
White, E.: Report on Proposed Cheraw and Waccamaw Rail-
road, Fayetteville, North Carolina, 1837.
Whitehead, Z. W.: The Strawberry Industry of Eastern North
Carolina and especially along the various divisions of the At-
lantic Coast Line Railroad. Unpublished manuscript.
Wilmington, Columbia, and Augusta Railroad Company Re-
ports.
Wilmington Daily Journal.
Wilmington and Manchester Railroad Company Reports.
Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company Reports.
Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad Company. Reports of Ex-
amining and Accounts Committees, 1845.
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company Reports.
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad Company. Contract whereby
the company took a 99-year lease on the Wilmington, Colum-
bia, and Augusta Railroad Company, June 1, 1885. Treasurer's
office, Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company, Wilmington,
North Carolina.
INDEX
INDEX
Adams, Charles Francis, 139.
Alabama Midland Railroad, 136.
Alabama Terminal and Improve-
ment Company, see Alabama
Midland Railroad.
Albemarle Sound, 50.
American Improvement and Con-
struction Company, see Atlantic
Coast Line Company.
Armour Car Lines, 126.
Ashe, President of the Wilmington
and Weldon Railroad, 110.
Atlanta and West Point Railroad, 1.
Atlantic Coast Despatch, agree-
ment among railroads concern-
ing, 124.
Atlantic and Gulf Railroad, early
history of, 80; purpose of con-
struction of, 132; reorganization
of, 133; purchase of by H. B.
Plant, 133; constituent part of
the Savannah, Florida, and
Western Railroad, 134.
Atlantic Coast Line Company, pro-
visions of charter of, 140.
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Com-
pany, roads acquired by, 1; for-
mation of, 3.
Atlantic Coast Line of South Caro-
lina, roads consolidated into, 2;
formation of, 75; chartered, 143;
friendly suit against, 143; con-
stituent part of Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad, 144; leases Geor-
gia Railroad, 144.
Atlantic Coast Line of Virginia,
formation of, 2; charter of,
amended, 142.
Atlantic Steam Navigation Com-
pany, 14.
Augusta, largest inland cotton
market, 68.
Baltimore, connection with the
West, 10.
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 93.
Belmont, August, statement of, 150;
chairman of the board of direc-
tors of the Louisville and Nash-
ville Railroad, 148; places stock
of Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road on market, 148.
Bird, President of Petersburg Rail-
road, 31, 32, 33, 88.
Blockade runners, 112.
Board of Public Works of Virginia,
23, 24, 25, 45, 96.
Boston, connection with the West,
10.
Brunswick and Albany Railroad,
early history of, 79; sale of, 135.
Brunswick and Western Railroad,
constituent part of the Savannah,
Florida, and Western Railroad,
145.
Caldwell, President of the Univer-
sity of North Carolina, railroad
proposed by, 52.
California Fruit Growers' Express,
126.
Camden, South Carolina, inland
market, 68.
Cape Fear River, entrance to, 50;
outlet for the products of North
Carolina, 53; formation of bars
in, 53; appropriation of Congress
for the improvement of, 53.
Central of Georgia Railroad, lease
of Georgia Railroad by, 144.
Charleston, decline of trade of, 8,
71; population of, 73; exports of,
73.
Charleston and Hamburg Railroad,
76.
Charleston and Savannah Railroad,
early history of, 81; destruction
of, by General Sherman, 133;
sale of, 133; conversion of bonds
of, into stock of, 134; constituent
part of Savannah, Florida, and
Western Railroad, 145.
Chattanooga, convention of south-
ern railroads at, 107.
194
INDEX
Cheraw and Darlington Railroad,
75; interest of Charleston in, 77;
construction and cost of, 78; con-
stituent part of Atlantic Coast
Line of South Carolina Railroad,
131, 143.
Cheraw, location of, 77.
Chesterfield Railroad, transfer of
coal from, 40.
Civil War, effect of, on railroad
consolidation in the South, 139.
Clover Hill Railroad, lease of, 44, 86.
Coal mines in Chesterfield County,
Virginia, 19.
Coastwise trade, interruption of,
during War of 1812, 3.
Columbia, South Carolina, inland
market, 68.
Competition, 84, 91, 111, 119, 120.
Confederate government, contro-
versy of, with railroads, 111.
Cotton, culture of, in the South-
west, 6; effect of culture of, on
population, 6; effects of steam-
boat on marketing of, 6; inven-
tion of cotton gin, 6.
Cumberland Road, 5.
Dickinson, P. K., report of, on a
New England railroad, 57.
Dismal Swamp Canal, history of,
and effect of, on trade, 14, 15.
Dudley, E. B., Governor of North
Carolina, 54, 57, 88, 96; ex officio
chairman of the board of direc-
tors of the Wilmington and
Raleigh Railroad, 59.
Eagle Island, 76.
Ellis, President of the Richmond
and Petersburg Railroad, 104.
Erie Canal, effects of, on exports
through New York, 5, 10.
Fall line, location and description
of, 4.
Fayetteville, focus of wagon trade,
55.
Fredericksburg, location, descrip-
tion, and history of, 17.
Freemont, Chief of Corps of State
Artillery and Superintendent of
the Wilmington and Weldon
Railroad, 111.
Gallatin, Albert, report of, 4.
Gates, John W., buys stock of the
Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road, 149; statement of, 149.
Georgia, decline of population of,
71.
Georgia Railroad, joint lease of,
144.
Gill, E. H., Superintendent, evacu-
ation of Richmond described by,
103; statement regarding travel,
105.
Greene, James S., 60, 61.
Greenesville and Roanoke Railroad,
relationship of, with the Peters-
burg Railroad, 26.
Gulf Stream, bars along North Car-
olina coast formed by, 50; effect
of, on transatlantic shipping, 70.
Hawley, Edwin, member of syndi-
cate, 150.
Inconvenience of early railroad
travel, an illustration of, 94, 95.
Internal improvements, a conven-
tion to encourage, held at Ra-
leigh, 54.
James River, water power of, at
Richmond, 19; rebuilding of
bridge over, 104.
James River and Kanawha Canal,
history of, 18.
Lee, General Robert E., telegram
of, to Governor Vance, of North
Carolina, 112.
Long and short haul, 90.
Louisville and Nashville Railroad,
majority of stock of, owned by
the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad
Company, 1 ; leases Georgia Rail-
road, 144; purchase of stock of,
144; activity of stock of, 147;
contest for control of, 147.
Lynchburg, location, description,
and history of, 18, 19.
MacRea, Alexander, 59.
McFarland, W. H., first President
of the Richmond and Petersburg
Railroad, 39.
Manchester and Augusta Railroad,
INDEX
195
constituent part of Atlantic Coast
Line of South Carolina, 143.
Manchester and Petersburg Turn-
pike Company, 38, 39.
Martineau, Harriet, 68, 72.
Mayers, J. M., 135.
Migration from coast inland, 72.
Morgan, J. P., and Company,
statement of, regarding the
Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road, 149.
Murphey, A. D., report on internal
improvements proposed in North
Carolina, 51, 5i.
Naval stores, decrease of, in North
Carolina, 87.
Navigation companies, incorpora-
tion of, in North Carolina, 51.
New England, trade of North Car-
olina with, 56.
New Inlet, advantages of, to Con-
federate blockade runners, 53.
New Orleans as cotton market, 7;
benefited by decline of Charles-
ton and Savannah, 8.
New York Central lines, 139.
New York State, manufacturing
in, 72.
Norfolk, history of trade and trans-
portation of, 13; attempts to
secure foreign trade, 13, 14;
evacuation of, 108.
Norfolk and Port Walthall Steam-
boat Association, 43.
North Carolina, trade of eastern
section of, 28; condition of, dur-
ing the colonial period, 48 ; trans-
fer of the election of governor of,
from the legislature to the people,
48; configuration of, 49; drain of
population of, to the West, 49;
decline of exports of, 49; market
for products of, outside of State,
49; draining of specie from, 49;
profit of business of, to other
states, 49, 52; inlets off the coast
of, 50; interest of, in internal
improvements, 51; internal im-
provement fund of, 52; division
of sentiment of people of, as to
direction of railroads, 54; trade
with West Indies, 55 ; tardiness
of, in securing railroads, 56;
Board of Internal Improvements
of, 59; literary fund of, invested
in Wilmington and Weldon Rail-
road, 63.
Northeastern Railroad of South
Carolina, chartered, 76; interest
of Charleston in, 76; damage of,
during Civil War, 130; constit-
uent part of Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad of South Carolina, 143.
Ocracoke Inlet, 50.
Pamlico Sound, 50.
Panic, 1837, effect of, on Petersburg
Railroad, 27; on Richmond and
Petersburg Railroad, 39; 1873,
on railroad consolidation in
South, 139.
Peedee River, navigation on, 77.
Pennsylvania, caravans in, 16.
Pennsylvania Lines, 139.
Petersburg Railroad, provisions of
charter of, 22; opening of, 25;
contract with Post Office De-
partment, 26, 31; competition of,
with Dismal Swamp Canal, 29;
inadequacy of track of, 30; mis-
management of, 31; financial
condition of, 32; reduction of
fare on, 32; wages paid by, 40;
statistics of, 87; contract of,
with F. E. Rives, 97; new route
opened by, 100; operation of, in
connection with Richmond and
Petersburg Railroad, 105; lease
by, of rolling stock of the Sea-
board and Roanoke Railroad,
108; deterioration of, 108, 109;
attack upon, by Federal troops,
109; operation of, by Federal
Government, 110; reorganization
of, 120, 121; merged into the At-
lantic Coast Line of Virginia, 142.
Petersburg and Weldon Railroad,
105.
Philadelphia, connection with the
West, 10.
Physical connections, 105, 116, 117,
118, 119.
Plank roads, 55.
Plant, H. B., owner of Savannah,
Florida, and Western Railroad,
145; contest over will of, 146.
196
INDEX
Plant System, see Savannah, Flor-
ida, and Western Railroad.
Pole boats, use of, on shallow
streams, 56.
Portsmouth and Roanoke Railroad,
failure of, 32, 97; opposition to
charter of, 30, 96; controversy of,
with F. E. Rives, 97.
Port Walthall branch, 86; abandon-
ment of, 104.
Post Office Department, relations
with the Wilmington and Raleigh
Railroad, 62.
Raleigh and Gaston Railroad, 26;
relationship of, with Petersburg
Railroad, 26, 27; cost of, 57.
Rate discrimination, early cases of,
90; justification for, 91.
"Rebecca Edwards," first schooner
to pass through the Dismal
Swamp Canal, 14.
Regulation, conflicting federal and
state, 158, 159.
Rhodes, Holden, President of Rich-
mond and Petersburg Railroad, 39.
Richmond, location, description,
and history of, 17, 18.
Richmond and Petersburg Connec-
tion Company, 116.
Richmond and Petersburg and
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac Connection Company,
116.
Richmond and Petersburg Rail-
road, mail contract with govern-
ment, 41 ; description of track of,
41, 42; bridges of, 42; contro-
versy of, with Post Office Depart-
ment, 45; connecting link be-
tween other roads, 84; statistics
of, 87; main line of the Confeder-
acy into Richmond, 102; receipts
of, in depreciated paper money,
102; damage of cars of, during the
Civil War, 103; burning of bridge
of, over James River, 103; mail
contract with Confederate gov-
ernment, 103; operation of, with
Petersburg Railroad, 105; pur-
chase of Petersburg Railroad, by,
142.
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac Railroad, 83.
Rives, F. E., controversy of, with
Portsmouth and Roanoke Rail-
road, 97; contract of, with the
Petersburg Railroad, 97.
Robinson, Edward, President of
Richmond, Fredericksburg, and
Potomac Railroad, 33.
Robinson, Wirt, President of Rich-
mond and Petersburg Railroad,
33.
Sand bars, formation of, in North
Carolina rivers, 50.
Santee Canal, 69, 77.
Savannah, decline of, 73; nature of
exports of, 73; first shipment of
cotton from, 73; conditions of
shipping of, 74; dependence of,
on North for supplies, 74.
"Savannah," first transatlantic
steamship, 8.
Savannah, Florida, and Western
group, 132; nature of traffic
handled by, 136, 137; formed by
consolidation of other roads, 145;
purchased by Atlantic Coast
Line Railroad, 145, 146.
Schlatter, Charles, 135.
Seaboard Air Line, 139.
Seaboard and Roanoke Railroad,
89.
Shipbuilding, decline of, in the
South, 70; statistics of, 70; gov-
ernment aid to, 71.
Slaves, employment of, in railroad
construction, 89; ownership of,
by Wilmington and Weldon Rail-
road, 90.
South Carolina, early products of,
69; decline of population of, 71.
Southern Railroad, 139.
Southside Railroad, 34.
Spencer, President of Southern
Railroad, 150.
State regulation, impotence of, 98.
Steamboat, invention of, 6; use of,
on western rivers, 6.
Steamship, effects of, on ocean
transportation, 8, 9.
Suffolk, price of staves at, 50.
Tarboro branch, completion of, 59.
Through ticket, controversy con-
cerning, 92, 93, 98, 99.
INDEX
197
Truck-growing, in North Carolina,
122, 123, 124, 125.
Turpentine, production of, in North
Carolina, 48.
United States Trust Company,
146.
Vance, Governor of North Caro-
lina, 89.
Virginia, senate rejects bill relative
to Baltimore and Ohio Railroad,
10; economic conditions of, 10;
attempts at railroad construc-
tion, 10; jealousy of, toward
other states, 10; attitude of,
toward internal improvements,
11; jealousy of tidewater portion
of, toward western portion of, 11,
12; topographical description of,
12.
Virginia and Tennessee Railroad,
89.
Washington, George, interest of, in
connecting East and West, 5.
Western and Atlantic Railroad,
completion of, 8.
Western Railway of Alabama, 1.
West Virginia, caravans in, 16.
Williams, President of Seaboard
Air Line Railroad, 150.
Wilmington, as trade center, 55;
prices at, in 1864, 114.
Wilmington, Charlotte, and Ruth-
erford Railroad; dismantling of,
113.
Wilmington, Columbia, and Au-
gusta Railroad, chartered, 75;
sold under foreclosure, 75; a
naval stores road, 85; destruc-
tion of, during the Civil War, 127;
gauge of, standardized, 127; reor-
ganization of, 128, 129; provi-
sions of charter of, 128; leases
Wilmington and Weldon Rail-
road, 128; leased by Wilmington
and Weldon Railroad, 130; con-
stituent part of Atlantic Coast
Line of South Carolina, 143.
Wilmington and Manchester Rail-
road, see Wilmington, Columbia,
and Augusta Railroad.
Wilmington and Raleigh Railroad,
charter amended, 57; incorpora-
tion of, 57; provisions of charter
of, 58; subscription to stock of,
by North Carolina, 59; early
equipment of, 60; celebration on
occasion of completion of, 60;
endorsement of bonds of, by
North Carolina, 62; loss of
trains on, 62; subscription of, to
stock of Wilmington and Man-
chester Railroad, 63; securities
of, sold in England, 65; statistics
of, 87.
Wilmington and Weldon Railroad,
110; how formed, 2; constituent
part of the Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad, 2; sections of country
united by, 53; owner of slaves,
90; effects of blockade on, 112;
attack upon, by Federal forces,
113; taxation of, by Confederate
government, 114; deterioration
of, 114, 115; damage to, by
Confederate forces, 115; Con-
federate securities held by, 116.
Wolffe, Frederick, 135.
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